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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Why Study Freud? 
Why should students who will live well into the 21st century study the 
thought of a m a n who was born just past the midway mark of the 19th? 
More so, why study the thought of a m a n whose major doctrines and ideas 
have been proposed, debated, and judged by numerous authorities and 
scholars since his first major publications in the 1890s? Finally, have not 
modern scientists and other authorities refuted those doctrines? The truth 
of this latter question seems supported by the fact that most professional 
psychologists and psychiatrists do not consider themselves Freudian in any 
significant manner. 
Yet Freud will not go away. His name and his work still permeate 
much of the thought of our age, from literary criticism to popular culture. 
More importantly, there remains a flourishing body of scholars and scien-
tists affiliated with institutes which carry out his basic work. 
But the best reason, I believe, for studying Freud is the sheer intellec-
tual joy he affords the serious student. That joy is the pleasure of following 
a great mind ask and attempt to answer questions of supreme importance 
to ourselves. Freud's famous essays on childhood sexuality, on dreams, on 
social relations, and on religion are documents on a heroic scale. They are 
gripping in their own right. In addition, Freud's intense style and wit give 
his work a rare literary quality. This fact was recognized when he was 
awarded the prestigious Goethe Prize for scientific writing. 
Finally, people read Freud because they seek to understand them-
selves. His most famous book, the Interpretation of Dreams (1900), is a 
remarkably open analysis of his own dreams, complete with detailed 
accounts of the ugly, embarrassing, and petty elements that typify a 
person's private life. In it Freud aims both to demonstrate the logic of 
dream interpretation and to show the truths that dreams hide. One cannot 
read Freud for long without asking oneself the same questions and, under 
fortunate circumstances, engaging in the same pursuit. 
Freud and the Love of Truth 
That pursuit is the pursuit of the truth. Ah, but what is truth? When 
asked this way the question takes on such weight that ordinary mortals 
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cannot hope for much illumination. The truth Freud sought and loved is 
not the truth of theologians and metaphysicians. Although he too addressed 
himself to their questions and did not usually denigrate their answers, his 
route to the problem was radically different. By far the greatest number of 
questions Freud himself raised appear, when compared to those of reli-
gious thinkers, downright trivial. H e sought to answer questions that arise 
from ordinary human complaints: why a young girl falls into sudden and 
inexplicable faints, or why a young boy wakes up with seemingly endless 
nightmares about a large animal, or why a graduate student cannot finish 
her course work. 
While these kinds of questions are of vital concern to the individual 
patients, they do not exercise the minds of great philosophers nor do they 
pertain to the fate of empires, nor the advance of culture. Yet these ques-
tions are the raw material with which Freud worked. Their scientific value 
lay in their ability to open up an unexplored road to understanding the 
human mind. 
One of Freud's great discoveries was that a person's actions, thoughts, 
memories, hopes, wishes, fears, and dreams, are of a single piece. Many 
had said that dreams, for example, were simply the mind working at idle. 
Freud discovered that dream thoughts were intimately connected to one's 
deepest feelings and oldest memories. To use one of his favorite metaphors, 
the psychoanalyst is like an archaeologist who is willing to explore an 
ancient garbage d u m p in order to find the pieces that are missing from 
view. As we will see when we read "Dora," Freud takes this metaphor 
seriously when he reconstructs, using the bits and pieces of material that his 
patient gives him, not only her history but that of her parents as well. H e 
can do this and hope for success because he believes that every piece will fit 
together, that every item of behavior is finally the product of forces and 
motives that one can comprehend. 
Discovering the truth about one's "meaningless" actions, therefore, 
necessarily means that one comes closer to a state of unification, where one 
understands and can control one's actions. For example, when Dora comes 
to understand that her coughing is a disguised form of sexual longing, she 
stops coughing. Does it always work? Does insight into one's actions always 
bring about this kind of dramatic change? Is psychoanalysis, which is the 
minute examination of a patient's behavior, always successful? The sim-
plest answer is no. Can insight help promote mental health? Can it provide 
one with more energy and more strength with which to face ordinary life? 
Can it serve to free one from terrors and unnameable dread? The simplest 
answer here is yes. 
Freud loved the truth and psychoanalysis is a search for the truth 
because human beings are, ultimately, unified beings. To put this thought 
another way, because human beings are unified, because every action is 
finally meaningful, falsehood in one area of one's life, like sexuality, 
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distorts necessarily the whole of one's life. In Freud's language, when we 
distort the truth about ourselves w e sabotage our most vital ability, the 
ability to distinguish true and false. Even petty lies, boasts, small devious-
nesses, are costly because w e distort both our memory and our natural 
capacity to distinguish the truth. Because a person is a whole, unified 
being, even if he or she feels otherwise, lying is a self-inflicted wound. One 
may easily verify this claim by recalling, in strictest privacy, some past 
event in which one was a little humiliated or defeated in some measure, 
and then trying to reconstruct the exact sequence of events: w ho said what, 
how one stumbled, etc. It is much easier to recall one's victories than to 
recall one's defeats, unless those defeats were so great that one can now 
think of nothing else! 
This leads us to a final question. If lying to oneself is so costly, if it 
impairs the ego, why do it? The obvious answer is because it helps reduce 
the amount of psychical pain outright. Lying is effective, especially in the 
short run when an angry parent, for example, is searching for the child 
who ruined his book. As one matures one lies less often. Rather one learns 
to prevaricate, distort, fib, equivocate, and also to pervert, misrepresent, 
slant, twist, whitewash and otherwise stretch the truth in order to protect 
oneself. 
The Goals of This Book 
The primary goal of this short book is to interrogate systematically 
Freud's major essays on religion. To do that well requires us to know what 
he is talking about when he compares religious rituals, for example, to 
obsessional actions. And to understand those kinds of comparisons we must 
understand his general theory of personality and character. There are 
many excellent texts that summarize, criticize, and develop Freud's gen-
eral theory. In the course of this handbook I will refer to them as well as to 
other relevant studies. However, none of them is quite like this handbook 
because none of them is written in the interrogative mode. 
I have chosen to structure this handbook around a series of question 
sheets because they permit m e to reach m y second, pedagogical goal: to 
illuminate how Freud thinks, not simply document what he thinks. The 
chapters that follow might be seen as scaffolds erected alongside Freud's 
texts. I have tried to plant them square and near enough the edifice so that 
w e can study it with care. But just as a good mason does not confuse the 
scaffolding with the original building, so too we will not confuse these 
chapters on Freud's thought with Freud or psychoanalysis itself. 
M y third goal is to elucidate the way Freud understood religion: it is an 
almost-good-enough attempt to promote human happiness. Freud's under-
standing of religion is essentially tragic. Like the hero of classic tragedy, 
religion is an entity that is noble but inherently flawed, tainted by birth, 
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and incapable of adjusting to the real world of ordinary mortals. 
A final introductory question: W h y not just read Freud's o w n book, 
The Future of an Illusion, and forego these other texts? It would seem to 
contain his clearest opinions about religion. This is so. It is a clear, well-
written summary of his major opinions about the nature of religion and 
about its faults and its virtues. The Future of an Illusion contains Freud's 
opinions about religion, but it does not permit us to see how he arrived at 
those opinions. 
Freud claims consistently that psychoanalysis is a science of the mind. 
If so, it is more than a philosophical system, or a set of religious insights, or 
a moral code that one can comprehend only aesthetically. A science is a 
method of inquiry into the truth of things. It can be transmitted from 
teacher to student. It can be criticized and developed by subsequent 
thinkers. 
If Freud is correct in claiming that psychoanalysis is a science^ then we 
should be able to reconstruct the reasoning that produced his particular 
judgments, whether those judgments are about neuroses or about religion 
itself. More so, a science should allow one to advance beyond the discover-
ies of its originater. Its future must be more than the future of an illusion. 
The debate about the scientific nature of psychoanalysis is still raging. For 
our purposes I will assume that that question remains open and that w e can 
therefore set out on the seas of Freud's thought. 
What This Book Will Not Do 
First, and most obvious, it will not serve as an introduction to all of 
Freud's thought. I have not focused any questions on two immense areas in 
his writings: the theory of technique, which includes questions of therapy 
and cure, and the theory of mind, which includes questions of metapsycho-
logical explanations. 
The theory of psychoanalytic technique, how one engages the patient, 
overcomes resistances, and initiates the curative process, is indirectly 
related to Freud's critique of religion. There are fascinating connections 
between psychoanalytic cure, for example, and ritual confession. But I see 
no way to make those connections clear without a lengthy excursion into 
Freud's general theory of therapy. 
Freud's metapsychology is another kettle of fish. Where the essays on 
therapy require one to examine one's actual behavior, and ideally one's 
behavior under analysis, the essays on metapsychology are purely theoreti-
cal treatises that attempt to account for psychoanalytic observations. In a 
somewhat oversimplified sense, the metapsychology is to the clinical the-
ory as linguistics is to learning how to read. One m a y take part in the ana-
lytic process, as patient or therapist, just as one may read easily without 
recourse to theory of how those processes occur. 
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How to Use This Book 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sig-
m u n d Freud (hereafter referred to as the Standard Edition or SE) has 23 
volumes of text and a single volume of indexes. These contain more than 
7,000 pages or roughly about four and a half million words. N o one is going 
to read or comprehend them in a single term of college level work. 
This book should be used as one might employ a local guide to a for-
eign country about which one knows little. Just as there are many ways to 
explore England, so too there are many ways to explore the Standard Edi-
tion. M y route has three major links: (1) an overview, (2) Freud on psychic 
pain, and (3) the analysis of religion. I have tried to make each of these 
links both independent of every other, and yet reasonably tied together so 
that one might read the sections in order. If you are by yourself on this trip 
you may well choose to linger where a group of classmates or teacher 
might not. 
If this book is used in a class I believe it might serve to supplement a 
teachers lectures and perhaps serve as a guide to independent study. Of 
course it might also serve as an opponent against which one may contend 
and triumph. I have used these kinds of question sheets myself for seven 
years or so and I a m now addicted to them. M y hope is that they will serve 
both teachers and students and help them take up one of the greatest chal-
lenges afforded us, a conversation with Freud. 
References and Texts 
All my Freud references are to the Standard Edition. Some teachers 
and many students will not have immediate access to these 24 volumes 
(though any university library should have them). However, I work 
through each text systematically, using Freud's chapter headings as m y 
major subheadings. Hence one can follow m y questions even if one has a 
text the page numbers of which do not correspond to those of the SE. Each 
of the texts I discuss is available in good paperback editions. 
The core psychoanalytic literature, including major books and psycho-
analytic journals, is much larger than 100,000 items. An ideal handbook 
would cross-reference those items to these questions and so give the reader 
a truly useful m a p to this immense literature. But this is not an ideal text. 
Given the confines of severe page limitations I can only list a minimal 
research literature in the appendix. The reference section has four parts: 
Freud's work; texts on Freud the man; texts on the history and theory of 
psychoanalysis; and a list of prominent psychoanalytic journals. 
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FREUD'S LECTURES O N PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (SE 11) 1909 
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis 
(SE 15 & 16) 1915-1917 
Freud was one of the very best expositors of psychoanalysis (spelled 
"psycho-analysis" only in the SE). H e was keenly aware of the public's 
fascination with his science and he recognized the value of keeping them 
informed about it. Hence he took great care in composing popular lec-
tures. (For additional information on introductions to psychoanalytic 
thought and therapy see the texts listed in the appendixes.) 
Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis 
(SE 11) 1909 
Though very brief and when compared to the Introductory Lectures 
of 1916-1917, of less stature, these five short lectures are an excellent 
overview of the major points Freud will pursue in the longer, and more 
technical series. One can read them at one sitting and so gain a begin-
ning orientation to the subject matter at hand. 
First Lecture 
Technical Terms 
Trauma; absence; hysterical paralysis; conscious and unconscious; "talk-
ing cure"; affect; suppression; displacement 
1 Every reasonable reader will wonder how the physician or thera-
pist is able to tell whether or not a patient's symptoms are caused 
by physical factors, emotional ones, or a combination of the two 
types. Does Freud help us with this question? One clue is that 
symptoms produced by emotional shock would seem to be pri-
marily psychological and hence treatable by psychological means 
(p. 10). Is this sufficient in every case? 
2 What was it about Anna O.'s states of "absence" that demon-
strated they were produced by psychological causes? Were her 
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actions during the states of "absence" causally related to previous 
experiences? W h e n Breuer began to treat her symptoms he used 
hypnosis to induce a synthetic state of "absence." W h y would this 
seem a reasonable method to follow? 
3 "... Our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences" (p. 16) is a 
famous statement taken from Freud's and Breuer's joint book, 
Studies on Hysteria (SE 2). Strictly speaking, is it true? That is, is 
it merely the accurate memory of a painful event in their past 
which haunts them or something additional? Note that Freud 
adds the phrase "mnemic symbols" to his fuller explication of this 
dictum. W h y is that a more adequate summary of his claim? 
4 H o w does he argue from the clinical observations of Anna's "dou-
ble conscience" to a theorem about conscious and unconscious 
mental states? What evidence can he offer to suggest that an 
"unconscious" mental state can influence a conscious mental state in 
a normal person? Is Freud's goal to erect a theory of pathology only? 
5 The last paragraph in this lecture ought to be read very slowly 
and with great care. If w e are fortunate w e will understand it 
now, at the beginning, and recall it when Freud's exposition 
becomes complex and, sometimes, contradictory. 
This is another way of saying that Freud feels it is a mark of his 
scientific goals and scientific honesty that his accounts are often 
incomplete and his theories subject to change without notice. This 
makes the task of his readers (and expositors) especially difficult. 
W h y should we, therefore, learn to suspect a theoretician whose 
account is full, complete, and rigorously deductive? 
Second Lecture 
Technical Terms 
Dissociation; resistance repression; pressure technique; dynamic; substi-
tute symptoms; sublimation 
6 Freud studied with some of the most famous psychiatrists in 
Europe. For the most part, he says, they searched for physiologi-
cal explanations of mental disorders like hysteria. So did Freud. 
Yet he gave up that particular hope. What observations were 
crucial to that decision? H o w did the success of the "pressure 
technique" demonstrate that he could forego the concept of 
"absence" and no longer had to hypnotize his patients? 
7 What is the sequence of clinical trials that gave rise to the concept 
of "resistance" (p. 24)? Is this concept a clinical observation or 
clinical generalization? That is, would any neutral observer of 
such patients come to agree with Freud's use of this term? 
Freud's Lectures on Psychoanalysis 3 
8 To illustrate this central concept and its relationship to the equally 
important one of repression, Freud uses an analogy drawn from a 
public event, namely, his lecture. W h y is this an especially apt 
choice, given what w e know of the doctor-patient relationship 
Freud experienced during the period he employed the pressure 
technique? Compare the metaphors Freud used to describe intra-
psychic conflict with the metaphors and models Breuer, Charcot, 
and Bernheim and even Anna O. herself used to describe hysteria. 
9 W h y does he say that the concept of "repression" is only the begin-
ning of a psychological theory (p. 26) and not the conclusion? H o w 
is repression an essentially "dynamic" concept? What underlying 
implications does this term have, especially given its etymology, for 
Freud's general orientation to psychological theory? 
10 A "symptom" is a substitute for the repressed idea (p. 27). What is 
the implied analogy here? Can physical symptoms of organic 
diseases be said to have representatives or to act as substitutes? If 
neurotic symptoms are, as Freud says, capable of forming substi-
tutes can one predict which behaviors or thoughts or dream images 
a particular kind of patient will manifest in his or her treatment? Is 
psychoanalysis a kind of history or a kind of empirical investigation 
of unchanging patterns of psychological function? 
Third Lecture 
Technical Terms 
Word Association Test; complex; free associations; psychological deter-
minism; dream work; manifest dream and latent dream thoughts; con-
densation and displacement 
11 Freud's gentle irony about his prejudice (p. 29) deserves careful 
consideration. O n what grounds did he proceed to tell his patients 
that even while awake, that is, not under hypnosis, every one of 
their thoughts (their associations) would prove of value to the 
analysis. At first, he says, this was confirmed by the obvious paths 
their thoughts took. But eventually their associations became more 
and more tenuous. W h y was it a mistake for him to agree with 
these (initial) patients and reject these latter kind of associations? 
12 His adherence to the principle of psychological determinism per-
mits him to explain why some associations are only apparently 
irrelevant to the precipitating trauma. H o w ? H o w does his expla-
nation of severely distorted associations fit into a comprehensive 
dynamic psychology? 
13 Once again, to illustrate an especially important—and original— 
part of his theory he uses an analogy, a joke, drawn not from 
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science, but from a rather complex social interaction (pp. 30-31). 
In the joke it was the wit and skill of the connoisseur that permit-
ted him to make the allusion to the Savior on which the entire 
story turns. Given Freud's analogy, to which aspect of the mind 
(sometimes termed the "mental apparatus") must w e then assign 
skills of a similar nature? 
14 The analysis of associations, of dreams, and of parapraxes serves 
the psychoanalyst in his or her attempt to discover the uncon-
scious (pp. 32-33). What are the patient's responsibilities in the 
enterprise (according to Freud in this text at this time)? 
15 Are most people skeptical of the claims psychoanalysts make 
about the unconscious motives that animate us all? Psychoanalysis 
is a science that emerged through the treatment of "nervous" 
patients by medical doctors. What has it got to do with people 
like ourselves? W h y are dreams so important to Freud's presenta-
tion and to his general theory? 
16 H o w are we, his listeners and readers, akin to neurotics, and even 
perverts and profoundly disturbed psychiatric patients? What fact 
of our daily life, one to which most of us have immediate access, 
is a replica of all these mental disturbances? What is "sufficiently 
wonderful" (p. 34) about dreams themselves? 
17 To how many things may the term "dream" refer as it is used in 
ordinary conversation? And to how many distinct mental contents 
does Freud's use of the term refer? Which of the terms, manifest 
dream or latent dream thoughts, refers to the "dream-like" prod-
uct with which we are most familiar? 
18 Freud says the analysis of dreams is the royal road to understand-
ing the unconscious functioning of the mind. W h y is it also the 
road that permits him, a dream interpreter, to understand neu-
rotic symptoms? H o w does the technical term "repression" help 
him explain both irrational dream imagery and irrational neurotic 
symptoms? H o w is the "dream-work" (an odd enough term) 
related to repression? 
19 O n p. 36 Freud uses technical terms (condensation, displacement, 
sublimations, reaction formation) without defining them or giving 
examples. H e will do both later on in the Introductory Lectures, 
to which we turn after this section. Yet one can make a rough 
approximation of their meaning by comparing them to those 
terms which have opposite meanings. (And what are those?) 
20 Freud then turns to discuss "faulty actions" or as his English trans-
lators call them, "parapraxes." Most people, he says, are perfectly 
aware of such events or actions and yet almost always consider 
them to be meaningless, as if they were accidents. Which great 
principle of psychoanalytic theory does this opinion violate? 
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21 If Freud is correct in his assessment of one's usual response to 
parapraxes—that is, that one brands them as pointless accidents— 
why must one analyze one's own examples? This call to examine 
one's own life in light of psychoanalytic claims is unavoidable. It 
enrages and even disgusts many people who feel Freud is not 
playing fair, as it were, philosophically, to force them to assume 
the validity of his most contentious claims. Yet which element of 
his general theory requires us to engage in a minimum of self-
analysis? 
22 What does the "arrogance of consciousness" (p. 39) mean? If Freud 
is correct, it means that we too, as students of his thought, cannot 
understand him fully without analyzing our own parapraxes, and, 
eventually, our dreams. In attempting this kind of analysis it may 
help if you keep notes on a day-to-day basis (though once the topic 
of parapraxes is introduced and explained in a public forum there 
emerge suddenly numerous "Freudian slips," often committed by 
the lecturer). 
Fourth Lecture 
Technical Terms 
Libido; instincts (drives); fixation; regression; nuclear complex; perver-
sions; pregenital sexuality; object choice; erotogenic zones 
23 Freud is famous for his theories of childhood sexuality, most of 
which are misrepresented when they appear in short chapters in 
psychology textbooks. H o w did he come to place so much empha-
sis on sexual (or erotic) factors in the development of children, 
and, later, in the development of neurotic conditions in adults? 
W h y does he say he was "converted" to the libido theory only 
later (p. 40)? 
24 What can he mean by the phrase "under the spell of the combina-
tion of prudery and prurience" which he says typifies the attitude 
most adults have toward sexuality? Is this true in our "modern" 
age too? Give an example of this combination in a contemporary 
setting. If one can find no such illustrations how do you account 
for the discrepancy between Freud's judgment of his time and 
your findings? 
25 W h e n he raises the issue of childhood sexuality (p. 41) he is ready 
for a stream of abuse and condemnation. Would his findings arouse 
the same sentiments in our times? What is the standard "modern" 
opinion about childhood sexuality now? Can we distinguish be-
tween that "manifest" opinion, as it is expressed in newspapers and 
baby-books, like that of Dr. Spock, and "latent" opinions on the 
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same subject? What kinds of observations would be required to 
make such a comparison a valid and convincing one? 
26 If people bother to think of childhood sexuality at all, they usually 
conceive it as a single kind of behavior, involving the genitals, mod-
eled on adult (heterosexual) intercourse. W h y is this "adultomor-
phic" opinion wrong, according to Freud's research? H o w many 
sexual instincts (or "drives") are there operating in the child? 
27 W h y does he say that children have a "dissociated" sexual life that 
is brought to order only after puberty—and sometimes not ever? 
And why, according to his summary on p. 44, must w e conclude 
that whatever the number of component instincts or pregenital 
instincts the total will always be an even number? 
28 This entire discussion of childhood sexuality is schematic and 
therefore not fully persuasive. A m o n g its least clear statements is 
the assertion about "coprophilia" (p. 45). (Although he does not 
say it here or on the preceding page, this kind of interest or com-
pulsion ought to be subsumed under anal, pregenital trends.) 
Surely this is a disgusting topic, one pertinent only to the most 
esoteric of psychiatric specialities—hardly worth mentioning in a 
distinguished setting like that of Clark University or to a group of 
refined readers. 
It is true that most (adult) people do not manifest warm and 
accepting feelings toward their feces, nor toward other bodily 
products, like sputum, nor toward that of others. But is anality a 
rare event exhibited only in the actions of the very ill? Consider 
the range of obscene terms which employ anal allusions—why are 
they so popular and so powerful? 
29 Since all adults have been children, and all children manifest 
infantile sexuality, it follows that all adults will have had to sur-
mount those earlier, pregenital trends (usually by repression) in 
order to achieve adult, genital sexuality. If trouble then occurs in 
their sexual life, "the repression that took place during the course 
of development will be broken through at the precise points at 
which infantile fixations occurred" (p. 46). W h y ? What metaphor 
or model underlies this image of infantile sexuality "breaking 
through" the repression barrier? (Note the entire set of metaphors 
which Freud employs to describe the intermingling of pregenital 
trends.) 
30 You may be struck by Freud's use of the term "object," as on p. 47 
where he speaks of the child's first choice of an object to love. It 
would appear that this technical term means merely "person"—so 
why does he persist in using "object"? Either he is trying for and 
achieving a measure of obscurity or he uses the term for a particular 
reason. And what might that be? (Note that pregenital sexual 
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trends, the original collection of diverse "instincts," also have ob-
jects, or, better, "objectives.") 
31 To which set of mental factors—intellectual capacities or sexual 
interests—does Freud ascribe dominance? In his discussion of the 
nuclear complex, which he was to rename shortly the Oedipus 
complex, he says that even after it is repressed it continues to 
exert influence upon the child's life. H o w does he explain the 
persistence of most implausible theories of birth in children who 
are otherwise observant, intelligent, and well educated? 
32 Finally, he says children must struggle to free themselves from 
their nuclear complex (p. 48). Is this merely a manner of speak-
ing, to give added clarity to his contention about the Oedipus 
complex? What aspects of the theory of repression, including our 
own knowledge of the feelings with which it is usually associated, 
support Freud's choice of words? Is the task of separating a child 
from its original erotic ties to its parents a matter for moral exhor-
tation or something else? 
Fifth Lecture 
Technical Terms 
Regression; sublimation; transference; "flight into illness"; condemnation 
This is an extremely condensed lecture, summarizing as it does not 
just the previous four, but nearly twenty years of work. It contains a 
number of precise formulations. It will be worth our time to ponder 
them slowly. 
33 In the first paragraph Freud gives a causal explanation of neurosis: 
because people are frustrated in one realm they retreat to another 
where they find "satisfaction" (p. 49). What does he mean by satis-
faction? Are not neurotics miserable, anxious, sometimes depressed, 
and sometimes impossibly happy, that is, manic? Are neurotics 
aware of any distinct form of satisfaction brought about by their 
symptoms? (Are not symptoms defined as conscious complaints?) 
34 The "flight into illness" follows along what two paths? H e says 
that this flight back to earlier, erotic modes of satisfaction is the 
illness and responsible for the "main damage caused by it." In 
what does this kind of damage consist? That is, what parts of the 
person are harmed necessarily by these regressions that give rise 
to neurotic suffering (and to neurotic pleasures)? 
35 H o w is modern neurosis like an ancient monastery (this is Freud's 
wonderful analogy that reads almost like a joke)? Are w e all liable to 
the onset of a neurotic condition? Broadly speaking, what two 
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factors must operate together in a person's circumstances such that 
neurosis is the outcome? Given Freud's comments about fixation 
and regression, above, to what kinds of facts would one require 
access in order to predict both the type of neurosis that would follow 
and the unconscious fantasies that would accompany it? 
36 W h y is transference (p. 51) a "strange phenomenon"? Note that 
when we read and discuss his actual case histories, below, Freud will 
confess that he failed many times in his early career because he had 
no understanding of transference. H e gives us only a brief definition 
in this lecture. Transference occurs when a patient exhibits strong 
feelings, both positive and negative, toward the therapist. These are 
repetitions of earlier (now unconscious) feelings and fantasies about 
former love objects. But why did he not predict the existence of such 
feelings, say, at least by the late 1890s when he was composing The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900a)? In other words, why is psycho-
analysis not a predictive science? 
37 Freud seems especially concerned to explain not just what his the-
ories are but to explain why they are so often despised. H e offers 
two distinct reasons for their unpopularity (at least in 1909). One 
is that people fear it may harm them since it obviously deals with 
intimate and often painful topics. Second, most people do not 
accept the principle of determinism (p. 52). Are these two fears 
connected by a more profound anxiety? (Consider the c o m m o n 
understanding of the power that unconscious wishes hold—can 
one link these anxieties about unconscious processes to aspects of 
religious life?) 
38 O n the same page he gives one of his early formulas as to the aim 
of psychoanalytic treatment. According to this formula what is 
the therapist's role once the unconscious wishes have emerged, 
through symptoms, or parapraxes, or dreams? What would a con-
demning judgment look like? (Would religion be of help at any 
stage in the treatment process?) 
39 In addition to condemnation, there are two other outcomes possi-
ble: sublimation and active satisfaction of the infantile wish. W e 
will see him return to the first concept again and again in his 
essay on religion (and in the case histories, too) where he gives his 
readers a much more useful description of this process. Must all 
infantile sexual wishes, about which we his readers still know very 
little, come under the dominance of the genital organization in 
mature, heterosexual life? Can they? H o w does sublimation oper-
ate such that repression does not take place? (If w e cannot answer 
this kind of question at this point, what kind of information 
would we need, and what concepts would require clarification, 
before we could?) 
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40 Freud leaves his audience with a humorous story about clever folk 
who demand more and more sacrifices from a once mighty ani-
mal. H e says some may consider it an exaggerated, even if clever, 
warning. Is it? The horse died, an event that would put an end to 
its usefulness and cause the townsfolk some consternation since 
they had lost a very valuable property. Is there a corresponding 
clarity in the case of children and the demands made upon them 
to conform to idealized social norms? H o w could one measure 
these kinds of costs? And who would feel them most? W h o would 
feel them least? 
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis 
(SE 15 & 16) 1915-1917 
As the editor of this volume tells us, Freud prepared these lectures 
for delivery to an educated audience beginning in October of 1915. 
Since that audience is very similar to that for which this book is 
intended, it will pay us to read them slowly and with care. Where Freud 
had used the Five Lectures to describe his science to an elite group of 
scholars, he uses these longer lectures to persuade a more general audi-
ence whose skepticism he anticipates with neither apology nor rancor. 
I have divided these 28 lectures into three parts: (1) Introduction and 
Parapraxes, (2) Dreams and Dream Interpretation, and (3) H u m a n 
Development and Therapy. Questions in each section are numbered 
independently. 
PART ONE 
Lecture I: Introduction 
1 Why does Freud "seriously advise" his readers that they may not 
appreciate the way he intends to treat them (p. 15)? N o doubt 
you have read or heard about psychoanalysis already. Does an-
noyance appear to be a typical response people have to psycho-
analysis itself? 
2 "One learns psycho-analysis on oneself, by studying one's own 
personality" (p. 19). Is this typical of scientific disciplines? H e says 
one advances even further by becoming a patient of a trained 
analyst. W h y might this be so? If Freud is correct does that mean 
that critics of psychoanalysis must themselves also undergo an 
analysis? 
3 O n pp. 21-24 he lists the two great "insults" his science perpe-
trates: one about the unconscious, the other about sexuality. W h y 
are these insulting? What kinds of things do most people find 
insulting? An insult is an affront to one's positive understandings 
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of oneself or one's group. Given this, what kinds of feelings must 
psychoanalytic patients experience as they undergo treatment? 
4 H e then offers a condensed explanation of why his science arouses 
such intense feelings (an explanation that prefigures his essays on 
religion). W h y must society condemn his labors? Must this be true 
of all societies or just "Victorian" epochs like that of the late 19th 
century? 
Lecture II: Parapraxes 
5 Freud himself did not use the word "parapraxes," a term which 
his English translators concocted out of two Greek words: "para" 
(along or beside) and "praxis" (action or behavior). W h y would 
they make up pseudo-Greek terms like this? W h y not use English 
words like "faulty action"? 
6 Whatever the reason, note that Freud calmly assures his audience 
that everyone, not just his patients, experiences parapraxes. W h y 
does he choose to begin with this kind of fact? W h y not begin 
with a description of one of the more outlandish case histories 
available to him? H e had no lack of sensational anecdotes, full of 
sexual actions, the descriptions of which could not fail to interest 
an audience. Yet he begins his exposition with an account of "mis-
hearing," "missaying," and other parapraxes. W h y this subdued 
subject at this point? (Can you predict with what tone he might 
begin a private analysis?) 
7 Is it true we instinctively trust "small pointers" (pp. 26-28), espe-
cially nonverbal messages, when assessing a person's true feelings 
toward us? Can one lie as easily in either mode: verbally as well as 
nonverbally? Note that he uses a curious analogy: that of the detec-
tive and the murderer. W h y that analogy at this juncture? W h o , in 
the analytic situation, is the detective, who the murderer? 
8 ". Everything is related to everything, including small things to 
great" (p. 27). What does this mean for the psychological investi-
gator? If true, would it be a source of comfort and solace for the 
therapist presented with a puzzling case? 
9 Freud then argues against purely physiological explanations for 
parapraxes, especially slips of the tongue. W h y must he do so? 
Note that he invokes the authority of two great dramatists (pp. 
36-39). W h y would he turn to artists as sources of confirmation of 
his theory rather than to the scientists of his day? 
Lecture III: Parapraxes 
10 Freud's central claim is that "slips" are not accidents or happen-
stance occurrences made in a random way. Rather he says they 
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can be interpreted as meaningful utterances in their own right. 
H o w ? That is, on what grounds can we "guess the second inten-
tion" (p. 43)? Can intentions of this second kind—the unconscious 
kind—be as diverse and complex as conscious ones? If so, Freud 
says psycho-physiological explanations are empty phrases (p. 46). 
W h y ? (Note that the criminal elements return in his example.) 
11 Freud's examples of linguistic slips are mainly German. To assess his 
general theory and his general claims—claims that are typical of 
"every psycho-analytic investigation" (p. 48)—one must use real 
examples taken from real life. Describe two or three examples. D o 
they show the dual structure that Freud says all parapraxes must 
have? 
12 "You will break off at that point, but only to take up your resis-
tance again at another point" (p. 49). What does resistance mean 
here? The interchange becomes heated—are the judicial meta-
phors essential parts of the argument now? 
Lecture IV: Parapraxes 
13 This last chapter on parapraxes summarizes the others. In it Freud 
expands the notion of two trains of thought to cover instances of 
forgetting, losing articles, etc. His method is to "interpret" the 
faulty action or the failure to carry out the intended one. Is the 
correct interpretation always obvious? Are there constraints upon 
interpretations like this? What might "wild psychoanalysis" be? 
14 Freud has led us to one of his basic principles: ". . . mental life is 
the arena and battle-ground for mutually opposing purposes ..." 
(p. 76). H o w do the adjectives "conscious" and "unconscious" per-
tain to this claim? Is the "battle" pleasant or unpleasant? If the 
latter, what must characterize the patient's experience within 
psychoanalysis? 
PART TWO 
Lecture V: Dreams— 
Difficulties and First Approaches 
1 Is Freud comparing apples and oranges when he starts, right off 
the bat, with equating dreams and neurotic symptoms? Note that 
he puts the usual objections smack into the open (pp. 83-84). W h y 
be so blatant? W h y does "an excess of criticism" (p. 84) make him 
suspicious? 
2 W h y is he not keen on the "exact sciences" (p. 87) and their investi-
gations of dreams? H e then addresses dreams and sleep. W h y does 
the world "not possess even those of us who are adults completely" 
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(p. 88)? Is a dreamless sleep the best kind of sleep? (Why did Ham-
let fear that sleep that may come after death?) 
3 H e says there are at least two features common to all dreams: 
they are produced by the mind while asleep, and they differ qual-
itatively from ordinary thinking (p. 90). Is a third feature their 
"meaningfulness"? Freud's initial answer is no. But is this his 
opinion at the end of the chapter? 
4 As usual, he considers reasonable objections to his line of inquiry: 
for example, some dreams are quite ordinary and even "undream-
like." Yet will they yield to interpretation as well? H e rejects the 
academic psychologists and sides with the common wisdom, espe-
cially that embedded in ordinary language. W h y is the term 
"daydream" a "hint"? Is this a fourth c o m m o n feature? 
Lecture VI: The Premises 
and Technique of Interpretation 
5 This is the bridge chapter between the analysis of parapraxes and 
the interpretation of dreams. Page 101 is the keystone of that 
bridge. If dreams mean something, why can w e not simply ask 
the dreamer what that meaning is? Freud sees fit to use a rare 
exclamation point. W h y ? 
6 Again, he summarizes the obvious criticisms against his position. 
What are those and how does he handle them? W h y does he 
emphasize the importance of not concealing these difficulties, 
especially to a naive audience? 
7 But he does offer some corroboration in the form of a report on 
hypnotic treatment. Given that analogy, who is the hypnotist, who 
the subject, and what provides the content in the interpretation of 
a patient's dreams? . 
8 The exclamation points multiply rapidly on p. 105 where he de-
scribes the "lively opposition" to his technique: what is the major 
complaint raised against his method? And why is Freud so sure 
that his simple method—asking the dreamer to report the first 
thoughts that occur—must work? 
9 Is "free association" really free (p. 106)? If it were perfectly free, 
that is, uncaused and unpredictable by any means, could Freud's 
method work? H e mentions some experiments—some that you 
can carry out, like his young patient described on p. 107. 
10 H e says his method assumes that a person's thoughts will eventu-
ally lead to the "complex" which he or she has. What is a "com-
plex," according to this text? Is it distinct from what w e ordinarily 
call "character"? 
11 The experience of forgetting a name and struggling to recall it is 
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an especially good illustration of the work of dream analysis (pp. 
110-111). W h y is he so fond of the term "work"? Is the example 
on these pages simple? 
Lecture VII: The Manifest Content of Dreams 
and the Latent Dream-Thoughts 
12 Freud summarizes his argument on p. 113 and introduces the 
term "substitutive structures." (We shall see this term reappear in 
the essays on culture.) H e then lists three rules (pp. 114-115) and, 
on p. 117, adds a fourth principle about the level of resistance. 
There is an immense literature on psychoanalytic interpretations 
(see the appendixes below). What is the most likely objection to 
them? H e says, " W e must wait till the concealed unconscious 
material we are in search of emerges of its own accord" (p. 114), 
exactly as did the word "Monaco." Is this analogy between dream 
interpretation and recalling a word "on the tip of one's tongue" 
perfectly consistent? 
13 What prevents any crazy "interpretation" from becoming as 
defensible as any other? Note that if Freud cannot answer this 
question the remainder of his claims are simply so much smoke. 
As usual he is ahead of us, for in the next paragraph he mentions 
the importance of self-analysis. W h y is that so important? To 
hone our skills? Or to realize—and so gain conviction—that we 
too have an inner, unconscious resistance? 
14 Freud's tone changes in the next page when he lists the "rules" 
and "promises" he extracts from his dreamer (and his patients). 
W h y this change? H o w does the existence of so many examples of 
"disobedience" validate his technique of interpretation and his 
claims about the unconscious? 
15 Freud's examples and metaphors are always important aspects of 
his argument, e.g., that on p. 116. If a patient's associations lead 
to an image of himself as an especially fine person, or another 
patient's associations lead to an image of herself as a loving 
daughter, are these the core "latent dream thoughts"? H o w do we 
know they cannot be the deepest layer of the dream? 
16 By now you will have found that Freud pretty much inverts the 
usual understanding of dreams and dream meanings. W h y , given 
his method and his theory, must it follow that perfectly normal 
dreams are necessarily products of the most intense distortion? 
17 In this chapter Freud has revealed his full hand, demonstrated his 
argument, and fulfilled the expectations of his enemies: he dis-
misses their criticisms of psychoanalytic theory unless they too 
have undergone an analysis. W h y would Freud demand this even 
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of the most educated and expert scientists of his day? What other 
disciplines demand a similar initiation? 
Lecture VIII: Children's Dreams 
18 Here Freud begins to gather in his generalizations about dreams, 
using those of children as examples. The most important conclu-
sion, and one only hinted at earlier, is number 6: a wish is the 
motive force behind the dream (p. 129). H o w does this momen-
tous claim allow him to link the interpretation of dreams with the 
interpretation of parapraxes? 
19 H e then asks a profound question: W h y have other authorites not 
recognized that all dreams are, at some level, the expression of a 
wish? The answer is suggested by his remark, " W e can well imag-
ine what it is that has held them back . n " (p. 131). And what is 
that thing? 
Lecture IX: The Censorship of Dreams 
20 Like the brilliant novelist who only alludes to the unhappy fate a 
character will suffer, Freud has led us up to this central chapter. 
Like the herald in a Greek play, he announces his theme again in 
the first paragraph: only those dreams that are the hallucinated 
fulfillment of a wish are completely intelligible. What is the corol-
lary principle, therefore, regarding interpretation? 
21 H e uses another new term, "the dream work" (p. 136). What is 
this? And why, again, does he use the term work? W h y does he 
say that the old lady condemned the dream and that this is a sign 
she understood how to interpret it? 
22 From where does he draw the term "dream censor"? Does this 
entity or agency operate in one mode only? Or many? Can one 
predict the number of ways it might reach its goals? 
23 Is the censorship fixed or does it change? What kinds of events in 
one's life will alter the amount of sexual and aggressive themes 
that emerge in one's dreams? If Freud is correct about the censor-
ship, what kinds of feelings will one experience upon hearing the 
correct interpretation of a heavily censored dream? 
24 Whose wishes are those that analysis uncovers? An inner being? 
A hidden, interior personality? W h y does he refer to the Great 
War (World W a r I) at this juncture in the debate? H o w does the 
existence of evil figure into his last enigmatic remarks on a part of 
the mind that is "permanently unconscious " (p. 148)? 
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Lecture X: Symbolism in Dreams 
Since his publication of The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899, 
Freud's name has been linked to a set of symbols of sexual matters to 
such a degree that the odd knife, cigar, and water-tower, like the odd 
cave, trap-door, and valley, are termed "Freudian symbols." This chap-
ter is a condensed discussion of chapter VI of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. 
25 Note that the nature of dream symbols is described by way of the 
failure of free-association (p. 149). W h y is this a necessary element 
in Freud's presentation? Is his a "timid" experiment (p. 150)? H o w 
is free-association the inverse method of interpretation to those of 
"dream books"? Which method is central to the psychoanalytic 
enterprise? 
26 H e then lists a set of typical symbols: objects which invariably 
represent something else. W h y are they so monotonous? H e also 
refers to old jokes, folklore, and "buffoonery," as other areas in 
which one can see sexual symbols operating in the open. If these 
symbols are of so obvious and banal a nature, why does Freud 
claim to be saying something new about dream life when he men-
tions them in this context? 
27 H e hurries through the listing of the symbols in order to speak 
about an "ancient" language (pp. 166-167). Are these speculations 
essential to his argument? 
28 The central question for Freud was why are dreams, sometimes, 
so obscure. Symbols may be partly to blame. Are they the most 
important source of obscurity and craziness in dreams? 
Lecture XI: The Dream-Work 
The most important sentence of this chapter is the first line of the 
second paragraph: "... W e were studying the relations between the ele-
ments of dreams and the genuine things they stood for." As Freud notes 
it is easy to misunderstand him. The concept of dream-work is one of his 
most original notions: from it or upon it he erected much of his theory of 
neurosis, and, in turn, upon that theory he erected his theory of culture. 
29 How many dreams are there to be considered whenever a mani-
fest dream is reported? What is the actual work that the dream-
work accomplishes? (Again, note Freud's penchant for the notion 
of work as applied to psychological processes.) 
30 H e says there is a strict relationship between the way the dream-
work constructs the manifest dream and the way in which the 
interpreter must reconstruct the latent dream-thoughts. What is 
this relationship? If this claim is valid, why would it therefore 
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make sense to say that the art of interpretation is a kind of anti-
censorship (p. 70)? 
31 Freud then lists three "achievements" that the dream-work accom-
plishes in the course of creating the manifest dream. W h y are these 
three—condensation, displacement, visualization—called "achieve-
ments"? As usual he asks his readers to recall their own dream exam-
ples in order to verify the presence of each of these achievements. 
32 H e says condensation may serve the goals of distorting the latent 
dream thoughts—since it may make the dream more obscure— 
but it is not an "effect of the dream-censorship" (p. 173). Is it 
exactly like translation from one language to another? If not, then 
to what shall w e liken it? (Note that if the translation/transcrip-
tion metaphors fail to impress us, Freud's request to examine 
actual cases of condensation takes on more urgency.) 
33 Displacement, the second achievement, is "entirely the work of 
the dream-censorship" (p. 174). H o w do w e know this? That is, 
what characteristics of displacement make it purely a function of 
the censorship? (Note his allusion to the mechanisms of jokes vs. 
that of displacement in dreams.) 
34 The third achievement he calls "transforming thoughts into their 
visual images"—a long-winded term. In other texts he calls this 
symbolization. But is this third mode akin to the symbolic substi-
tutions he described in chapter 10? Which parts of speech are 
easiest to visualize? And which are the most difficult to visualize? 
Is this third mode like displacement—that is controlled by the 
censorship? Or is it like condensation—a product of thought pro-
cesses that cannot represent logical relations like "because"? 
35 H e then makes one of his most famous and provocative claims: 
"a . . A representation of 4no'—or at any rate an unambiguous 
one—is not to be found in dreams" (p. 178). What kind of logical 
relation is entailed by the concept of "no"? That is, what minimal 
rules of either language or logic must one employ in order to use 
correctly a sign meaning "no"? 
36 H o w is the inability to represent "no" related to the fact that con-
traries may signify their opposites in dreams? If the latent dream-
thoughts exemplify myriad contradictions, and cannot express 
negation, are they capable of demonstrating "reason"? If they can-
not, then can they "compose speeches" or "carry out calculations"? 
37 Freud is often criticized for "reducing normal behavior" to a kind of 
pathology; many say he used his theory of neurosis to criticize un-
fairly non-neurotic actions. Is this true in these lectures? Note that it 
is only on p. 183 that he mentions the psychoanalytic interest in the 
neuroses. Is he discussing normal and easily observed behavior or is 
he discussing abnormal behaviors that are especially obscure? 
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Lecture XII: Some Analyses of Sample Dreams 
38 In this sampler of common dreams Freud notes that he cannot 
submit a stranger to a full interpretation since that would be a 
"ruthless exposure" (p. 185). W h y "ruthless"? H o w is the concept 
of "resistance" connected with this dire warning? 
39 If one interpretation may run to 76 pages of printed text, how can 
one tell when the interpretation is complete? Must there be an 
end to the chain of associations the dreamer brings to the task of 
the analysis? 
40 Freud says one of his patients has an unusual ability to interpret 
the symbols in his own dreams (pp. 193-194). Given what we 
know of the mechanisms of the dream-work, what kind of charac-
teristics might we expect to find in such a naturally talented inter-
preter? Would he make necessarily a good psychoanalyst? 
41 Note that some elements of dream-work are absent in some of 
these examples (which are only parts of dream reports, after all). 
Dream No. 9 (p. 196) is interpretable only by way of the patient's 
associations. Is this true of many dreams? If so what does that 
mean for the use of dream interpretation techniques upon books 
or stories for which one has no associations? 
Lecture XIII: The Archaic Features 
and Infantilism of Dreams 
Freud introduces here for the first time an explicit reference to the 
ontogenetic-phylogenetic parallels he feels he has discovered with the 
aid of psychoanalysis. While dream interpretation is the major concern 
in these chapters, the implied identity between the mental life of chil-
dren and that of primitives is a central feature of his critique of religion. 
W e will see this most dramatically in Totem and Taboo (1912-13) and 
Group Psychology (1921). 
42 "Latent thoughts do not differ from our familiar conscious thoughts 
of waking life" (p. 199). W h y , then, are dreams so often incompre-
hensible to us? W h y do they not yield easily to our conscious every-
day efforts at understanding them? Another way to put this problem 
is to ask why Freud feels he has anything new to say about the inter-
pretation of dreams. 
43 O n pp. 200-201 Freud speaks about his "amazement" and "aston-
ishment" rather a lot considering how well educated he is. W h y 
does he use these words to his audience at this juncture in the expo-
sition? What is a "screen memory" and why does he use his personal 
example? Can we, his readers, gain conviction without appealing to 
our own experiences, e.g., of screen memories? (This is another 
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excellent place to sit down with a record of one's own dreams and 
examine them in light of Freud's claims in this chapter.) 
44 People hate other people, wish them dead, are jealous of their suc-
cess, and egoistic in the extreme. These facts do not surprise us, 
but Freud's claims about the Oedipus complex do. H o w does he 
explain the lack of gratitude the world has shown him regarding 
this issue? 
45 About this most famous claim—that young children have strong 
sexual and aggressive feelings toward their caretakers—much has 
been written. W h y might Freud have chosen the peculiar name 
"Oedipus" to designate this new discovery? Recall that he had 
earlier appealed to folklore, ordinary language (on "daydreams"), 
and great poets like Shakespeare and Schiller for support of his 
various claims. So why now Oedipus? 
46 H e introduces a new term—repression—and uses it to explain why 
dreams are so often of a sexual and aggressive quality. What is his 
connection between the "archaic" feelings and "unconscious" 
thoughts? And what is the new meaning of the word "unconscious" 
such that he can say "it is a particular realm of the mind" (p. 212)? 
Lecture XIV: Wish-Fulfilment 
This is probably the most complex chapter so far. In it Freud sets out 
to explain his theory, defend it against the usual criticisms, and to distin-
guish it from its competitors. A tall order for fifteen pages of text. 
47 " All dreams are children's dreams , they work with the 
same mental impulses and mechanisms of childhood" (p. 213). 
W h y is this so? If it is not true what happens to the argument 
Freud has so carefully laid out in the previous chapters? 
48 Freud asks an apparently good question: "But where is wish-
fulfilment, which is supposed to be the aim of the dream-work"? 
Yet this is a mistaken question. W h y ? "His [the layman's] rejection 
of the theory of wish-fulfilment is actually nothing other than a 
consequence of the dream-censorship . " (p. 214). Is this a fair 
response? (It is just this kind of point that has won Freud numer-
ous enemies.) 
49 If dreams are simply wish-fulfillments then how can there be 
dreams that are manifestly unpleasurable, e.g., anxiety dreams? 
H e gives us three explanations. Compare the first against the 
second and third considered as a set. Is it plausible to speak of 
"two persons" as it were occupying a single body? Is this multi-
plying entities without cause, or is it following the implications of 
what analysis uncovers? 
50 Where does the "other, censoring person" (p. 219) come from? 
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Can you come to Freud's rescue here, either with examples of a 
similar "dual personality" from literature or with reference to 
parapraxes? Consider the occasions upon which people plan their 
own "accidental" defeat. Are the subsequent punishments wish-
fulfillments? 
51 Note that if Freud is correct and we are able to describe a person 
whose wishes, when fulfilled, cause them pain, this only deepens 
the mystery. No? That is, if we speak of such behaviors as wish-
fulfillments (which is by definition pleasurable) does that not 
require us to suppose that one and the same event can be both 
painful and pleasurable? And is this not a contradiction? It is, and 
it needs solving. 
52 Turning to the other, more immediate battle over the universality 
of wish-fulfillment, Freud again speaks about two dreams. What 
is the difference? Recall our question about latent thoughts (No. 
42 above). Are they, as unconscious thinking, restricted to archaic 
modes of feeling and representation? 
53 " All these highly complicated mental acts . . . can take place 
unconsciously" (p. 223). But had he not just said that dreams 
admit of no "no," show the most illogical of connections, etc.? The 
answer appears to lie in the meaning one assigns to the term 
"dream." What is the only proper sense we can give it? 
54 To preserve the notion of wish-fulfillment Freud makes another 
distinction, between the "day residue" and the 'archaic wish" (pp. 
223-224). What is the distinction? Some dreams are especially 
complicated, yet all must manifest one feature, which is c ? 
55 H e is aware of how complex his exposition becomes at this point. 
To help clarify it he returns to the theater tickets dream. Return 
with him and list: (1) the latent dream-thoughts, (2) the recent 
wishful impulse, (3) the day residue, (4) the archaic (infantile) 
wish, (5) the feeling (affect) which she experienced during that 
day vs. the affect she had felt much earlier as a child, and (6) the 
means by which her displeasure was replaced by pleasure. 
56 It might be good to recall the aim of dream interpretation: to 
undo the manifest structure that the dream-work had accom-
plished by way of its three modes. W h y is it not adequate to note 
simply the archaic wish? W h y not just find the infantile wish that 
theory tells us must lie at the base of the manifest dream? 
57 Freud summarizes one of his famous analogies: that between the 
capitalist and entrepreneur and the unconscious wish and the day 
residues (p. 226). W h y is he so concerned to stress that the role of 
capitalist and that of entrepreneur might be filled by one person? 
And why would he choose this example from economics and not 
from any of the other numerous occupations and professions? 
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(Note that if psychic determinism—one of Freud's cardinal as-
sumptions—holds true for all persons it also holds true for Freud 
and his choice of examples.) 
Lecture XV: Uncertainties and Criticisms 
As he promised, Freud is more than willing both to point out what 
appear to be gaps in his theory and to list unexplained facts. H e arranges 
them in four sets. 
58 In the first he raises questions about the arbitrariness of interpre-
tations. Are these valid points? What other endeavors in the sci-
ences or the humanities rely upon "skillful interpreters"? It is not 
accidental that he returns to the theme of archaic languages, e.g., 
Egyptian hieroglyphic script as well as cuneiform writing. Is this 
a valid example? (See the recent essays on the problem of inter-
pretation noted in the appendixes.) W h y does the "system of 
expression" of dream thoughts occupy a less favorable position 
than these other ancient scripts? 
59 H o w might one conduct an experiment on dream interpretation 
similar to the experiment conducted by the Royal Asiatic Society 
in 1857? Which of the two experiments would be the easier to 
perform? Note that Freud sometimes speaks about translating the 
manifest dream back into its latent dream thoughts and into the 
archaic wish that "fueled" it. W h y is the word "translation" an 
unfortunate term to use here? 
60 Another set of objections to Freud is that psychoanalytic theory 
and interpretations are farfetched and extraordinary. Is this a 
severe problem? W h y would Freud use the frontier control exam-
ple in his response to these objections (recall his earlier images of 
judge and criminals)? Dreams are often constructed like a joke: 
but why do they leave us cold (p. 236)? 
61 A more vexing problem now emerges: some of his students and col-
leagues reject his major thesis. H o w does he explain their disagree-
ment? Furthermore, does the existence of a number of contrary 
theories argue against the plausibility of each? Is this a principle 
one can apply to other scientific claims? 
62 H o w does his distinction between the dream material and the 
dream itself disarm this fourth objection to his theory? Is it a 
plausible defense? If two people report the same manifest content, 
induced by hypnotic suggestion, does that mean that both people 
must have produced the dream using the same method and that 
each dream means the same thing to each dreamer? If I dream of 
m y father dying and you dream of your father dying, do the two 
dreams mean the same thing? To both of us alike? 
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The last sentence of this chapter outlines the road Freud will follow 
as he passes from the investigation of harmless parapraxes to the analysis 
of normal dreams to the explanation of the sufferings of neurotics. It is 
also a hint at the grandeur of his conception when he notes the "rapidity 
of the transformation which makes a dreamer into a waking and reason-
able man." It is just such a transformation that psychoanalytic therapy 
aims to effect with the neurotic whose waking life is dominated by 
unexamined dreams. 
PART THREE 
Lecture XVI: Psycho-Analysis and Psychiatry 
The remaining thirteen lectures differ greatly from the first fifteen. 
In the first half Freud treated his audience and readers as co-
investigators, often giving them the better lines, and always appealing to 
their own experience and reason. This changes to a much more didactic 
mode. Yet it is hardly less fascinating. For here we see Freud at his 
strength as he first sketches out portraits of human beings in torment and 
then grapples with the task of explaining their sufferings. 
These chapters also afford us a more direct view of Freud's own 
character, a phenomenon that some cherish as an exemplar of truthful-
ness and others reject as overweening and prideful. The text and the 
man will speak for themselves. 
1 Why is benevolent skepticism the most desirable attitude for both 
critics and patients of psychoanalysis to manifest? Do these lec-
tures foster this kind of attitude? 
2 Freud immediately describes part of his usual working day, in-
cluding a description of the famous double doors. Is it customary 
for a host to point out that his or her guest has made an error 
upon entering the room? Even after he has embarrassed some 
poor person who cannot shut the door, Freud persists in remark-
ing upon such errors? Is this an example of hauteur on a grand 
scale? Why does Freud persist? 
3 He goes on to say that many of these patients are disrespectful 
and arrogant. Is this fair? Note that Freud is perfectly sincere in 
these comments about his patients. Is that sincerity a necessary 
part of the treatment? 
4 A brief case history follows. Like the detective or judge whose 
profession is to ferret out the true account from the brambles of 
the false, Freud pays special attention to the way in which the 
story is told. Why would "gaps" in the account be of particular 
interest? Or why should we be especially sensitive to words like 
"incredible," "suddenly," and phrases like "as if by magic"? 
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5 Freud contrasts his method with that of the traditional psychia-
trist (pp. 254-255). Is this a fair comparison? Note that questions 
like those he raises on p. 253 are essential to his work. Is this sim-
ply part of his teaching style? What other professions rely upon 
this kind of question—other than judges and the police? Would 
standard medical education be the best means for training people 
to become adept at this kind of questioning? 
6 Is psychoanalysis primarily a mode of treatment? Note that Freud is 
overly modest, for by 1916, the year in which he delivered these 
lectures, he could count numerous cases of outright cure. So why 
does he stress the powerlessness of his method to remove symptoms? 
Lecture XVII: The Sense of Symptoms 
7 After crediting three other men with the discovery that neurotic 
symptoms have a hidden meaning, Freud describes the two forms 
of neurosis with which he is most concerned. Compare the two. 
W h y , again, are the silly, irrational, and crazy features of these 
diseases especially pertinent to psychoanalytic inquiry? 
8 Contrary to what he said (above, question 6), he here reports two 
dramatic cures: the first a spontaneous recovery of the meaning of 
an obsession; the second the result of many hours of treatment. 
W h e n does the first occur (p. 261)? Note the metaphors Freud 
uses to describe the structure of her illness: are these typical of 
most scientific accounts? 
9 Reading these short descriptions may appear to be a mild chore 
compared to reading the detailed theoretical sections of Freud's 
essays on dreams and other technical subjects. W h y is this an 
incorrect assessment? W h y can one not simply skim these case 
histories and proceed to the real issue, the theory? 
10 If a patient does not receive relief from his symptoms does that 
mean that the proffered interpretations were incorrect? In other 
words, can one imagine a case in which a person recognized the 
"truth" of the explanation put forth but persisted in the neurotic 
behavior? 
Lecture XVIII: Fixation to Trauma—The Unconscious 
11 Why does Freud use the term "economic" when he gives an 
account of the traumatic illnesses (p. 275)? After introducing it as 
a plausible concept that will permit us to explain both war 
neuroses and hysteria, he puts it aside. W h y ? 
12 "Mental processes had therefore been at work in her . " (p. 277). 
H o w does Freud move from this observation to his grander claim 
that there is an unconscious mental process? What features of her 
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"crazy" actions permit us to say they are products of a mind— 
rather than merely accidental occurrences? 
13 There was and is no lack of philosophers and rational thinkers 
willing to prove that there can be no unconscious mind. W h y is 
Freud not grateful for their guidance? 
14 "The construction of a symptom is a substitute for something else 
that did not happen" (p. 280). If this is true what is the task of psy-
chotherapy? Upon discovering the likely meaning of a symptom 
why cannot the psychoanalyst simply tell the patient these truths 
and so undo the neurosis? Note that Freud returns to the theme of 
"work" (p. 281). Is "work" a dynamic or an economic concept? 
15 Freud is one of the most widely cited authors of this century—his 
name appears in an immense variety of scholarly and non-scholarly 
works. Yet he is also one of the most widely abused authors (a fre-
quent criticism being that he is authoritarian and dogmatic in his 
pronouncements about the infallibility of psychoanalysis). Is this 
true of this chapter? If not how can you explain the particular vehe-
mence which his name still evokes? 
Lecture XIX: Resistance and Repression 
16 Freud had used the term "economic" to describe the traumatic 
neuroses. H o w is that term related to the two central "observations' 
in this chapter? W h y is the existence of resistance a "strange fact" 
(p. 286)? 
17 Resistance would appear to occur in the analysis of all persons— 
even the well-educated. W h y are they not immune from this 
characteristic? W h y does Freud refuse to grant "sanctuary" to his 
patients who wish to keep some things secret? 
18 W h y do otherwise intelligent people act like emotional imbeciles 
(p. 293) whenever the analysis touches upon a topic that is near to 
their "unconscious conflict"? Is the vehemence and stridency of a 
patient's objections to the analysis a sign of the therapist's failure 
or something else? Which is primary, the "critical faculty' or the 
set of emotional attitudes? Given Freud's answer, what is the 
likelihood of a person's completing a successful self-analysis? 
19 O n pp. 294-298 Freud suggests a series of theoretical models of 
the behaviors he has described, e.g., the two rooms (a public one 
and a private one) connected by a door at which a watchman 
prevents certain guests from entering into the public domain. 
Freud is aware that there are no little m e n (or women) who live 
in our brains; why does he, then, pursue this analogy with the 
watchman? W h y must this model account for normal psychology 
as well as that of neurotics (p. 297)? 
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20 He introduces the technical term "transference neuroses" and then 
a special use of the term "frustration" (p. 300). H o w does the 
latter term prefigure his comments on the social basis of the 
neuroses? The watchman, he says, "represses" certain thoughts 
and does not permit them public exposure. H o w is this related to 
the activities of the dream censor? Yet, he concludes, symptoms 
are "compromise formations"—they accomplish, or attempt to 
accomplish, two distinct objectives at one and the same time. Are 
these objectives ever compatible with one another? In which 
"realm" or part of the mind can one find both an intention and its 
opposite flourishing side by side? And in which normal behaviors? 
Lectures XX-XXIII: 
Sexuality and H u m a n Development 
Technical Terms 
Libido; sexual object; sexual aim; latency; polymorphously perverse; 
erotogenic zones; autoeroticism; defence; sadism; inhibition; Oedipus 
complex; pregenital trends; regression; cathexis; component instincts; 
organ-pleasure; love object; ambivalence; sublimation; adhesiveness of 
the libido; repression 
Lecture XX: The Sexual Life of Human Beings 
21 Freud begins his comments on the term "sexual" with a joking refer-
ence to learned experts. W h y ? And why is he willing to forgo offer-
ing a strict and exact definition of the term before venturing into his 
descriptions? Is the element of "secrecy" an unimportant feature of 
his or our understanding of sexuality? Note that Freud feels no com-
punctions about using the terms pervert and perversion. Is this true 
of contemporary psychiatry? 
22 Clarify the distinction between sexual object and sexual aim 
(p. 305). O n what grounds does Freud compare these types of sexual 
activities with "normal" heterosexual, adult intercourse? W h y is the 
presence of "excessive sacrifices" a sign of sexuality (p. 306)? 
23 " Homosexual impulses are invariably discovered in every sin-
gle neurotic ..." (p. 307). H o w does Freud's general thesis about 
the sexuality of children help us account for this clinical claim? 
H o w does that same thesis allow him to explain why the depriva-
tion of normal sexual satisfaction "brings out perverse inclinations 
in people" (p. 310)? Define "polymorphously perverse." Of w h o m 
is it descriptive? 
24 Freud is aware that his thoughts on children will not pass uncrit-
icized by the majority of official spokespersons. Yet he turns the 
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tables on his critics, one of his accomplished skills, by pointing out 
the source of their hostile rejection (pp. 311-312). Is this fair? 
H o w does his retort fit into his larger claims about the nature of 
civilization itself? 
25 H e goes on to catalogue a variety of "sexual" behaviors in which, 
he says, all infants and children engage. H o w does he link these 
innocent childish activities with those of adult perverts? Indeed, 
he says if children have any kind of sexual life it must be per-
verse. W h y ? What other sources of confirmation or illustration 
might he turn to for additional support? W h y are children given a 
"depreciatory and incomplete explanation" of sex? Is this true of 
our contemporary life too? W h y is education, say in school classes, 
about sexuality incapable of preventing the development of both 
repression and symptoms? Is this a pessimistic conclusion? 
Lecture XXI: The Development of the Libido 
and the Sexual Organizations 
This is a crucial lecture. In it Freud outlines his major claims about 
the nature of both infantile sexuality and the core-complex that appears 
to underlie many neurotic conditions: the Oedipus complex. 
26 In other contexts he speaks of the principle of the psychic unity of 
mankind. W h y would he be so concerned to promote this principle? 
H o w does he demonstrate that normal infants, outright perverts, 
neurotics, and normal adults, as well as great poets all manifest "per-
verse" tendencies? W h y is he so adamant about calling these things 
sexual when the term "organ-pleasure" appears to be less theoreti-
cally biased (p. 323)? 
27 H e then calls up an analogy. H e compares the development of the 
apple tree and the bean from seedlings that appear identical with 
the development of overt sexual pleasures (including perverse sex-
ual pleasures) from infantile behaviors (pp. 324-325). For this 
analogy to hold, what must he believe about the sources of infan-
tile "sexuality"? 
28 In a somewhat roundabout fashion he describes four major phases 
of infantile and childhood sexuality: oral, anal, a period of 
latency, and the efflorescence of adolescence. W h y is it important 
to underscore the events that occur just prior to latency (p. 326)? 
To what does the term "infantile repression" refer? 
29 Contrary to what one might expect, he does not say that the pre-
genital instincts are a unified set of impulses that one can see oper-
ate, as it were, in a coherent and consistent manner. Rather there 
are "breaks" (p. 328) in the development of the libido: where else 
has he drawn our attention to the existence of breaks or gaps? 
26 Reading Freud 
30 How does the multiplicity of pregenital instincts compare to the 
number of potential targets (objects) of those instincts? And when 
does the number of objects decrease, such that, in normal chil-
dren, one finds that only a single person (object) remains as the 
target for their affections? (Cf. "the psychical work of repression" 
on p. 329.) 
31 This leads us to consider the Oedipus complex—a term of far-
reaching significance in his thinking. After calling upon the 
authority of Sophocles Freud says that the latter's play, which is 
replete with illicit sexuality, the murder of a father, and mutila-
tion, never incites condemnation. Yet his (Freud's) work does. 
W h y ? W h y would one text gain an immense stature, especially 
within cultivated circles, and another, dealing with precisely the 
same topic, receive so much rancorous abuse? 
32 If Sophocles, and even Goethe, the great German poet, spoke 
about oedipal feelings in children before him, why does Freud 
claim that his theory is revolutionary? Another way of raising this 
question is: W h y was it only in Freud's work that these bits of 
wisdom from past sages gained a central place in a psychological 
theory? Given Freud's understanding of the nature of social con-
straints and the reality of repression, can one say that the former 
are symptoms while the latter, psychoanalytic science, is the cure? 
33 The standard criticism raised against Freud's theory about the 
source of incest taboos is that they have a biological not a psycholog-
ical foundation. As animal breeders know, mixing blood lines too 
closely can create genetically inferior stock. Yet Freud says the very 
existence of incest taboos and other such rules indicates that the 
constraints upon incest are not genetically based. Is this reasonable? 
What kinds of behavior are legally constrained within this society? 
O n the other hand, what kinds of behavior are encouraged in ser-
mons, lectures and other official organs of wisdom? 
34 With the advent of puberty children must confront again the 
issues dealt with by repression just prior to latency. W h y ? That is, 
why did these issues and the infantile wishes associated with them 
not fade away, like most memories from childhood? H e uses the 
term "cathected" with libido (p. 336, n. 2). What has persisted, 
then, the "energy" attached to an infantile urge or the urge itself? 
35 Does the evidence from dream interpretation support or weaken 
Freud's claim about the universality of oedipal feelings? If the for-
mer what can w e conclude about the "archaic source" of the 
dream wish? Is psychoanalysis primarily a theory about certain 
rare forms of mental disease called neurosis or something else? It 
would pay us to underline the last sentence in this chapter (p. 338). 
If Freud is correct, can ordinary people use psychoanalytic 
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principles to investigate the "depth structure" of their own dreams 
or of cultural artifacts, like novels and plays? What inner con-
straints might prevent one from achieving a full understanding of 
the unconscious themes in one's own life or in artistic products? 
Lecture XXII: Some Thoughts on Development 
and Regression-Aetiology 
36 In order to explain the difference between "fixation" (of an 
instinct) and "regression" (back to an earlier libidinal mode), 
Freud uses a number of analogies. Which is the best? (Note that 
there are many distinct instincts or "libidinal tendencies," not just 
one that develops over time.) 
37 H o w can the investigation of adult neurotic patients cast any light 
on the normal developmental process (p. 341)? This is no small 
claim, for if correct it means that psychoanalytic investigations are 
one way to recover the otherwise inobservable sequences that go to 
make up the complex institution called adult sexual behavior. Is this 
institution a singular or composite structure? At what other junc-
tures can one see some of the parts of which it is composed? 
38 H e briefly discusses the difference between "repression" and 
"regression" (p. 343). Which is typical of hysteria, and which of 
obsessional neurosis? What on earth could "sadistic-anal-
organization" mean? H e has not prepared us for this unique term, 
and it will make little sense to us until we have read his "Rat 
Man" case history (below, "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional 
Neurosis,' 1909). 
39 There is one key sentence : "A regression of the libido without 
repression would never produce a neurosis but would lead to a 
perversion" (p. 344). If this is true what then is the structural rela-
tionship between perversions and the neuroses? That is, if the 
existence of perversion means that repression has not occurred, 
are there any "symptoms" that will be amenable to psychoanalytic 
treatment? If not, what can w e conclude about the value of psy-
choanalysis for treating such "disorders"? 
40 H e then addresses the murky issue of the aetiology of the neu-
roses. W h y can there be no single agent or source responsible for 
the generation of a neurotic condition, e.g., a trauma? Consider 
his metaphors on p. 345—about the sexual impulses and their 
"intercommunicating channels." W h y would he find this i m a g e — 
which will reappear in many of his essays—especially attractive? 
41 "Sublimation" is one of the more vexatious concepts in Freud's 
thought. Try to explain what he means here when he says it "consists 
in the sexual trend abandoning its aim of obtaining a component or 
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a reproductive pleasure and taking on another which is related 
genetically to the abandoned one but is itself no longer sexual and 
must be described as social" (p. 345). Of which kind of sexual trends 
(or part instincts, or libidinal currents) can this be true? Can the 
fully mature genital organization abandon the aim of heterosexual 
intercourse? 
42 An illustration or two of "sublimation" would be immensely help-
ful; unfortunately Freud offers us none. Given the little w e know 
thus far about the pregenital libidinal trends, e.g., oral and anal 
sexuality, what can w e say of their "aims' and "pleasures"? Can 
sublimation—a term derived from alchemy, by the way—ever 
work for the whole of sexuality? Is sublimation akin to the "sub-
lime" that poets and religious authorities often speak of? 
43 H o w does the concept of "complemental series" help Freud account 
for his lack of success both in predicting which people will become 
neurotic, and, explaining why they and not their siblings, for exam-
ple, became his patients? Compare prediction and postdiction in 
other sciences or modes of investigation. Can literary critics predict 
the content of an author's next book? Or can they predict which 
young writer will become a great author and of those that are great, 
look back into their past and show the clear lines of development 
that lead from their earliest efforts to their present success? 
44 After noting how libidinal choices are of an "adhesive" nature, 
Freud distinguishes between external and internal frustrations 
which, according to the theory, together produce a neurotic con-
dition. W h y does he add that internal frustrations themselves may 
have been external at one time? What time was that? 
45 What are the "ego instincts" (pp. 350-351) and why do popular 
accounts of psychoanalysis, and more so, critics of psychoanalysis 
overlook them? W h y did the first psychoanalysts investigate the 
sexual instincts rather than the instincts associated with the ego? 
Can a neurotic condition exist without the active conflict of ego 
instincts with sexual ones? Must treatment focus, therefore, upon 
the analysis of both sets of instincts? 
46 To illustrate his distinctions he makes up a story about two little 
girls. W h y does he assign the burden of neurosis to the middle-
class girl and not her proletarian playmate? W h e n Freud says the 
neurotic had a "higher moral and intellectual development," is he 
being ironic or honest? 
47 H e then takes up a point of view w e have not yet seen: namely, 
metaphysics. Must one agree with these latter remarks if one has 
agreed with him so far? W h y are the "sexual instincts" harder to 
educate than the ego instincts? Which set of instincts is most typi-
cally addressed by either legislation or morality? 
Freud's Lectures on Psychoanalysis 29 
48 What is his evidence for his grand claim that pleasure is "in some 
way connected with the diminution, reduction or extinction of the 
amounts of stimulus prevailing in the mental apparatus" (p. 356)? 
What is a "mental apparatus"? H o w might one verify his claim 
about the supremacy of the sexual act? Would other philosophical 
systems or religious institutions support this kind of claim? W h y 
or why not? 
Lecture XXIII: The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms 
This is the most compact and the most abstract lecture of the group. 
Where before Freud gave us a few examples to enliven the presentation 
and ease us along, here he elaborates his central theory of the source of 
hysterical symptoms in a way that cannot be bettered, nor further con-
densed. As we will see in the lecture following this one, he is aware of 
these special difficulties. 
49 First, Freud defines the term "symptoms" (p. 358). What is the 
key to ascertaining whether or not a patient has a particular 
symptom? Are symptoms the same as signs or indicators? Can 
psychoanalytic treatment work if the patient has no complaints, 
no problems, and no discomfort? If there is no discomfort what 
must the therapist bring about before the work of treatment can 
begin? 
50 H e sometimes calls symptoms compromise formations. What other 
physical product might be termed the product of a compromise 
between two, distinct, parts of the mind? H o w does the fixation 
"lure" the libido into the path of regression (p. 359)? W h y does he 
use the verb "lured" here? 
51 "The ideas to which it now transfers its energy as a cathexis 
belong to the system of the unconscious and are subject to the 
processes there, particularly to condensation and displacement" 
(p. 359). If this is so, to which aspect of the process of dream for-
mation do the original libidinal aims correspond? In other words, 
why do we find that neurotics cannot express their repressed 
libidinal aims? And why do we find that their symptoms—the 
compulsions, fears, and other ailments of which they complain— 
are themselves complicated and often unintelligible, except upon 
arduous analysis? 
52 What factors contribute to the formation of the symptom so that 
it "emerges" as a "many-times distorted derivative of the uncon-
scious libidinal wish-fulfilment, an ingeniously chosen piece of 
ambiguity with two meanings in complete mutual contradiction" 
(p. 360)? The manifest dream is produced, he says, in a similar 
way except it is less distorted and has fewer absolute negations 
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obvious within it. Why is the dream less dangerous for the 
dreamer than the libidinal trend is for the neurotic w h o is wide 
awake? 
53 Recall Freud's earlier discussion of the archaic elements in dreams 
(Lecture XIII, above): H o w many types of archaicisms does he 
describe in this lecture? Is his notion of a "prehistoric" experience 
necessary to the exposition of his theory of the genesis of hysteria? 
(Is his model of evolution Darwinian or Lamarckian?) Does he 
rule out a genetic explanation for the onset of neurotic conditions? 
54 W h y must all neurotics deny any validity to an initial psychoana-
lytic investigation of their symptoms? Is Freud being ironic when 
he says w e can disregard a patient's (accurate) claim that he or 
she has no access to or any recognition of the truths which the 
analysis of a particular symptom has brought about? If a person 
knew exactly what his/her behavior meant would he be a patient 
at all? Would he/she be a neurotic? 
55 Freud prides himself on his honesty, perhaps with good reason, for 
he adds another level of complexity to his exposition when he notes 
that having investigated the infantile precursors of symptoms we 
find they are sometimes merely fantasies. (Note that the English 
translator uses English spellings; w e will use American except in 
direct quotations.) Some patients recall accurately that they were 
seduced by older children; other patients have exactly the same rec-
ollection but it is false. Does this remove psychoanalysis from among 
the set of plausible theories about human behavior? 
56 As is his wont, when faced with a conundrum of this sort he 
proffers a distinction: this time between psychical and material 
reality (pp. 369-370). W h y is it proper to say that the former kind 
may be a throwback to an even earlier material sort? 
57 Also as is his wont he asks an excellent question: " H o w does the 
libido find its way [back] to these points of fixation" (p. 373)? 
What does the "hypercathexis of phantasies" (p. 374) mean? If the 
"quantitative factor" is a major element in the aetiology of a neu-
rotic symptom, can w e use it to predict—roughly—when a person 
is most likely to exhibit neurotic behavior? For example? (Note 
his earlier discussion of adolescence and the term "dementia 
praecox".) 
58 H o w does the quantitative factor work in the case of artists? W h y 
do they have more at their disposal? Given this interpretation 
would you predict that artists would welcome or decline the 
chance to enter into psychoanalytic treatment? Recall Freud's 
earlier discussion of Sophocles—a great artist, surely—and the 
special pleasures his plays continue to afford audiences. In what 
does their special charm lie? Will you expect to find that case 
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histories are also charming and fascinating in the manner of a 
play or novel? (Recall the "bad jokes' in dreams above.) 
Lecture XXIV: The Common Neurotic State 
In this rather chatty lecture, which is misleadingly titled since it has 
little to do with "our" c o m m o n neurotic state, Freud makes a number of 
apparently routine comments. Yet they are of profound importance for 
us since they are basic to his understanding of what makes psychoanaly-
sis a unique science. 
59 He correctly identifies his reader's state of mind having just fin-
ished the former lecture with its abstract descriptions. Yet he 
obstinately refuses to apologize. W h y ? W h y not begin his exposi-
tion with more sensational stories from the annals of the field? 
60 Many schools of philosophy and depth psychology developed, in 
part, as responses to psychoanalysis. Most of their practitioners 
begin treatment with an examination of the patient's point of view: 
for example, they would ask Dora how she understood the meaning 
of her symptoms. "Phenomenological" psychology requires the 
therapist to examine closely the particular conscious meanings a 
patient assigns to his or her experiences. W h y does Freud reject this 
apparently sensible and fair route to understanding the meaning of 
a symptom? 
61 H e then uses a theatrical analogy to describe the varieties of possi-
ble neurotic forms with which the psychoanalyst must be con-
cerned. Recall his earlier analogies: W h y is he so keen on these 
social or group comparisons? W h y are traumatic neuroses—which 
have actual and often violent origins—not a problem of his theory 
of the aetiology of symptoms? 
62 Explain "flight into illness,' "secondary function," and "secondary 
gain (pp. 383-384). W h y , according to Freud, does the existence 
of the latter, in which the neurosis appears to aid the patient, not 
count for much? Is this a value judgment or a clinical one? W h y 
is it better to go down in an honorable struggle? 
63 H e attempts to distinguish between two great classes of neuroses: 
the "actual neuroses" and "psychoneuroses" (pp. 386-387). Can his 
theory account for both types? Are both types amenable to strictly 
psychoanalytic treatment? Must every patient manifest only one 
type or the other? 
64 Is psychoanalysis a complete science? To which fields must it look 
for its ultimate grounding and verification? W h y is Freud so con-
cerned with the notion of sexual noxa? Yet, at that time, what 
characterized psychoanalytic research? Would medical training 
be a necessity for that kind of work? 
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65 Sometimes the "actual neurosis" gives rise to a "psycho-neurosis" 
(pp. 390-391). H o w ? And how could one tell when that shift had 
occurred? 
Lecture XXV: Anxiety 
66 Anxiety would appear to be one of those topics about which 
everyone has direct knowledge—yet Freud says w e are not suffi-
ciently surprised that neurotics suffer from it especially. W h y ? 
And why does he reject the anatomical study of anxiety, or any 
other emotion? 
67 H e offers a minimal distinction between normal and pathological 
anxiety and then leaps back to a biological theory: Is his distinc-
tion plausible? W h y does the prehistory of the species question 
arise here? Must one accept both these biological speculations if 
one has agreed up to this point with his other claims about neuro-
sis and dreams? 
68 What distinguishes the three types of anxiety? The third type—a 
grown m a n afraid to cross a street—seems the most irrational. 
W h y does that make them the most amenable to psychoanalytic 
investigation? (The SE editor points out that Freud's theory of 
anxiety went through a number of changes; what w e see here is 
only one small segment of that larger discussion.) 
69 Some kinds of anxiety, he says, are simply the products of an 
increase in sexual tension (pp. 401-402). But that of hysterics, 
especially, is not directly tied to sexual frustrations. H o w does the 
notion of "secondary revision" (taken from dream theory) help 
him explain the puzzling diversity of phobias found in the analy-
sis of hysteric patients? 
70 Finally, he attempts to link his discussion of symptoms with the 
analysis of anxiety (p. 404). H o w does repression figure into the 
generation of anxiety, and, in turn, how do w e know that neurotic 
symptoms "are only formed to escape an otherwise unavoidable 
generating of anxiety" (p. 404)? 
71 What is the ego's role in the generation of both "realistic" and 
neurotic anxiety? Flight or fight are the two great defensive oper-
ations open to all creatures in the face of imminent danger. These 
are active behaviors in response to external dangers. What are 
their psychical counterparts? (See also p. 420.) 
72 What does "bound anxiety" mean and to what is it contrasted? 
Can it serve the entire set of needs of the individual? Recall 
Freud's discussion of anxiety dreams—does their existence pose a 
problem for his general theory of wish-fulfillment? If not, can he 
use a similar line of argument regarding the anxiety produced by 
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neurotic fantasies? (The case histories discussed below will give us 
a much better description of anxiety and its alleviation.) 
73 Consider the beautiful story on p. 407 about the child in the dark 
room. W h y would the child's longing—experienced in the dark— 
be transformed into a fear of the dark? That is, why, according to 
the theory outlined above, would the ego transform an emotional 
(intrapsychic) need into a phobia of an external thing? Which 
kind of anxiety—real or neurotic—appears first in the develop-
ment of most children? W h y would earlier emotional traumas 
have more severe impact than later ones? 
74 H o w does repression contribute to the generation of "bound anx-
ieties"? What are the "two phases of the neurotic process" (p. 410)? 
Given his account of the "fortress," why would the ego have to erect 
a continuous series of symptoms? That is, can Freud now explain 
why neurotics are driven to repeat behaviors that are obviously 
unpleasant and often self-destructive? 
75 Consider your own anxiety dreams—if you cannot recall one con-
sider an account of that of another person. Are the objects that ter-
rify you in the dream terrifying in reality? Or is there a mix? Are 
they sometimes like grizzly bears? And at other times, are they 
frightening only during the dream? H o w could Freud account for 
the latter? 
Lecture XXVI: The Libido Theory and Narcissism 
As he observes midway through this lecture he is far less clear about 
the nature of "narcissism" than he is about the three neuroses—hysteria, 
obsessive-compulsive, and anxiety—which he had studied since the late 
1890s, a period of more than twenty years. This lecture requires, there-
fore, careful reading. One must struggle to distinguish outright specula-
tions from clinical observations, and both of these from comments upon 
methodology. 
76 Perhaps the most perplexing, as well as the most typical, quality 
of Freud's presentation is his insistence upon retaining a complex 
account in face of a more attractive, if simpler, grand theory. 
W h y , in other words, does he not accept Jung's suggestion that it 
would be more elegant to speak not of two sets of instincts (ego 
and sexual), but one? W h y not suppose there is but one form of 
psychic energy that could assume many guises, like physical 
energy that may appear as heat or potential energy or other forms 
of a single kind of energy, all of which are transformable into one 
another? 
77 Freud's candor immediately costs us some hard won clarity when he 
first distinguishes between "sexual instincts" and "self-preservative 
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instincts" (p. 414) but then speaks about "narcissism," which entails 
a notion of sexualized ego instincts (or ego-libido). H o w does he use 
Abraham's theory of dementia praecox (what is now termed schizo-
phrenia) to account for the sexualized cathexis of the ego (p. 415)? 
(Note the weight Freud gives to the observation that these schizo-
phrenic patients over-value their bodies.) 
78 H e immediately refers back to a theory of sleep and dreaming. W h y 
is sleep so attractive to him as a model of the "primal state of the dis-
tribution of the libido" (p. 417)? Which, according to this account, is 
first—ego-interests or object-libido? Consider his analogy of the 
amoeba (p. 416) and its use of pseudopodia: does it permit him to 
"explain" or "describe" complex functioning? (What is the differ-
ence between the two?) 
79 What is the tell-tale sign that a person, say a young man, has 
expended some of his own narcissism upon another person? (Note 
that the topic of narcissism is of central importance in Freud: the 
SE editor points out the major texts.) Will this sign be present also 
in other instances where one expends or transfers narcissistic 
cathexis onto another person or thing? For example? 
80 The Goethe poem, unfortunately presented in a nearly unintelligi-
ble translation, is to illustrate sexual overvaluation. Explain the 
line, "I to m y very self a m lost" (p. 418). Given the complexity of 
this topic it would help to have more examples of this kind of 
overvaluation—especially since it will play a decisive role in 
Freud's critique of religion. 
81 Explicate the two critical questions Freud places in his listeners' 
mouths (p. 420). H e says everyone withdraws their object libido 
during sleep, and then, upon awakening, sends it back (p. 421). Is 
this a plausible generalization? What kind of everyday behaviors 
illustrate this reversal? 
82 H e suggests that our knowledge of regression and fixation in 
transference neurotics (transference being a term which he will 
not explain until the next lecture) m a y help us account for the 
genesis of schizophrenic symptoms. H o w ? 
83 W e then read a most obscure paragraph about restitution and the 
shadow of objects (p. 422). The SE editor refers us to two of 
Freud's theoretical papers. Yet can w e piece together what Freud 
is saying here—if w e follow out the metaphor of the thing and its 
shadow? Schizophrenics, according to this account, mistake the 
shadow or image or an idea of a thing for the thing itself. During 
what daily period do normal people engage in precisely the same 
error? And with what results? 
84 There is no lack of self-conscious reflections by philosophers and 
other learned people about their conscious experiences, their 
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ideas, and their perceptions. Why does Freud reject these sources 
of information? (Ricoeur, a contemporary philosopher, has called 
Freud an "anti-phenomenologist"—why might he have written 
this?) 
85 Although psychoanalysts had not, at that time, studied schizophre-
nia as intensely as they had investigated the classical neuroses, 
Freud makes some comments about the genesis of some symp-
toms, especially paranoid delusions of persecution (pp. 424-427). 
Granted that he is correct about these particular cases, would it 
follow that the same kind of conflicts would engender paranoid 
delusions in our time? Would a change in sexual mores bring 
about a change in the structure of unconscious processes? For 
example? Would paranoid symptoms vary from time to time and 
place to place therefore? 
86 The study of narcissistic disorders (among which Freud is now 
including many types of schizophrenia) led him to recognize a 
split in the internal structure of the ego. H e calls part of this split 
an "ideal ego' (p. 429). (It is intimately tied to his later, more 
famous, notion of the superego. The superego, in turn, is a central 
concept in his analysis of religion.) What provides the ideal ego its 
energy? And what determines its shape? 
87 Freud cannot resist adding an afterthought—another sign that this 
is not a systematic presentation of deduced truths—about the 
source of anxiety in the presence of danger (p. 430). H e attempts 
to distinguish between a behavior—running away from danger— 
and one's conscious feelings—fear. O n what grounds? That is, 
with what principle taken from what field of inquiry, does he 
make this distinction? 
Lecture XXVII: Transference 
88 Though a little late in coming, Freud now offers to explain what this 
central term means. This and the final chapter are the only ones 
devoted to the technique of psychoanalytic therapy—surely a fas-
cinating subject to his listeners. W h y does he place them, therefore, 
at the end of his exposition of the essentials of his science? 
89 Is he on the side of "civilized sexual morality" or of its opposite, a 
kind of hedonism of which there were no lack of examples even 
in his day? What degree of persuasive power does he ascribe to 
the therapist (or any other person) relative to the two forces 
which contend with one another and which create neurotic symp-
toms? H o w does therapy help the polar bear and the whale meet 
on the same ground (p. 433)? 
90 W h y are cures by persuasion, change of habit, exhortation, and 
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religious transformation, not compatible with cure brought about 
through analysis? H e offers one of his many famous formulas on 
p. 435 when he describes the task of his kind of therapy. Which 
of the numerous concepts discussed above is essential to his for-
mula? Will psychoanalysis as a treatment work with outright per-
verts? (See above, question no. 21.) 
91 Does Freud believe his method is the final and authoritative 
means of bringing about therapeutic change? W h y is it not a 
causal method of cure? Regarding Freud's alleged dogmatism 
about the validity of his science, is it in evidence here in this 
chapter? H o w does repression operate in patients such that no 
amount of "education" will suffice to replace their unconscious 
thoughts? Does the answer to this question also help explain why 
simply reading Freud himself is not sufficient to the task of solv-
ing one's own difficulties? 
92 But it sometimes works—with which type of patients? What psy-
chological characteristic do persons suffering from hysteria, or 
obsessional neurosis, or anxiety neurosis share? Recalling his last 
lecture what psychological characteristic do the patients listed on 
pp. 438-439 share? Given his description of the development of 
libidinal positions in chapter X X V I , is it fair to say that in this period 
of his thought he does not believe psychoanalytic therapy is feasible 
for persons suffering from pre-oedipal fixations or regressions? Is it 
worthwhile for analysts to investigate such conditions? 
93 N o w he describes the transference proper (pp. 439ff.). Is it a rare 
event brought about only by the esoteric workings of the analytic 
process in the secrecy and gloom of the consulting room? W h y 
does he say a person with sharper eyes will confess with no hesita-
tion that a patient's glowing reports of the therapist's genius are 
really quite boring? What factors guarantee that such glowing 
reports must be boring to reasonable people? 
94 Might the therapist experience a modicum of boredom as well at 
this incessant flow of praise and glory? You have no doubt ob-
served Freud's wry sense of humor, including humor about him-
self and his profession. What functions might this kind of humor 
serve? That is, how might it help the therapist guard against 
dancing to the patient's tune? In what other professions or in what 
similar circumstances do you find a wry sense of humor to be a 
typical characteristic? 
95 If transference is an ordinary thing, observed in numerous rela-
tionships, why does Freud count it as an unexpected novelty 
(p. 439)? W h y does it constitute a formidable resistance to the 
treatment? While the more observant friends of a patient may 
detect a bit too much repetition in the latter's praises (or attacks) 
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upon the good doctor, what is the patient's understanding of these 
feelings? Are they distinguishable from any similar feelings he or 
she m a y have had at other times about other people? 
96 If patients cannot, initially, distinguish transference feelings from 
other, similarly intense, feelings, how valid are such self-reports? 
That is, if transference occurs regularly in the analysis of certain 
kinds of neurotics, to which factors—patient self-understandings 
or patient behaviors—must the therapist attach most significance? 
97 Freud says there are two modes transference may manifest: a pos-
itive one and a negative one (p. 443). Is either a better sign than 
the other of the patient's chances at eventual recovery? D o good 
people show positive feelings and bad people negative feelings 
about the therapist? W h y would the negative aspects of the 
transference appear later in the treatment than the positive 
aspects which appear from the beginning? Does the treatment 
create or fabricate the negative features of the transference? 
98 H o w is it that the therapy comes to focus upon an artificial neurosis 
rather than upon the original problems that brought the patient into 
treatment? W h y are hysteria, obsessional neurosis and anxiety neu-
rosis (also termed anxiety hysteria) rightly termed "transference 
neuroses"? What features do they share such that Freud says one 
cannot doubt his basic claims as to their libidinal character? 
99 H e concludes his lecture by arguing or demonstrating that psycho-
analytic treatment cannot be applied to persons who exhibit a nar-
cissistic neurosis (a vague term, since he had previously spoken of 
narcissistic forms of psychosis, a much more severe malady). D o 
they manifest in their behavior the conflicts typical of repressed 
wishes? What universal characteristic do they lack such that Freud 
excludes them from among the group of people who might benefit 
from psychoanalytic therapy? What kinds of feelings and behavior 
must they exhibit before w e could be reasonably sure that psycho-
analysis would help them? 
Lecture XXVIII: Analytic Therapy 
In this final lecture Freud simply outlines the basic features of his 
method of therapy. As Freud readily admits it is not an adequate 
account of the many subtle elements and technical considerations that 
operate in the conduct of an actual case. (To see those more clearly w e 
turn to his extensive case histories in the next section.) Yet it effectively 
summarizes many key elements of the preceding lectures. 
100 H e began his psychiatric practice using suggestion, a method 
which required him to hypnotize his patient, through a variety of 
means, and then to "force" the symptom to depart. Often this 
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required him to,touch his patient, pressing this, now that part of 
the patient's body. W h y might this latter technique have contrib-
uted to the more spectacular of sudden cures? 
101 H e returns, again, to the notion of "work" on p. 450 when he de-
scribes the ease with which suggestion effected cures. H o w does 
he link the theoretical concept "work" (in all the ways that term is 
used in these lectures) with the equally theoretical term "energy"? 
W h y is analysis the inverse of hypnosis? 
102 Is free association, a task he assigns both to the interpretation of 
dreams and to the interpretation of symptoms, an easy skill to 
acquire? Or does it demand work? (Recall his list of excuses, com-
plaints, maladies, and other responses people bring to the job of 
remembering their dreams, and of verbalizing or recording their 
free associations, without censoring them as either too trivial or 
too disgusting.) W h y is "lifting internal resistances" serious work 
(p. 451)? 
103 While analysis is more than suggestion, it does not exclude sugges-
tion from among its tools of forcing the patient to give up an 
earlier libidinal position. Where and how ought it to be 
employed? Perhaps psychoanalytic patients manifest typical sex-
ual themes because their physician, their therapist imposes them, 
via suggestion, upon the treatment? If so, perhaps then we will 
find that another theoretical orientation, one which rejects the 
libido theory, produces an analysis with no sexual themes whatso-
ever. H o w does Freud answer both these challenges? 
104 Pages 454-455 contain a concise formulation about the dynamics 
of cure—according to the libido theory. If therapy works because 
it permits the patient's ego to avoid a fresh repression, and if 
repression is an automatic response to the threat of anxiety, what 
emotional state must the patient pass through, at least initially, 
following the removal of these repressive barriers? In other words, 
are all the difficulties and fears that beset the neurotic products of 
irrational thoughts which upon enlightenment will vanish from 
view and cease operating? 
105 A popular understanding of transference is that it is simply a re-
enactment, in the present, of a prior relationship that somehow 
went wrong. Hence, according to this view, transference responses 
are historical repetitions. Does Freud support this view? W h y is 
he so fond of using metaphors drawn from warfare to describe 
the events of therapy? (Note that the original German term for 
cathexis, "Besetzung" [occupation], refers to the activity foreign 
troops engage in when they occupy an enemy territory.) 
106 Returning to his first subject, Freud notes that the dreams of nor-
mal people do not differ significantly from either the dreams or 
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the symptoms of neurotics. Why does he stress this point? Why is 
it a mistake to say that the dreams of normals are distorted and 
symptom-like in their structure only because they are the prod-
ucts of a sleepy mental mechanism that cannot process adequately 
an otherwise coherent and unconflicted message? 
107 Freud next lists a number of reasons for therapeutic failures. H e 
blames errors in training, crudity of technique, mis-diagnoses, and 
other aspects of the therapist's behavior. Yet he also blames the 
patient's family. Is this fair? D o not all parents or spouses wish for 
their loved one's full and complete recovery at the earliest possi-
ble moment? (Cf. his comment about settling a family's estate.) 
108 If Freud's initial observations on the genesis of parapraxes, on the 
interpretation of dreams, and on the meaningfulness of symptoms, 
are correct, why would his science not attract public acclaim? 
W h y would he be especially liable to attacks, denunciations, and 
abuse? 
W e can best answer these last three questions by considering 
the detailed analysis of a real case, that of a young w o m a n whose 
parents sought Freud out with every apparent intention being 
that he should cure her of her profound suffering. That Freud 
failed ultimately in that attempt is one of the least important facts 
about this case history. 

II 
O N THE REALITY OF PSYCHIC PAIN: 
THREE CASE HISTORIES 
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria 
(SE 7) 1905 "Dora" 
Notes U p o n a Case of Obsessional Neurosis 
(SE 10) 1909 "Rat Man' 
F r o m the History of an Infantile Neurosis 
(SE 17) 1918 "Wolf M a n -
Freud's case histories, which have gained a renown that stretches far 
beyond the confines of psychiatry, may be divided up into two rough 
categories: those which are reports of his direct work with a patient and 
those which are essays upon the character of a person w h o m he did not 
treat. Members of the first set are the cases published in his and Breuer's 
Studies on Hysteria (1895, SE 2), "Dora" (1905, SE 7), "Rat Man"(1909, 
SE 10), "Wolf Man" (1918, SE 17), numerous short accounts, and his 
classic text, The Interpretation of Dreams, which contains major por-
tions of his self-analysis. The second set of case histories, those whose 
subjects were not his patients, includes "Little Hans" (1909, SE 10), 
"Judge Schreber" (1911, SE 12), as well as his essays on historical per-
sonages, like Goethe, and famous literary characters, like Hamlet and, of 
course, King Oedipus. 
The first set is the more valuable for the beginning student of Freud 
and more pertinent to our aims: to explicate his major claims and to see 
him at his strength. There is no end to the many fascinating questions 
raised in and by texts of the second set. His long-distance analysis of 
"Little Hans," using the boy's father as an intermediary, has spawned a 
sizeable literature on its own. His many comments on Hamlet and 
Shakespeare, scattered throughout his writings, are profound and fasci-
nating in their own right. But in all these instances Freud must rely 
upon either the observations of another person, or, as in the Schreber 
case, upon written materials from the patient as well as reports about 
him. These case reports include no systematic record of the patient's 
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associations, nor of the gestures, parapraxes, and other behavioral hints 
which make up the routine of a long analysis and which provide both 
parties additional confirmation. Furthermore, there is always something 
academic about these analyses. They are, necessarily, bookish and take 
on such didactic roles that reading them is something of a chore. 
This is not true of the direct case histories. O n the contrary, the 
three with which we will be concerned, "Dora," "Rat Man," and "Wolf 
Man," display Freud at his best. They are written with a masterful econ-
omy of description, great evocative power, and much wit. Yet they are 
not mere novels. Their endings are not predictable, they follow no for-
mula, and they have no idealized heroes who after suffering torment and 
danger rescue pure and chaste heroines. In fact, in the first, "Dora," we 
struggle along with Freud and his patient only to see the whole enter-
prise end in failure. Does this make Freud look bad? That judgment 
must be reserved until w e have pondered her story at length. 
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria 
(SE 7) 1905 "Dora" 
1 This is one of the very earliest, lengthy, psychoanalytic case histories 
to be published. What is Freud's manifest concern, as expressed in 
these prefatory remarks? And how would you characterize their 
emotional tone when Freud says that not publishing his findings on 
hysteria would be a " disgraceful piece of cowardice" (p. 8)? 
2 W h y would this kind of case be especially liable to be read as a 
roman a clef (a novel which is a thinly disguised account of 
famous or infamous people)? Is there something titillating about 
them, such that some readers might find them as if designed for 
their private delectation? Is this a mark against their veracity or 
against Freud's method? 
3 One reason Freud gives for publishing this account of a three-month 
treatment is that it illustrates the technique and therapeutic value of 
his method of dream interpretation (see above, Introductory Lec-
tures numbers V - X V ) . Yet even for those who understand that tech-
nique, the story will prove to be bewildering. W h y ? What factors 
give rise to it? Can it ever be removed? 
4 W h y did Freud change his technique from that of actively con-
fronting the patient's symptoms to more passively waiting for the 
patient to begin the conversation (p. 13)? W h y does this not lead to a 
state of complete randomness, in which the patient simply 
meanders from topic to topic? What principle of mental life must 
be true if one is to accept this as a valid therapeutic method? Given 
this method, which requires the patient to free associate to his own 
behavior and thoughts, is Freud's analogy of the archaeologist 
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entirely accurate? That is, do they also dig randomly and wait for 
the pieces to come together? 
Does Freud believe this single case is overwhelmingly supportive of 
his theory of neurotogenesis (how neuroses are produced)? Does he 
believe that a single case history fully exhausts the nature and struc-
ture of hysteria, that, following him, there is no more to say? 
Part I: The Clinical Picture 
Technical Terms 
Amnesia; paramnesia; unconscious disingenuousness; displacement; con-
version; reversal of affect; somatic compliance; secondary function; over-
determination; reinforcement from the unconscious; obsessive 
6 As Freud promises the story becomes complex quickly. (It will pay 
to keep both a record of the various actors arranged in rough chro-
nological order and a chart of Dora's many symptoms, together with 
Freud's interpretations of them.) H e could have made the reader's 
job a little easier by summarizing the story, explaining its meaning, 
and altogether giving us a neater package. But he refuses. W h y ? 
7 What universal features of hysteria make it impossible for the 
honest reporter to give a complete and uninterrupted account of 
both the patient's history and the patient's treatment? H o w does 
this feature permit Freud to distinguish true neuroses from simi-
lar, but purely organic, diseases (see pp. 16-17 n. 2)? H o w does he 
distinguish unconscious disingenuousness from its counterpart? 
8 What permits Freud to say that having repaired the patient's 
memory (compare paramnesia with amnesia proper), the practical 
aim of the treatment is also accomplished (p. 18)? H o w does the 
patient supply the missing facts which, when recognized, can be 
fitted into the narration? Could a patient accomplish this alone, 
without going to the expense and effort of treatment? 
9 N o w w e read the facts about Freud's patient, a young w o m a n he 
calls "Dora." Here it will be useful to refer to your chart of the 
family's particular history. In listing these facts about Dora's fam-
ily does Freud exclude the possibility that her difficulties, espe-
cially her physical symptoms, are the results of an unfortunate 
genetic inheritance? (Which of the family members seems less ill 
than the others?) 
10 W e learn that Dora's father had had syphilis before his marriage 
(p. 20, no. 1). Does Freud consider that to be a factor which may 
have contributed to Dora's propensity towards psychological ill-
ness? H o w might Dora's mother have responded to the knowledge 
that her husband had been syphilitic prior to their marriage and 
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that he might have passed that illness on to their children? What 
is the popular image of such sexual diseases? Is there some con-
nection, possibly, between those images and her subsequent 
"housewife psychosis"? 
11 In listing some of Dora's physical ailments (pp. 21-12), can one 
find any thematic relationship that appears to unite them? Were 
her other physicians ever in doubt as to the diagnosis? W h y would 
someone suffering so many difficulties laugh at the efforts of her 
doctors to cure her of them? 
12 It is often useful to know how persons become patients, and to 
understand who is most adamant about their need to secure treat-
ment. What sequence of events precipitated Dora's contact with 
Freud? H o w is it she was "handed over" for treatment? 
13 W h o m does Freud believe when it appears, very early in his 
work, that Dora's story does not always tally with her father's? Is 
the latter consistent in his own accounts? Is Freud an advocate for 
either of them? 
14 Freud says that he first attempted to apply his and Breuer's 
trauma theory to this case and to search out, therefore, the actual 
traumatic event that gave rise to her suicide threat (assuming that 
that threat was the mark of a "disturbed person"). Yet he does not 
agree with her father's assessment. H e turns back to an event that 
occurred four years prior to the suicide episode (p. 28). W h y does 
he say Dora's behavior then was "completely hysterical"? 
15 This scene, to which both Dora and Freud return an immense 
number of times in the course of the treatment, is crucial to the 
entire story and to our judgment of it. W a s Herr K abusing Dora 
when he acted in this way (see p. 29 n. 2)? Contemporary author-
ities remark upon the frequency of sexual molestation of young 
children, particularly girls, by older men. Is this such a case? 
16 Freud labors to prove that she was hysterical even then and to 
illustrate the symbolic relationships between the kiss and her sub-
sequent symptoms, including hallucinations. Freud discusses "re-
versal of affect" and "displacement/' Explicate these terms. Does 
their persistence over a period of four years support or weaken 
the diagnosis of hysteria? 
17 Overtly Dora was shocked and disgusted by Herr K's advance. 
Freud is sure that part of that shock lay in her perception of his 
erect penis which in turn is linked to her "oral orientation" toward 
heterosexual relations. What facts about her father and Frau K 
and about her own development support Freud's interpretation? 
18 Given Freud's understanding of phobias as he developed it in his 
Introductory Lectures, and given a dynamic theory of interpreta-
tion, what unconscious wishes and fantasies must underlie and, as 
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it were, fuel a conscious fear of seeing a man's erection? How 
does a phobia differ from a reaction formation (see Introductory 
Lectures, pp. 375, 381)? 
19 Both Dora and her father are intelligent and much beyond the 
average in the acuity of their judgment and common sense. What 
tells us Dora is not simply a silly, frightened school girl bullied by 
more powerful and more intelligent adults? Yet she is neurotic 
and so "blinded" to other truths. Is her father without psychologi-
cal impairment? 
20 Dora's complaints about her father, Frau K, and Herr K seem 
legitimate and well taken. Yet Freud makes it a point of his tech-
nique to challenge not the veracity of these complaints but their 
target: on what grounds? 
21 One of the great themes that runs throughout this case is that of 
"silent acquiescence" (p. 37). It would prove instructive to list the 
characters and their actions who engage in this passive activity. 
Should Dora's mother be included on this roster? Where was she 
during all the years Herr K was virtually courting her adolescent 
daughter? 
22 Freud forces Dora to admit that her frequent (hysteric) illnesses 
coincided with Herr K's absences (p. 39). This is an unconscious 
sign of the intense love she bore for him. Is it also a positive sign, 
that is, in general would so intense a response indicate the pres-
ence of an overwhelming passion for the beloved? Recall Freud's 
discussion of parapraxes and other signs of unconscious conflict. 
H e says they are more truthful indicators of one's feelings than 
sentiments one merely mouths. If Herr K had understood all this 
ought he have to been optimistic about his future with Dora? 
23 H o w does the concept "somatic compliance" (p. 40) help account 
for hysteric symptoms? W h y , according to this discussion, is there 
no natural sign language or body language which would convey 
the same meaning in every instance? W h y does it make sense to 
say hysteric symptoms are overdetermined? 
24 Her illness, while overdetermined, has a meaning and so repre-
sents a motive. What is that motive, according to Freud? W h y 
does he ask Dora to forgo challenging her father? To protect the 
latter? Because her father was a powerful man w h o m he hap-
pened to like and so favored over Dora? Is there something else 
he could have done to "combat her motives"for remaining ill? 
25 W h y does Freud insist upon treating Dora's rejection of Herr K's 
advances as a riddle? W h y ought Herr K to have trusted the 
"innumerable small signs" of Dora's affection—at least under 
more usual circumstances? 
26 Follow out Freud's deduction of the meaning of Dora's cough (or 
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at least one of the many meanings expressed by her cough) on pp. 
46-47. Dora is not shocked by his questions about oral sexuality, 
and she answers them easily. Yet Freud says there must come a 
point in either her recollections or in her associations where she 
cannot answer. W h y ? (It might be useful to sketch out Freud's 
interpretation and diagram the two lines of thought he ascribes to 
her, both the conscious and unconscious streams.) 
27 Note that Freud feels compelled to defend himself from readers 
who would find his discussions of sexual matters with so young a 
w o m a n improper and even immoral. What is his defense? (Why 
does he quote French slogans, why not refer to his favorite poets 
here?) 
28 An ancient bit of wisdom says one should resist condemning the 
actions or life of another person because "there but for the grace 
of God go I." A famous psychoanalyst who worked with severely 
disturbed people said of them "There I go." With w h o m would 
Freud agree? 
29 W h e n Freud and other dynamic psychologists describe the work 
of interpreting the meaning of symptoms (or dreams or para-
praxes) they frequently use metaphors drawn from linguistics, 
especially translation. While these two activities are similar, since 
each is concerned with finding the meaning of a phenomenon 
which is initially puzzling, why is the metaphor misleading and 
finally false? (Consider carefully pp. 52-54.) Does the meaning of 
a Chinese text, for example, suffer the same kinds of changes, 
reversal, and disconnections that characterize the meaning of 
Dora's symptoms? 
30 Consider the very condensed metaphor about the "reinforcement" 
of conscious thoughts by excessively intense unconscious thoughts 
(pp. 54-55). W h y is Freud so taken with the galvonometer model 
as a representation of the relationship between the two trains of 
thought? Is this a linguistic model, akin to a notion of translation? 
Given this model and assuming it is valid, does it permit Freud 
to predict his patient's behavior if there is a likelihood of an un-
conscious wish arising under certain circumstances? W h y would 
interpretation of the underlying unconscious thought, which 
means discovering the infantile wish associated with it, help 
decrease the compulsivity and intensity of the conscious thoughts? 
31 What feature of unconscious thoughts in general permits a wish to 
be represented by an entirely opposite and contrary conscious 
feeling? Is this a c o m m o n feature of linguistic signs? 
32 O n what grounds does Freud conclude that Dora's feelings about 
her father went beyond the usual bounds of daughterly affection? 
Is Dora's mother responsible, in part, for the unusual strength of 
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those feelings? And is her father guilty as well? 
33 What can Freud mean when he says that "No other kind of lYes' can 
be extracted from the unconscious; there is no such thing at all as an 
unconscious 'No'" (p. 57)? If interpreting the unconscious meaning 
of symptoms and dreams and parapraxes were simply a matter of 
translating from one language to another, would the "archaic" lan-
guage of the unconscious be able to represent "No"? This question is 
worth pursuing for our answer to it will determine how we judge all 
Freud's later propositions about the uniqueness of psychoanalytic 
interpretation. What are the consequences for Freud's libido theory 
if we conclude that unconscious processes are essentially the prod-
ucts of one kind of language operating in a context where it is not 
yet translated into a language recognized by consciousness? If psy-
choanalytic interpretation is essentially a linguistic process, what 
kind of training and education would best prepare one to become a 
psychoanalyst? 
34 But patients have no trouble emitting loud "No's" when con-
fronted by interpretations like the one Freud put to Dora on 
p. 58. W h y ought we to note that her "No" was "most emphatic"? 
H o w can a "No" signify "Yes"? Can one find other behaviors or 
gestures which accomplish a similar feat, that is, represent their 
opposite? Again, is this a feature of ordinary human languages? 
35 By this time an honest reader of Freud's case history and faithful 
user of these questions will confess that the whole account is 
immensely frustrating and most obscure. It seems neither very 
good science, since we can say so little that is absolutely certain 
about the exact meaning of the various symptoms, nor very good 
literature since the story is so confused. H o w does Freud show 
that the latter, especially, is a sign of his veracity? 
36 Freud mentions three w o m e n with w h o m Dora was intimate, per-
haps to the point of displaying overtly sexualized feelings. Are 
there any other females w h o m we should place among this three-
some? Freud says Frau K's betrayal of their secret discussions of 
sexual matters to Herr K and thereby to her father hurt Dora 
more than anything else. Is this persuasive? What signs does 
Freud rely upon to validate this claim? 
Part II: The First Dream 
Technical Terms 
Switch-words; screen memory; primal scene; change of meaning 
37 As we have noted before, Freud is not willing to spare his readers 
the work of carrying out the process of interpretation and suffering 
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as he did the confusions and frustrations attendant to it. For exam-
ple, a vital piece of information as well as a helpful bit of theory 
emerge at the end of this chapter, pp. 92-93. Consequently it will 
help to read this entire chapter through at least once before 
attempting to respond to these questions. 
38 Note that Freud disallows Dora's objections to her first associations 
to the dream. W h y ? What principle of mental functioning allows 
him to boom out "Start away" (p. 65)? 
39 Freud aims to interpret each element of the dream (although later 
in this chapter he confesses that he overlooked one element). W h y 
is he so keen on establishing when the dream occurred and the 
number of times it was repeated? Is his guess of four confirmed— 
directly or indirectly? Note how Freud uses single quote marks 
around his reports of his and Dora's speeches. What reasons might 
he have to compose this history in this way? 
40 W h e n a murder has occurred there must be a murderer, a means, 
and a motive. Freud assumes a similar determinism governs the 
production of a dream: its occurrence and its contents are not 
random events. H o w does his insistence upon knowing the num-
ber of times the dream was presented lead to his interpretation of 
one of the intentions which are elements of the latent dream 
thoughts? The key would seem to be the key. 
41 Having established this important bit of reconstruction Freud 
pauses to recapitulate some major tenets of his theory of interpre-
tation as put forth in The Interpretation of Dreams. (Most of 
which he summarized in the lectures on dreams in the lectures we 
have read already.) W h y does he insert it here, when he is not 
concerned with the infantile wishes that appear to be part of the 
dream's larger meaning? 
42 W h e n he discusses the jewel case symbol Freud invokes the auth-
ority of a "favourite expression" that links it with the female geni-
tals (p. 69). Is this a plausible connection in our culture in our 
time? Must such symbols be universally interpreted in one way in 
order for this kind of claim to have merit? H o w are jewel cases 
and "reticules," a kind of drawstring bag, related to one another? 
43 H o w does the number of reversals in the dream, where a wish or 
an idea is converted into its opposite, demonstrate the strength of 
Dora's feelings? Freud says Dora invoked her oedipal feelings for 
her father in order to ward off her feelings for Herr K. Would 
this make sense if one assumes her father is a more taboo object 
than Herr K? 
44 Freud is not finished, for, according to his previous work with 
dreams, behind this first layer of current (repressed) wishes must lie 
an even older layer of wishes stemming from childhood. So he uses 
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the "hint" provided in Dora's concern about an accident occurring 
in the middle of the night (p. 71). O n what authority does he con-
nect the symbol of fire with the problem of bed-wetting? H o w is the 
latter connected to her problem with Herr K? 
45 Dora reported an addendum to her dream. W h y does Freud con-
clude that it must represent the most repressed dream thoughts? If 
so, why would her "transference" feelings toward him be the ones 
she was most afraid of revealing? W h y is it that the final interpreta-
tion (p. 74) can be stated in a few clear words, while the dream, 
including its addendum, is obscure, confusing, and disjointed? 
46 "No mortal can keep a secret" (p. 77). Does Dora's playing with 
the string purse prove or merely support Freud's general theory 
of parapraxes? W h y does Venus stand on a shell? (Freud is refer-
ring to the famous painting by Botticelli.) 
47 In his account of the relationship between masturbation and hys-
terical symptoms, Freud recalls his analogy of river channels 
(p. 79). W h y would these analogies seem especially appropriate to 
him, given his general theory of libido? H o w is masturbation 
treated in contemporary accounts of childhood and adolescence? 
48 The "primal scene" (pp. 79-80) is Freud's name for the child's per-
ception and subsequent representation in memory of adult, usually 
parental, intercourse. H o w is it that hysterical actions, like Dora's 
"dyspnoea" (labored breathing) are remnants of the primal scene? 
(See the footnote on p. 81.) H o w might we explain the presence of 
hand-washing ceremonies. W h y would females exhibit hand-
washing ceremonies in conjunction with the repression of masturba-
tory urges? Compare the concept of primal scene with that of screen 
memory (p. 82 n. 1). Is either a strict photographic representation of 
a real event? If not, along what lines would one expect such "memo-
ries" to be structured? 
49 O n pp. 83-88 Freud summarizes the factors he feels are responsi-
ble for most of Dora's hysteric symptoms (note that he does not 
doubt she had a most unhappy life). W h y is it true to say that 
Dora fell ill because she was particularly moral, particularly 
unfortunate, and particularly intelligent? What other route was 
available to her? 
50 Freud then takes up the task of "synthesizing" the dream on pp. 
88-93. One excellent way to follow his reasoning is to write out 
both the manifest and latent dreams and then diagram the ways 
in which the switch words, like "drops" and "jewel case," connect 
the first to the second. Does Freud believe that his reconstruction 
is the only plausible one? 
51 A more vexing question reappears in his concluding remarks 
about the dream's change of meaning (p. 93). (Compare this with 
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the change of meaning he ascribed to her symptoms, above.) If 
the manifest dream remains consistent, but its "meanings" change 
according to Dora's circumstances and feelings, is the dream an 
ordinary communication? 
Part III: The Second Dream 
52 So whom did Dora love most? Up until this discussion of her sec-
ond dream, Freud has only pointed out the variety of people, 
both male and female, w h o m Dora loved (or hated). W h y must 
we answer this question? W h y can we not give a general answer 
to it? What additional determinants must we note? 
53 Is our view of Herr K and his intentions altered in this chapter? 
Note that a superficial reading of "Dora" might lead one to sup-
pose that Herr K had simply abused her and treated her only as a 
sexual conquest. Does Dora (and does Freud) agree? 
54 As he had mentioned in the introduction to this case history, 
Freud's account of the treatment and of how he arrived at his 
interpretations is not a perfectly coherent set of deductive steps 
(e.g., p. 93). W h y not? W h y does he make his reader follow along 
these winding paths, going from this association to that, rather 
than simply lay out the dream's "real meaning"? (Again, if a 
dream were nothing more than a disguised message, would it 
require so many false starts and stops?) 
55 W h y does he say the theme of wandering around a strange town 
was "overdetermined" (p. 96)? What permits Freud to say that 
Dora's associations to this element really belong to the dream 
thoughts? (Compare the notion of "nodal point" with that of 
"switch word," above). 
56 As he analyzes the dream point by point Freud first designates a 
dream element and then Dora's associations (and his reconstruc-
tions). Then he links this set of ideas to the next dream element, 
e.g., on p. 97 he goes from "she asked about a hundred times" to 
the "contents of the letter." Are these connections simply random 
or are they brilliant guesses on his part? In other words, how does 
Freud justify this procedure? (Is it based upon the theory of 
dream interpretation or upon his knowledge of real life? Is it 
based on semantic knowledge or encyclopedic knowledge?) 
57 Freud usually says that an oddity such as the question mark in 
front of the word "like" denotes an especially important element 
in dreams (p. 98). W h y would it hold that the more distorted or 
contorted a dream element the more likely it signifies an impor-
tant thought? (See his footnote on p. 100 about "endopsychic" 
resistance.) 
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58 Freud uses Dora's associations to press her to report again what 
occurred at the lake. H o w do her thoughts lead him to make the 
brilliant reconstruction that Dora must have read a great deal 
about sexuality in textbooks and consequently knew the technical 
terms for both male and female genitals? 
59 Freud argues that Dora's additional symptom, similar to those 
associated with appendicitis, was an hysterical elaboration of an 
actual somatic illness. The final proof being that it appeared nine 
months after the scene at the lake (p. 103). H o w would you char-
acterize Freud's attitude toward Dora in these pages? W h y does 
he say "I scarcely dared hope" (p. 103) that Dora would corrobo-
rate his solution? 
60 The case builds to a finale on pp. 105-108. Dora announces her 
rejection of the analytic relationship, Freud solves his major puz-
zle, and gives his final explanation of Dora's hostile rejection of 
the man she truly loved: "Wounded pride added to jealousy and 
to the conscious motives of common sense—it was too much" 
(p. 106). H o w does Freud present these facts, that is, what stylistic 
devices does he employ? 
61 H o w does Freud end his narration of the case (p. 109)? W h y is 
there a dash between "She seemed to be moved . . . and—came 
no more"? What are the "half-tamed demons' (p. 109) with which 
the analyst must struggle? In what kind of literature would one 
expect to find demons and such struggling with the hero? 
62 Is revenge a dominant motif in Dora's life? H o w could her break-
ing off the treatment have harmed Freud? Is revenge a primary 
motive or a response to a former injustice? W a s the treatment a 
success or a failure? And for w h o m ? 
Postscript 
Technical Terms 
Transference; acting out; sublimation 
63 The single most provocative question one can ask of this case 
history is why did Freud assent to its publication? Not only was 
the treatment a failure, but he himself is not portrayed in the 
most winsome way imaginable. So why did he publish it? 
64 Would new discoveries about the somatic (physical) sources of 
mental illness, including the neuroses, dismay Freud? To what 
does "excitant action" (p. 113) refer? (Note that we do not read 
Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality [1905, SE 7] in 
which he sets out his major observations and theory of infantile 
sexuality.) 
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65 "Transference" (pp. 116-117) is a technical term created by Freud 
to designate a certain feature of the analytic relationship. Is trans-
ference itself a rare ocurrence, appearing only in the intensity of 
psychoanalysis? W h y is it more difficult to detect and analyze trans-
ference elements than it is other elements of the neurosis? 
66 Sometimes these revived feelings become conscious and "subli-
mated" (p. 116). What does this mean and why does Freud call 
these sorts of feelings "revised editions"? H o w are transference 
feelings and "acting out" (p. 119) connected so that one might say 
that acting out precludes insight? 
67 Freud implies it was his technical errors that precipitated Dora's 
sudden withdrawal from treatment. D o you agree? H o w would 
you characterize his feelings toward Dora, particularly after she 
had announced her decision? Note his attitude toward her when 
she returned fifteen months later: "I could not help smiling; for I 
was able to show her that exactly a fortnight [fourteen days] ear-
lier she had read a piece of news that concerned m e in the news-
paper" (pp. 121-122). W h y can he not stop himself from smiling? 
(On the relationship between Dora and Freud see Erikson [1962] 
and Deutsch [1957].) 
Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis 
(SE 10) 1909 "Rat Man" 
As he said in his introduction to "Dora," Freud recognizes that he 
has not arranged these case histories in the most readable manner. These 
are not textbook accounts, designed to initiate the student into a well 
documented mode of study the methods and findings of which are com-
patible with common sense and received opinion. O n the contrary, the 
"crumbs of knowledge" (p. 157) each contains were won at the cost of 
arduous labor and immense patience. W e , his readers, will have to exert 
a modicum of effort along the same line that connects the oddities and 
incoherencies of the Rat Man's manifest behavior with the deeper strata 
of his latent motives. 
Given that it took Freud, a m a n of wide learning and striking talent, 
a month to organize the case history, it seems not unreasonable that we 
may have to spend a few hours of work in comprehending it. 
Introduction & The Beginning of the Treatment 
Technical Terms 
Flight into illness; mesalliance; nuclear complex; obsessive ideas; 
delirium; compulsive behavior; prohibitions; reconstruction; scopophilia; 
protective measures 
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Dora's analysis took about fourteen weeks; the one described here 
took around a year. But does Freud believe the record he presents 
is complete and that it describes fully the nature of obsessional 
neurosis? Would a purely deductive science admit of so many 
gaps and, sometimes, inconsistencies within its propositions? 
Having read "Dora" w e will want to compare her story and Freud's 
analysis of it to the young m a n who, thanks to his outstanding obses-
sional fear about rats, is known universally as the "Rat Man/' (If that 
name offends one he is also referred to as Dr. Lorenz in the adden-
dum, p. 254). Compare the ways in which both came to visit Freud 
for their first consultation. W h y is Dr. L's more propitious than 
Dora's? H o w does Freud feel about Dr. L? 
Freud says he made the patient "pledge" to say everything that 
came into his head (this is also termed the basic rule). What great 
principle of mental functioning, elucidated in the Introductory 
Lectures, underlies this pledge? Are there any other disciplines or 
treatments or relationships in which one party is required to 
pledge absolute candor? Are these therapeutic relationships? 
Outline Dr. L's description of his life in the first hour (a full 
hour—why could Dora not have produced so coherent and com-
plete an account in her first hour with Freud?). W h y does Freud 
say that his patient was already an obsessional neurotic at age six? 
W h y is the presence of sexual urges and aggressive wishes not 
sufficient to produce an infantile neurosis? A significant element 
in the definition of obsessional neurosis is the compulsive and 
repetitive quality of the patient's actions. Given what we know of 
Dr. L's boyhood (pp. 162-163), how can we account for these 
irrational repetitions? 
Although there is no doubt that the patient was obsessional at age 
six, the link between his wishes and his fears, even at that age, is 
not clear. What will "reconstruction" bring about? 
Freud's account of the "Great Obsessive Fear" is a marvelous 
piece of dramatic reportage (note he gives us both dialogue and 
scene). W h y is Dr. L's "composite expression" (p. 166) a key to 
understanding the whole story? What can "horror at pleasure of 
his own" (p. 167) mean? Given this observation of manifest 
behaviors, what must w e conclude about the latent thoughts of 
which they are expressions? 
The obsessional idea is revealed in much of its absurdity by the 
patient's admission of the second, concurrent fantasy about his 
father suffering the same rat punishment. Then comes the matter 
of the money the "cruel" captain had told him to pay Lieutenant 
A. To which elements in "Dora" ought w e to compare this 
memory/fantasy of the money owed to Lt. A? (As in that history, 
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so here too it will pay to keep a chart or list of the ideas and 
memories that the patient links to this nodal point.) 
8 Dr. L addresses Freud as "Captain" during his recitation of these 
events. W h y ? Are there similar events in daily life when normal 
persons may find themselves addressing someone incorrectly? 
What feelings typify this kind of parapraxis? (Note that during 
such moments the patient speaks well but as if in a dream 
[p. 170]). 
9 Did Dr. L wish to become a patient? H o w did he arrive at 
Freud's doorstep? W h y would the chance event of reading one of 
Freud's books serve him in his efforts at finding help? Was it a 
chance event—given what w e know about parapraxes and other 
apparently accidental behaviors? 
10 Freud terms these first sessions an initiation into the treatment. Is it 
fair to say that they are also initiations into the theory of psycho-
analysis? Is Freud's metaphor about Pompei and the unconscious 
persuasive? Is it entirely accurate? If yes, would that mean that 
there would be no hints or traces of the "buried" thoughts and 
wishes observable in the patient's everyday conscious behavior? 
11 At the end of their fourth session Freud summons up his thoughts 
and gives a prognosis (p. 178). Given what he has said already 
about the validity of affective responses which, although tied to 
inconsequential or even ridiculous thoughts, point to authentic 
wishes, how should we assess the fact that Dr. L responds with 
"visible pleasure" to Freud's good opinion of him? 
12 H o w is the quantity of affection an important element in the gen-
eration of Dr. L's obsessional ideas about his father's death? Given 
Freud's reasoning would w e expect to find obsessional ideas sur-
rounding persons of no consequence to oneself? (And given what 
we know of transference, what kind of feelings might we expect 
the patient to exhibit toward Freud when the treatment reaches 
the depths of the patient's unconscious?) 
13 W h y does the age, as it were, and intensity of his infantile feelings 
make them so recalcitrant? Note that most neurotic symptoms are 
irrational behaviors that appear trivial both to the neurotic and to 
his acquaintances. (Recall Freud's favorite metaphor of the uncon-
scious as a burial ground of ancient relics.) 
14 After castigating himself and his motives, Dr. L admits to his 
deep feelings of cowardice, to which Freud responds. And then, 
in the footnote, Freud would appear to disown his arguments as 
ineffective (p. 185). But were they? H o w might the patient have 
experienced these admonitions? 
15 In part E, "Some Obsessional Ideas and Their Explanation," Freud 
describes six well-defined symptoms, then explains their common 
Three Case Histories 55 
origin. Summarize the six symptoms, show their interior logic, 
and, if possible, arrange them along a line of severity. Freud often 
speaks of "translating" these ideas into their actual or original 
motives (e.g., p. 186). Is "translation" a correct term for the work 
he and his patient do in this analysis? 
16 Obsessional neurotics manifest a deep ambivalence toward signifi-
cant persons, as do hysterics. W h y do the former "construct" their 
symptomatic expressions differently than the latter? W h y would 
one repress hostile feelings toward someone more readily than one 
would repress affectionate ones? Freud notes that people may 
laugh during a funeral or upon hearing of the death of a loved 
one. Are there similar instances of inappropriate mirth in ordi-
nary life? H o w might we explain them? 
17 In part F, "The Precipitating Cause of the Illness," Freud com-
pares the logic and genesis of obsessive symptoms with those of 
hysteria. W h y is the archaeology metaphor, about Pompeii, for 
example, even less appropriate to a correct understanding of 
obsession than it is to hysteria? H o w does Freud distinguish the 
two kinds of repression as well as two kinds of knowledge that 
typify obsessives (see the note on p. 196)? 
18 In the story of his other client who ironed his money while 
abusing the trust of his friends Freud concludes that the m a n had 
displaced his self-reproach because an accurate self-understanding 
would inhibit his one avenue of sexual pleasure. W h y is it plausi-
ble to suppose that the latter was based upon "infantile deter-
minants' (p. 198)? 
19 Freud says Dr. L became ill, as an adult, precisely when he had 
to resolve a conflict that paralleled an event in his father's young 
manhood (pp. 198-199). H o w did Freud use the transference 
elements to convince his patient of the correctness of this inter-
pretation? (Compare Freud's use of the transference here and on 
p. 209, with his failure with Dora on similar issues.) 
20 Returning to the theme of infantile and adolescent masturbation, 
Freud seems convinced there must be some meaning to Dr. L's 
bizarre actions upon the midnight hour (p. 204). W h y is he con-
vinced that these must have infantile precursors? Are w e "aston-
ished" too by the patient's response? 
21 W h y is the work of analysis a "school of suffering"? Could Freud 
have made it any easier or more pleasant for his patient? H o w did 
he remain calm and neutral when he and his family were sub-
jected to so many verbal abuses? Would a clever patient, such as 
Dr. L, not have found at least a few weak spots in Freud's charac-
ter or in his family and so directed his insults toward a real, and 
therefore vulnerable, point? 
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22 How are the German words "Spielratte," "Ratten," "Raten," and 
"hieraten," connected together in the patient's mind? What kind 
of connections are these? That is, could one have predicted their 
appearance? Would an excellent knowledge of German have 
allowed one to predict their occurrence in such a story? If not, 
what additional information would one require? W h y does Freud 
refer to Goethe (p. 216) and to Ibsen and fairy tales in connection 
with the theme of rats? 
23 Note that the interpretation of the obsessional idea is exactly like 
that of the interpretation of the manifest dream content: Freud 
aims to account both for the latent content and for the distortions 
of that content by the censorship. What crime had Dr. L commit-
ted (in his thoughts) such that the torturous trip from P to Z, etc., 
was the fitting punishment? 
24 Is Freud claiming that any young man, faced with a similar situa-
tion (the error about the money he owed), would have concocted 
so elaborate an obsessional drama? What appear to be the deter-
minate factors, summarized in this section, that together produced 
Dr. L's neurotic actions? If one could have known these factors 
before the events with the cruel captain, could one have also 
predicted exactly which ideas and which fantasies would have 
appeared in his deliria? 
25 If one could not predict the exact content of a patient's (or experi-
mental subject's) obsessional ideas, does that mean there is no 
objective way to verify the correctness of Freud's interpretations? 
H o w did Dr. L respond to them? Is this kind of response an ade-
quate verification of so elaborate a theory? 
Theoretical: General Characteristics 
of Obsessional Structures 
Technical Terms 
Primary and secondary defense; omnipotence of thoughts; reaction for-
mations; undoing; isolation; ambivalence; regression; sexualization of 
thoughts 
26 While reading Freud or another author concerned with the eluci-
dation of neurotic behavior one may feel inexplicably tired, or 
distracted, or bored even though one is overtly interested in the 
subject matter. W h y might this occur? For example, a young man 
might find it necessary to re-read a passage in this case history 
many times before he was able to understand it. Suggest some 
lines of inquiry about this kind of event—would w e be justified in 
considering it an example of an obsessional structure (p. 221)? 
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27 How does Freud distinguish between the primary defensive strug-
gle and the secondary defensive efforts that come after it? W h y 
would patients "tone down" the distinction between wishes, inten-
tions, doubts, etc. and call them all "ideas' (p. 223)? 
28 During the secondary struggle the patient creates new ideas which 
Freud terms obsessional structures, or, more technically, "deliria" 
(p. 222). W h y does he say these are structures, rather than simply 
trains of thought or groups of ideas? Does the secondary struggle 
issue in a "tertiary" struggle in therapy (cf. "the disease plucks up 
courage" on p. 223)? 
29 A famous French psychoanalyst once advised that solving cross-
word puzzles would be good practice for young analysts. Does this 
make sense to you? Compare two or three of the patient's protec-
tive formulas with a crossword puzzle: Are they identical? 
30 Freud says jokes, dreams, and obsessional formula may all exhibit 
an identical structure: the use of ellipsis (pp. 226-228). Compare 
the joke on p. 227 with an obsessional idea (from this case history 
or elsewhere). W h y is it that most people can "get" the joke, and 
are pleased by it, while very few people can interpret correctly 
the obsessional idea (and if they do are repelled by the latent 
thought)? 
31 From the beginning, Freud and his science have been subjected to 
numerous philosophic critiques, some sophisticated and intelli-
gent, others ill-informed and vicious. W h y would he appear so 
vulnerable to rationalist critics? Is he? Another famous French 
thinker said that he found himself changed, for the better, by his 
careful reading of Freud. Does this make sense? Would philoso-
phers in general have a special concern about obsessional actions? 
32 After describing typical superstitious beliefs Freud explains the 
difference between two types of repression: one that effects a state 
of amnesia, another that severs "causal connections" (p. 231). 
Which is typical of obsessives? Consider two or three examples of 
superstitious behavior (including those typical of groups as well as 
individuals). Are these similar to Dr. L's obsessive structures? 
(Freud addresses this issue at length in "The Uncanny," which w e 
consider below.) 
33 H o w does a belief in the "omnipotence of wishes" typify the 
obsessive's mental life? In what other circumstances, or in what 
kind of literature or cultural artifacts do you find a similar 
emphasis upon the power of wishes? It happens that L had a 
number of experiences in which his wishes for the death of a rival 
were granted (e.g., p. 234). Does this mean that such events con-
vinced him of his special power, that they were partly responsible 
for his becoming neurotic? If not, how should we understand the 
58 Reading Freud 
frequency with which Freud's obsessive patients report such 
"uncanny" experiences? 
34 Surely many young m e n experience difficulties similar to those of 
Dr. L. W h y are they all not obsessive and indecisive? In other 
words, what is the relationship between Dr. L's adult neurosis and 
his childhood conflicts with his father? W h y is Freud convinced 
that it was the repression of Dr. L's infantile hatred for his father 
that underlay the later neurosis? W a s that hatred sui generis or 
was it, at least in part, related to the "nuclear complex"? 
35 O n pp. 240ff. Freud makes a few conjectures about the source of 
the intense hatred obsessional neurotics manifest as children: Does 
he rule out a biological or physiological source? H e then lists three 
factors responsible for the insidious way this primal hatred (com-
bined with a primal love) comes to dominate the patient's life. 
Which of these three appears to be the most important? 
36 While Freud uses the term repression here as he did in "Dora," 
w e have seen that it refers to a distinct process in which the 
infantile wish persists but is altered radically. W h y ? Given this 
second kind of repression, what may w e conclude about the accu-
racy of Freud's reconstructions when w e learn that L showed the 
"most violent resistance" (p. 238) when Freud touched upon his 
hatred for his father? 
37 Freud's patient had quoted Nietzsche's famous dictum: "'I did 
this,' says m y Memory, T cannot have done this,' says m y Pride 
and remains inexorable. In the e n d — M e m o r y yields" (p. 184). 
H o w does the structure of memory lend itself to the obsessional's 
aims? (Trace the sequence of perception, psychic pain, memory, 
doubt, and repression and then repetition that issued in one of Dr. 
L's symptoms.) 
38 W h y , according to Freud's discoveries, is it correct to say that 
obsessive actions are instances of "regression" (p. 244)? Does this 
mean that all children will manifest beliefs and hence protective 
measures similar to those Dr. L produced? Around what kinds of 
themes would one expect to find childish superstitions and protec-
tive rituals centered? Examine two or three examples of children's 
games: D o you find obsessive features in them similar to those 
Freud found in Dr. L's behavior? Given Freud's general under-
standing of the source of such actions, what kinds of behavior will 
an especially superstitious child exhibit if he or she is placed 
under severe emotional strain? 
39 Consider Freud's formula on p. 246: an obsessive thought repre-
sents an action regressively. What factors in the Rat M a n case 
history support his contention that every thought (or "idea") has 
two sides, an economic one and a representational one? H o w is it 
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that an obsessive patient like Dr. L may recognize easily an idea 
that the analyst has laboriously reconstructed, yet remain un-
impressed by its relevance to his neurotic conflicts? 
40 In his conclusion Freud says his patient has, as it were, disintegrated 
into three personalities (pp. 248-249). Does he mean to imply that 
there were three distinct personalities operating within one body? Is 
this latter idea so foreign to lay persons or, indeed, to children? H o w 
might we understand the presence of so many doubles, twins, good 
witches vs. bad witches, and ghosts in children's stories? (We recon-
sider this great question, and its relevance to religious myth, below 
in our discussion of "The Uncanny"). 
Original Record of the Case 
(SE 10, pp. 253-318) 
Although Freud never intended that his notes be published, we are 
extremely fortunate to have them. They show Freud's mind at work, one 
of the wonders of this century, and they give us a much fuller portrait of 
the patient's day-to-day life. They also permit us to ask a number of 
additional questions, the answers to which will help explain the hints 
Freud makes about the connection between his patient's great fear about 
the rats and the general topic of anal sexuality. 
41 It will have struck the reader new to Freud that his patients seem 
to be extraordinarily concerned about the smells, products, and 
state of their genitals and the status of others' as well. W e recall 
the fascination and dread about genital secretions that marked 
Dora's thoughts about herself, e.g., the switch-word "drops." So 
too, Dr. L's associations are tied to genitals, feces, urine, semen, 
blood, odors, and other kinds of discharge. Is this peculiar to 
neurotics or to nineteenth-century Vienna? H o w are these body 
products treated in our culture? (Are they in some way still magi-
cal substances?) 
42 In a similar way, Dr. L's transference fantasies about Freud and 
members of Freud's family are distinctly scatological. In what 
extra-analytic circumstances does one find scatological comments 
to abound? W h o in our culture and what professions are espe-
cially concerned with odors and fragances? 
43 Compare Dr. L's equation of rats and money and his fascination 
with anal imagery with the major themes of the play and film 
"Guys and Dolls." In the latter the big gambling scene takes place 
in a giant underground sewer. W h y does this make psychological 
sense (was the movie a crap out or did it bring in buckets of 
money)? 
44 A m o n g the fascinating accounts of the transference interaction 
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Freud mentions that he had once given his patient some food (pp. 
311, 314-315). This elicits a great many fantasies from the patient. 
W h y ? O n p. 303 Freud simply tells us he was hungry and was fed 
(note that their two families were distantly known to one another). 
45 Assuming the reader of these questions has made it through these 
two case histories it cannot fail to impress him or her that they are 
about actions and thoughts that verge on the disgusting, and are 
almost always in the worst of taste. Must this be so? Compare 
these fantasies and wishes with the overt actions in children's T V 
shows in this culture. Is it easier to watch a cops and robbers show 
than it is to read "Dora" or "Rat Man"? W h y might this be so? 
From the History of an Infantile Neurosis 
(SE 17) 1918 "Wolf Man" 
Although this case history, popularly known as the "Wolf Man" in 
honor of the patient's dream about wolves, is Freud's longest and most 
detailed, it lacks the breathless quality of urgent discovery that charac-
terizes both "Dora" and "Rat Man." One reason for this is Freud's didac-
tic efforts to defend his science against his critics Jung and Adler, both of 
w h o m had been his collaborators. These efforts, especially chapter five, 
are not mere polemics. O n the contrary, Adler's rationalist critique, 
especially, is important because it exemplifies contemporary philosophic 
opinions about psychoanalysis and hence Freud's response is as pertinent 
now as it was then. 
Yet the case is a vivid and fascinating account of the life of a real 
human being whose inner turmoil is captured in Freud's account and 
made intelligible to us. It is an ideal bridge text since it connects Freud's 
strictly clinical theories with larger questions about the social and cul-
tural factors that influence each of us. More so, it contains an extended 
analysis of the boy's religion (chapter six) and so takes us to our final 
consideration of Freud's essays on religion proper. 
Introduction (I) 
and General Survey of the Case (II) 
Technical Terms 
Primal scene; deferred reaction; screen memory; narcissism; passive/ 
active aims; bisexuality; sublimation 
1 Although Freud says he cannot hope to give a complete and full 
account of this long case, which lasted four years, any more than 
he could of that of Dora, which lasted fourteen weeks, the story is 
remarkably coherent. (On first reading it may help to jot down 
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the chronology he sets out on p. 121 in chapter nine.) The title of 
the case history suggests we are to follow the investigation of a 
child's mind via psychoanalysis. Yet the patient is a young man! 
H o w does Freud defend both his title and the claims he intends to 
make about his patient as a boy? 
Freud summarizes the boy's history: he passed from anxiety-
hysteria (tied to an animal phobia), to obsessional neurosis (tied to 
strict religious observances), to a final collapse when he was seven-
teen (p. 8). Assuming this is an accurate sketch, compare the nature 
of psychiatric "diseases" with that of others. Can chicken pox turn 
into pneumonia and that into some other distinct disease? 
Freud has other reasons for publishing this case history: to expli-
cate his claim about the libidinal component and the absence of 
"any aspirations towards remote cultural aims" (p. 9). What must 
his assumptions be about the development of adult sexuality and 
adult personality in general such that he can confidently "post-
diet" the nature of his patient's infantile sexuality and infantile 
personality? (Recall the passages in the Introductory Lectures 
regarding the question of psychic determinism.) 
What is the "attachment to myself" that Freud says was of major 
importance in his effort to overcome his patient's resistance? W h y 
would the hypnotic-like lucidity Freud's tactic engendered be of 
special significance in this case of retrospective analysis? (Com-
pare it to Dora's usual mode of communication.) 
It sometimes happens that an ardent neurotic will suddenly change, 
drop all symptoms, and achieve something like normal psychologi-
cal functioning. For example, some neurotics became true heroes in 
the midst of concentration camps. Does this mean that therefore 
they were not really ill to begin with and that all they really needed 
was the correct exhortation or challenge? Given his analogy of the 
army fighting across a piece of land, how would Freud account for 
such dramatic moments of healing? (Would this be true of religious 
cures, as well?) 
General Survey of the Patient's Environment 
and the History of the Case 
III: The Seduction and Its Immediate Consequences 
In summarizing the story Freud says his patient threw all the inci-
dents around his "naughty period" into a jumbled mess (p. 15). 
W h y would he do so at the beginning of his analysis? (Note that 
as in "Rat Man" the case history includes a dominant theme of 
religious concerns that are somehow tied up with anal fantasies.) 
The patient reports two "screen memories" (p. 19). Are these 
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accurate memories of an actual event? If not, why does the patient 
experience them as if they were? And why would they be repeated 
so many times and have such strong feelings attached to them? W h y 
are dreams repeated? What caused the dreams reported on this 
page? 
8 W h y would the boy's initiation into sexual play by his older sister 
offend his masculine self-esteem? W h e n would such damage most 
likely occur? W h y is the issue of passivity and activity of such 
importance here? If his sister had been the guilty party, why 
would the little boy rage at the English governess and not his 
sister? W h y did he not report the "outrage" to either the govern-
ess or his Nanya? (Compare his reaction to his sister's death with 
his homage to the great poet.) 
9 As Freud mentions in the beginning section of the case history, 
ardent skeptics of psychoanalytic claims will not be persuaded by 
this short account. Which items of the seduction drama will 
appear most unlikely to the naive or skeptical reader? H o w does 
the boy acquire more and more confirmation of the reality of 
castration? H o w does it happen that so many children's stories 
lend themselves to these kinds of interpretations? 
10 The theme of passivity reappears in this section when Freud 
explains why the boy (1) concocted masochistic fantasies about 
being struck on the penis, (2) had sexual longings for his father (in 
which he vaguely pictured himself as receiving something from 
his father), and (3) fell away from the genital level of psycho-
sexual functioning. H o w does the threat and "reality" of castration 
figure into each of these passive responses? Are all children capa-
ble of such passive traits? 
11 H o w does the boy change the meaning of his screaming fits when 
his father returns? Is corporal punishment tinged with or related 
to sexual or erotic feelings? What facts of adult sexual life support 
(or refute) this association of violence and sexuality? (Looking 
forward, how does the infant's perception of the primal scene 
prefigure this later aggressive desire to be beaten by his father?) 
IV: The Dream and the Primal Scene 
12 The first three pages of this chapter are excerpts from Freud's 
essay on dreams and fairytales (1913d). Note that immediately 
after relating the dream the patient says it took a long time for 
him to realize it was only a dream, and not a real perception 
(p. 29). W h y will Freud hold that this is an important clue as to 
the reality of the primal scene? (The associations that follow are 
beautiful examples of dream interpretation.) 
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13 In addition to this clue, Freud accepts his patient's emphasis upon 
the stillness of the wolves and how attentively they peered at him 
(p. 34). Together with these clues he lists the theme of castration, 
sexual problems, his father and something terrible (p. 34). H o w 
does Freud get from this set of factors to the central intepretation 
on p. 37? What principles from the interpretation of dreams help 
us explain how the boy transformed the sight of his parents copu-
lating in bed into a vision of the wolves sitting in the trees? 
14 The evidence suggests that the boy witnessed his parents copulating 
one afternoon when he was about a year and a half. Yet his anxiety 
dream occurred two and a half years later, when he was about four! 
Is this a problem for Freud's interpretation of the dream? H o w does 
he propose to account for such a "deferred reaction" (p. 38)? Later, 
we learn, the boy had a Latin teacher named Wolf. Does this mean 
that "fate" was against him? (Compare this piece of fate with the 
Rat Man's propensity for finding uncanny connections between his 
thoughts and external occurrences.) 
15 As w e learned in the lectures on dream interpretation, Freud does 
not consider a dream to be interpreted fully until each element in 
the dream is accounted for and until one can re-express the manifest 
dream in straightforward language: the latent dream thoughts. 
What thoughts underlie the wolf dream? 
16 H o w did his mother and father "become wolves"? Are there simi-
lar themes of animals losing their tails, or some other extremity in 
fairy tales and folk literature? If so, how did they arise? Ought 
parents and teacher to excise them from the curriculum? Com-
pare the number and kinds of monsters with which contemporary 
children are fascinated—are they similar to the wolves and other 
sadistic animals of the Wolf Man's childhood? 
V: A Few Discussions, and 
VI: The Obsessional Neurosis 
17 Freud recounts the three major problems that confront his recon-
struction of the latent dream thoughts which, when transformed 
by the dream work, issued in the anxiety dream. H e then 
attempts to solve them. W h y is the "rationalization" of infantile 
sexuality (p. 49) so attractive? And why, even if events like the 
seduction and witnessing of the primal scene were merely adult 
fantasies ascribed to an early period, would analysis proceed in 
exactly the same manner? 
18 Freud's answer contains the surprising thesis that it is precisely the 
fact that the analyst must reconstruct them that argues in favor of 
their authenticity. W h y does this "single admission" not decide the 
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whole dispute? Why does the recurrence of material in dreams sup-
port his claim about the reality of the reported experiences? What 
single principle of mental functioning, again, underlies Freud's con-
fidence in his formulation of the "laws of dream-formation" (p. 51)? 
19 Another obvious and important objection to Freud's general thesis 
is the assertion that since psychoanalysts are so committed to a 
"depth" theory, and have themselves been initiated, as it were, 
into the "cult" of analysis, they will ascribe necessarily a fixed set 
of fantasies to their patients and so find "confirmation" of what 
they themselves created. H o w does Freud answer this frequent 
charge? D o other scientists demand that their critics acquire a 
firsthand knowledge of the facts before they launch their critical 
demands? Would this hold for the philosophic critics of analysis as 
well? 
20 Yet another problem emerges for Freud when he addresses the 
task of answering Adler and Jung, both of w h o m were experi-
enced analysts and therefore, presumably, had met Freud's initial 
demands, above. Is Freud denying what they say is true? If not, 
what is their error? H o w would one go about verifying or falsi-
fying Freud's claims that Adler and Jung could not tolerate the 
truly revolutionary aspects of analysis? 
21 In the addendum, pp. 57-60, Freud reconsiders the problem of the 
reality of the primal scene, since there is evidence that the boy may 
have observed sheep dogs copulating in the manner and with the 
frequency that his fantasy ascribes to his parents. After considering 
these arguments Freud gives his characteristic response, "I can tol-
erate the charge of absurdity," and says the question remains 
marked by a non liquet (p. 60). W h y use this judicial metaphor 
here? 
22 In chapter six w e read how the boy employed his religious 
instruction in support of his major anxieties. As Freud admits, the 
boy's original criticisms and questions about the Bible story, the 
Christian story, were especially keen—so much so that Freud 
attempted to convince his patient that he had incorrectly ascribed 
adult skepticism and critical powers to his boyhood. H o w does 
Freud account for this precociousness? 
23 H o w does the first sublimation, through religious identifications, 
differ from the second? W h y does the first give rise to obsessional 
symptoms, e.g., the bedtime rituals? Are these "overdetermined"? 
Is the persistence of ritualization in religion a sign of successful or 
unsuccessful sublimation? (Freud, of course, addresses these ques-
tions in his texts on religion which w e discuss below.) 
24 What are the two ambivalent feelings that "were to rule the 
whole of his later life" (p. 66)? H o w did the boy come to identify 
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the Holy Ghost (hagios pneuma) with his father and him in turn 
with an evil spirit who threatened bodily harm? Would this kind 
of identification occur in all young boys undergoing Christian 
instruction? W h y not? To understand more fully the link between 
the Christian story and his symptoms diagram how the young boy 
recasts the religious data along the lines of his earliest concerns. 
25 W h y was the new sublimation, effected under his German tutor, a 
better one? W a s it constructed for the same purposes as the first? 
Given this rudimentary explication of the meaning of the term, can 
we say that analysis itself fosters sublimations or that it replaces 
them with something else? H o w does the patient's response to ther-
apy differ from his response to the religious and then the military 
sublimations of his homosexual interests? 
VII: Anal Eroticism and the Castration Complex, and 
VIII: Fresh Material from the Primal Period-Solution 
26 The translator rightly refers us to Freud's essay on "Character and 
Anal Eroticism," for there he explains some of the extraordinary 
facts he simply mentions in this case history. Yet having read "Rat 
Man," and having reflected upon the pervasiveness of anality in 
our culture, w e can plunge ahead. (On the connection between 
money and anality see chapter three in Fisher and Greenberg, 
1977.) 
27 Consider the evidence Freud adduces linking his patient's fascina-
tion with money to his dread of his father (he mentions at least 
seven distinct examples). W h y does his lack of knowledge about 
his actual expenditures and his bank balance suggest that he has 
attached unconscious wishes to all his monetary dealings? 
28 H o w did his bowels "join in the conversation" (p. 76) with the 
work of the analysis? Since feces are connected in our adult cul-
ture as well as in the patient's adult life with money, does it fol-
low that feces and the bowels in general always had this signifi-
cance? H o w , according to this argument, did the patient come to 
use his bowels as a means of identifying himself with his mother? 
29 Freud does not overlook the contradiction engendered by his two 
distinct interpretations of the meaning of the bowel symptoms. 
W h y are unconscious processes capable of such contradictions, 
while conscious ones are not? What psychical mechanism allows 
us to explain how the boy retained these two incompatible 
theories—the cloacal one and the vaginal one? If the former is 
widely held, what kind of games or dreams or fantasies might we 
expect to see associated with it? 
30 Given Freud's general theory of mental functioning, why does he 
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conclude that his patient's sudden bowel problems, during their 
joint investigations of his anal birth theories, are confirmations of 
their reconstruction of the primal scene? (Compare the sudden 
appearance of "transitory symptoms" with Freud's conjecture that 
the boy's father may have scolded him—perhaps threatening vio-
lent punishment—when he soiled himself.) 
31 H o w is his "sordid avarice" (p. 83) and the intensity with which 
he accused his mother and sister of greed a measure of his anxi-
ety? More specifically, what permits Freud to conclude (p. 84) 
that the young boy's fear of castration was allayed by and some-
how transformed into the eroticizatlon of the fecal mass? 
32 From this immensely odd condensation of feces, penis, and baby 
into one unconscious representation, the patient concocted a 
sequence of representations of castration (pp. 85-88). W h y is his 
obsessional relationship to his tailors an especially good clue as to the 
reality of this unconscious fear? 
33 Chapter eight contains an account of the final interpretations 
which effected a cure of his patient. Furthermore, Freud extends 
his attempts to distinguish his method from those of Jung, Adler 
and rationalist philosophers who attempt to use the standards and 
modes of conscious psychology to account for neurotic behavior. 
It may help to diagram the differences between Freud's initial 
interpretation of the butterfly's stripes (p. 89) with the much more 
complex and idiosyncratic one that the patient eventually pro-
duces (pp. 90-91). 
34 Could anyone have predicted a child would come to associate the 
hour of five in the evening with the R o m a n V, and that with a 
butterfly wing moving, and those in turn with a w o m a n in sexual 
passion? Is the prediction of the organism's future behavior a 
crucial task of any authentic science? If analysts cannot predict 
consistently their patients' behavior, what constrains them from 
offering an infinite number of ad hoc "post dictions"? Could the 
patient himself perhaps have done this under Freud's insistence 
and, like a poet, simply fabricated a plausible connection between 
truly random elements? (Consider how the patient fell into violent 
love and consider how the treatment ended.) 
35 Freud has some sheep dog characteristics himself. Having reported 
the patient's beautiful dream of the "Espe" (p. 94), he returns to the 
nagging question of the authenticity of the primal scene (p. 95). 
H o w could one decide the question of the boy's feelings when he 
was two-and-a-half and urinating in front of Grusha? If this is not 
decidable, what kind of additional information or support would 
one require in order to answer these kinds of questions? (Freud's 
reflections on the phylogenetic heritage will emerge with more 
Three Case Histories 67 
force in Totem and Taboo, which we discuss below.) 
36 Freud then returns to one of his patient's most idiosyncratic pro-
nouncements: that he experienced the world as if hidden from it by 
a veil (p. 75 in the SE text). Given the complexity of this element it 
will pay one to chart out the associations the patient brings to bear 
upon it. At the same time it is worth noting what it does not include: 
Freud's hypothesis linking the torn veil with the tearing of the 
hymen of a virgin is not pertinent (p. 101, n.). W h y not? 
37 H o w does Freud arrive at his conclusion, which is also a final for-
mulation of the meaning of the adult's neurosis, that the fantasy 
underlying the Wolf Man's symptoms was one of copulation with 
a powerful male? H o w does the lifting of the veil correlate with 
this extraordinary fantasy? (Is it extraordinary?) 
38 The libido theory, in all its manifestations, has been criticized 
from the beginning as either much too abstract, since it refers to 
energies one can never measure objectively, or much too concrete, 
since it entails claims about the "organ" source of psychological 
energy. Yet Freud clung to it, just as he clings to his more difficult 
and improbable views on the primal scene. W h y ? If there were 
no such thing as anal eroticism, what status could we give to 
Freud's interpretations and reconstructions in this case? 
IX: Recapitulations and Problems 
39 In summarizing his presentation Freud delimits carefully what he 
feels his science can account for and what remains beyond its ken: 
W h y can one case not exhaust all possible elements of the psyche? 
Compare the method of analysis with that of microscopic investi-
gation: W h y can the former not pretend to the clarity and cer-
tainty of the latter? W h y , for example, is the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious processes not a stable indicator of the 
accuracy of reconstructions? What other sciences have these kinds 
of difficulties? 
40 "Whenever he shrank back onto the transference from the difficul-
ties of the treatment, he used to threaten m e with eating m e up and 
later with all kinds of other ill-treatment" (pp. 106-107). H o w does 
this kind of example support Freud's roundabout description of the 
primacy of the oral phase? What other kinds of evidence would you 
require before granting him this claim? (Note the editor's reference 
to Freud's Three Essays [1905, SE 7].) 
41 H o w can we distinguish a conflict between sexual urges and the 
ego as a whole (what Freud terms here the moral ego) and a con-
flict between active and passive sexual impulses? W h y are the 
latter not identical with masculine and feminine sexual currents 
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(that is, with bisexuality)? Finally, how do we know that the 
"sadistic-anal" phase persisted and triumphed even as the boy 
entered puberty? 
42 Freud's major goal is to document the ways in which an original 
anxiety hysteria was transformed into an obsessional neurosis, 
which in turn underlay the patient's collapse in his late teenage 
years. W e see the pieces fit into place only in the last part of the 
analysis (and in the last part of Freud's exposition). W h y ? W h y 
would the final key to the neurotic conundrums appear only at 
the end of the analysis? 
43 Did religion offer the boy any help at all in his difficulties? What 
"incomparable sublimation" did the Passion story offer the young 
boy? Freud says three things militated against his ability to adopt 
a religious solution (pp. 117-118). Which of these is the most sig-
nificant? Could the patient have become aware of his strong 
homosexual yearnings without the benefit of analysis? That is, 
what elements in his theory would Freud have to revise if we 
were to show him a case similar to this, including its religious 
dimensions, in which the patient was fully aware of his homosex-
ual longings? 
44 Is the "narcissistic" frustration Freud ascribes to his patient's bout 
with venereal disease a product of the breakthrough of instinctual 
forces alone, or is it something additional? What other indications 
do w e have that his narcissistic feelings were excessive? Freud 
says his patient did not achieve a complete sublimation through 
his religious devotions and practices. Does this mean that another 
person, one less ill or with better luck, might have done what the 
Wolf M a n could not? Might religious institutions provide avenues 
for the sublimation of narcissistic feelings, even excessive ones? 
W e consider these latter questions when w e contemplate 
Freud's analysis and critique of religion. W e will see that religion 
is one of Freud's lifelong concerns. Freud was not a shallow ratio-
nalist psychologist nor was he a shallow rationalist critic of reli-
gion. The sheer volume of his works on religion documents the 
intellectual intensity he expended upon its elucidation. However, 
before w e can understand completely the nature and extent of 
that critique w e must first comprehend his general theory of cul-
ture. One way to accomplish that task is to read critically his 
major short essays on the relationship between the individual and 
civilization. Principal among these is his wonderful essay, "The 
Uncanny." 
Ill 
T H E CRITIQUE O F RELIGION 
"The Uncanny" (SE 17) 1919 
Totem and Taboo (SE 13) 1912-13 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 
(SE 18) 1921 
The Future of an Illusion (SE 21) 1927 
Moses and Monotheism (SE 23) 1939 
As I suggested in the introduction to this study, many traditionalists 
in religious studies and other non-psychiatric disciplines will find m y 
approach to Freud frustrating. W h y take the long road to a critical read-
ing of his texts on religion when his official statement about religion, The 
Future of an Illusion, is readily available? Having tried to teach some-
thing about Freud's thought for seven years, I find three things funda-
mentally wrong with this traditionalist position and therefore with the 
usual humanistic approach to Freud (particularly that of philosophers 
and theologians). 
First, Freud's genius is not that of an abstract thinker. Rather it is 
that of the perceptive and revolutionary observer whose discoveries, like 
that of Columbus, are contrary to received opinion. The Future of an 
Illusion does not constitute his greatest gift to Western thinking (his 
place in history is assured without it). 
Second, one cannot properly understand the sweep and authority of 
his psychoanalytic claims—as opposed to his philosophic claims—without 
having spent some time laboring in the vineyards of self-observation, 
dream interpretation, and, ideally, personal therapeutic experience. All 
his thoughts on religion are the results of applied psychoanalysis—a fact 
to which he readily admits. They are hypothetical in the extreme and so 
depend for their authority upon the clinical theory elucidated in part in 
the three great case histories w e studied above. 
Third, psychoanalysis is primarily an observational science whose 
practitioners remain committed to fulfilling the general requirements of 
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scientific objectivity and rigor. And for that reason all honest analytic 
theorists admit that some formulations, for example about the absolute 
source of neurotic symptoms, are conjectures, while others are well 
established theorems, for example that obsessions and anality are inexo-
rably tied together. While some notable attempts have been made to 
formalize psychoanalytic theory, no one would claim they have been 
completely successful. It is not accidental that in his last work, A n Out-
line of Psycho-Analysis (1938), Freud concludes that w e still know very 
little about the mechanisms which underlie the creation of neurotic 
behavior. Hence psychoanalytic propositions rarely achieve the kind of 
formal elegance and clarity that mark the standard of philosophic 
deductions. 
The upshot of these three factors is that traditional rationalists, even 
those sympathetic to the possibility of psychoanalytic truths, will find 
that Freud is incompatible with their usual values and usual notions of 
veracity. In most cases the rationalist critic remains a rationalist and 
Freud is labeled with a current generality (reductionist, hermeneutic 
theorist, semiotician) and then forgotten. This seems to m e wrong. 
A final virtue of taking the long road is that w e can now read criti-
cally the texts on religion with more clarity and less hindrance than 
otherwise would have been possible. Texts w e consider in this final sec-
tion are "The Uncanny" (1919); Totem and Taboo (1912-13), an analysis 
of primitive religion; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 
(1921), an analysis of religious leadership and identity; The Future of an 
Illusion (1927), an essay on religious belief; and Moses and Monotheism 
(1939), an imaginative foray into the prehistory of the Jews. 
"The Uncanny" (1919) 
In this often overlooked yet splendid essay Freud sounds many of 
the themes on religion proper that he advances in his longer more for-
mal treatises. In keeping with m y policy of showing how Freud devel-
oped those treatises, and how they are built upon his clinical theory, we 
examine this essay first. This reflects Freud's general plan of attack. W e 
recall that he began his Introductory Lectures by discussing typical and 
quite unextraordinary behaviors: parapraxes. This rather pretentious 
term, with its air of scientific obscurity, was not his. It was imported by 
his English translators. Freud's terms were ordinary German expressions 
which we might better translate as "mishearing," "missaying," etc. The 
difference between the two modes of expression is not trivial. It amounts 
to a difference in point of view: Freud wishes to move from general 
truths, captured in ordinary language, to the presentation of new truths 
uncovered by psychoanalysis. His was a general psychology from the 
beginning. His English translators, like many other academics, began 
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their labors with the wish to demonstrate the power of their discipline 
and to distinguish it from its competitors. A Freudian approach to reli-
gion, then, will first analyze the structure of a universal experience, like 
that of the uncanny, and then venture onto the analysis of the particular 
experiences of one group or of one person. 
This essay is doubly important to us who wish to evaluate Freud's 
opinions on religion. First, it carries out his manifest intention to lay the 
groundwork for the analysis of religion. Second, w e see Freud, for the 
first time, exemplify his own intense ambivalence toward religion. 
Technical Terms 
Omnipotence of thought 
1 Why is Freud obliged to awaken within himself the possibility of 
experiencing the particular feelings that mark the "uncanny" 
(p. 220)? What kind of people would not require this effort? Would 
a perfectly healthy and happy person ever have "uncanny" experi-
ences? (We consider this question at length below.) 
2 Reading Freud's accounts of the German term "unheimlich" for 
the first time may tire one, especially if one is unacquainted with 
German. One should buck up though and see if his analysis fits 
the apparently similar English terms, "eery," "weird," "sinister," 
and "uncanny." An unabridged dictionary will prove an ally. D o 
these terms designate something that is both known yet unknown 
and frightening? 
3 If there are no strong parallels between the English and German 
terms, does that fact affect his general argument? Here the good 
student and good teacher will want to recall as many varied 
examples of uncanny experiences as possible. In addition to mak-
ing for a very lively class hour—full of wonderful stories which 
people are dying to tell—it brings the argument to a point: W h y 
are w e so fascinated with fortune telling, ghosts, spirits, ESP, and 
so on? 
4 Following the lead of Jentsch, Freud considers Hoffmann's famous 
tale about the mechanical doll Olympia whose story evokes a "quite 
unparalleled atmosphere of uncanniness" (p. 227). W h y does Freud 
say that the key to the story is "ambivalence" rather than "ambigu-
ity"? W h y would Hoffmann's faint satire tend to decrease the story's 
uncanny effect? 
5 Consider the nurse's tale about the Sand-Man (the story within the 
story). W h y did she (in contrast to his mother) tell the young boy 
this story in the first place? Recall our discussion of the Wolf Man's 
anxieties: D o fairy tales and folklore lend themselves to Freudian 
interpretation through accident alone? (If fairy tales are full of such 
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atrocities ought children to be spared them? Would such censorship 
remove the primary source of children's anxieties?) 
6 Freud holds that the source of the tale's particular power is its 
representation, again and again, of injury to one's eyes. And this 
he connects to castration anxiety. What is his evidence for this 
claim? H e says that the fear of castration is primary to the fear of 
damaging one's eyes. W h y is this claim so important to his argu-
ment? W h y would eyes be especially good candidates for sym-
bolic equivalents of the male genitals? 
7 The extensive footnote on p. 232 (in the SE) is especially useful 
for it demonstrates Freud's reconstruction of the original story. 
What would correspond to it in dream interpretation? What is the 
father imago and at what psychosexual stage would one expect to 
find splits like this take place? Given this, why would the theme 
of castration be repeated so many times in the story—or in a 
patient's dreams or in his transference fantasies? 
8 Consider other uncanny stories (a favorite example is Henry 
James's The Turn of the Screw): Would one expect to find that 
castration anxiety was always the single most important uncon-
scious element? Both James and Hoffmann employ the theme of 
doubt on the part of their respective narrators. Given what we 
know of the genesis of neurotic anxiety (e.g., in the development 
of the Rat Man's symptoms), why would this ploy be especially 
likely to succeed? (How is doubt connected to repression and 
repression to the formation of symptoms?) 
9 H e turns to the equally fascinating theme of the "double." (Why 
is this theme fascinating? Is "fascination" akin to "uncanny"?) 
H o w is the double linked to "a special faculty" of the mind which 
is able to oppose the rest of the ego? H o w is the double connected 
to the two parts of the father imago? Consider the presence of 
doubles or side-kicks in popular culture: D o they manifest the 
latent characteristics Freud predicted of them? (Compare Super-
m a n with Don Quixote and Sancho Panza!) 
10 H e gives more illustrations, including one w e have seen already in 
our discussion of the "Rat Man." W h y would obsessional neurotics 
be especially likely to report uncanny experiences? H o w is a 
belief in the "omnipotence of thoughts" (p. 240) manifested in 
reports of the uncanny? (Consider your own examples of the 
uncanny taken from everyday life: D o they too manifest a similar 
belief in the magical power of certain kinds of thoughts?) 
11 Freud summarizes his major propositions on p. 241. Explicate his 
two conclusions and show how each pertains to the "phylogenetic" 
and "ontogenetic" considerations he advances. Under which rub-
ric should we place the information given us about Hoffmann's 
The Critique of Religion 73 
own unhappy boyhood? Assuming that Freud is correct about 
these two conditions necessary to the production of the uncanny, 
how might one employ them in the conscious creation of uncanny 
effects in a film or a novel? 
12 "I should not be surprised to hear that psychoanalysis has 
itself become uncanny to many people for that very reason' 
(p. 243). Has this occurred? What is the usual understanding of 
psychoanalysis in our culture? H o w is it portrayed in the movies, 
or in N e w Yorker cartoons? Does this occur for any other kind of 
psychology? Are analysts hated and loved, feared and reviled, like 
their counterparts in so-called primitive societies? 
13 Of the two sources of the uncanny so far discussed, which is most 
likely to decrease with the advance in civilization and which is 
most likely to increase? At what point in their treatment would 
we expect patients undergoing analysis to report uncanny experi-
ences? H o w might they describe what would appear to be sudden 
fulfillments of their transference wishes? (Is the uncanny related 
to the experience known as having chills run up and down one's 
spine?) 
14 " . Not everything that recalls repressed desires and surmounted 
modes of thinking belonging to the prehistory of the individual and 
of the race—is on that account uncanny" (p. 245). W h y not? W h y 
does Freud hesitate to apply his formula to the uncanny in literature 
in general? What is the peculiarly directive power creative writers 
exercise over us? Does this mean that the N e w Testament stories are 
not fictional—or intended to be read as fiction—since they evoke no 
uncanny feelings in the reader? Or do they? Is the uncanny a kind 
of prototypical religious experience? 
Totem and Taboo (1912-13) 
Preface and Chapter I: The Horror of Incest 
Technical Terms 
Totem; taboo; categorical imperative; clan; phratry; Haeckel's Law; 
unconscious sense of guilt; compensation; rituals of excess; vicissitudes; 
cathexis; projection narcissism of minor differences 
1 The preface to this work is vital for there Freud delimits the 
extent of his claims and inquiry. W h y does he feel his comments 
on taboo are exhaustive while those on totemism are only conjec-
tures? Did Freud do "field work" with regard to either issue? Is 
psychoanalysis a kind of "anthropology"? If psychoanalytic claims 
are valid ought they to apply to all people equally? 
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2 Why does Freud choose to examine the behavior of Australian 
aborigines, w h o m he knows only through books, rather than the 
behavior of groups w h o m he might have investigated directly? 
Emile Durkheim, the great French sociologist, studied the same 
groups in a similar manner at roughly the same time (just before 
World W a r I). W h y would social theorists in general find the 
aborigines such attractive subjects? 
3 Are concepts like "ancient" and "archaic" applicable to human 
institutions, like religion, or human behavior, like language? An 
aborigine living today is as far removed in time from "proto-
humans" as we are. H o w can one say, nevertheless, that the aborig-
ine is "archaic" while we are advanced? (What would characterize 
an "archaic" language?) 
4 After offering definitions of the elusive term "totem," Freud 
attempts to demonstrate that primitives have an especially great 
horror of incest. W h y is the severity of their punishment for this 
kind of crime a clue to their fascination and dread of it at the same 
time? What general psychoanalytic rules is Freud here invoking? 
5 It seems one of the most c o m m o n avoidances is that between son-in-
law and mother-in-law. H o w does Freud connect this fact with the 
ways in which our culture treats this relationship? Consider three or 
four examples of this relationship in modern fiction or films. Do 
they manifest the level of ambivalence implied in Freud's discus-
sion? (An arduous research project suggests itself: to catalogue and 
analyze all the in-law cartoons that have appeared in the N e w 
Yorker or Playboy magazines over the last thirty years.) 
6 Freud concludes by comparing neurotics, children, and savages 
(pp. 16-17). W h y is this comparison of crucial importance to his 
general thesis? 
Chapter II: Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence 
7 Freud says he is much more confident about his interpretation of 
"taboo" than he is about his interpretation of totemism. Given 
what we know of his analysis of the "uncanny,'' why does it follow 
that "taboo violations have no grounds and are of unknown origin. 
They are unintelligible to us, to those who are dominated by 
them . . ." (p. 18)? H o w will understanding taboo help us under-
stand our own "categorical imperative" (Kant)? 
8 According to Wundt (p. 25) earlier stages of mythic thinking are 
preserved in later stages. What features of neurotic beliefs and 
actions exemplify a similar preservation? (Consider the three case 
histories, above: H o w does each manifest the preservation of 
archaisms?) 
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9 In part two of this chapter we are introduced to the psychoana-
lytic discussion. Given the warning on p. 26 that resemblances 
need not predict identity, what underlying pattern and what gen-
eral mechanisms must Freud attribute finally to the creation of 
taboos if they are to bear a psychoanalytic explanation? 
10 The crux of Freud's argument lies in his analogy between obses-
sional neurotic patterns and taboo practices. Analyze both the 
Maori chief example and the Mrs. Smith example (p. 28). (See p. 
96 after trying your hand.) Fill in the latter account with a con-
jecture as to the likely reason Mrs. Smith has become "taboo." 
(Note the prohibition upon touching suggested in the final sen-
tence in the paragraph.) 
11 One of the more puzzling aspects of "taboo illness" is the speed 
and dexterity with which the target of the prohibitions changes 
(e.g., recall Rat Man's intricate and contorted prayers). W h y does 
Freud argue that these instances of displacement are exact indica-
tors of the fact of repression? W h y does it make no sense to ask 
savages for the reason behind their taboo practices? 
12 Freud formulates quickly the two essential "laws" of totemism. Of 
what central psychosexual conflict are they the obvious and com-
plete correlates? Must each member of the group share the uncon-
scious desires against which these laws are erected? W h y must a 
primitive group, especially, inflict upon transgressors of these rules 
such severe punishment? H o w are taboo violators treated in our cul-
ture—are they criminals or "sick"? 
13 In parts three and four of this chapter Freud sets out to argue that 
the formal similarities between taboo and obsessional illness are 
more than happenstance. W h y is he so keen upon demonstrating 
that both are the results of primal ambivalence? H o w does he show 
this for rites? Consider his examples of taboo restrictions upon the 
treatment of enemies, the dead, and chiefs. Are there any similar 
restrictions—together with rituals of excess—in our culture? (Why 
are newly installed American presidents granted a "honeymoon" 
period, as the media cliche has it? What usually happens on a 
honeymoon? W h y are honeymoons called honeymoons?) 
14 Rituals of mourning and rites of interment are fascinating topics 
for psychoanalytic research since so much of the analysis of a 
normal person includes uncovering a whole slew of death wishes 
against loved ones and others. The observation and analysis of a 
typical funeral rite in our culture, together with a careful reading 
of Freud's great essay "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917, SE 14), 
would make an excellent field assignment. (On mourning and the 
fear of demons see Freud's remarks in section four, p. 65.) 
15 H o w is it that neurotics are atavistic vestiges of our primitive 
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ancestors? Does this mean that there is a phylogenetic, that is, inher-
ited, tendency toward regression operating in people prone to neu-
rosis? H o w might one go about measuring such a tendency? Yet 
most people are not neurotics. Does it follow that there is, therefore, 
no connection between their sense of guilt (or wrong) and what 
appears to be our c o m m o n ancestry? (Do modern American reli-
gious practices and teaching encourage or discourage the formation 
of a sense of guilt?) 
16 ". . There is no need to prohibit something that no one desires to 
do, and a thing that is forbidden with the greatest emphasis must 
be a thing that is desired" (p. 69). W h y is this claim crucial to 
Freud's entire argument? Is it plausible? (See also p. 123.) Con-
sider four or five things American children are forbidden to do, as 
well as four or five prohibitions from other groups: D o they mani-
fest a similar structure? (Note that they must be actions which are 
taboo, not merely dangerous or costly, e.g., a child is forbidden to 
carve the dining room table because it ruins a costly piece of 
furniture.) 
An equally interesting field of inquiry is the immense number 
of taboos established around race relations in multiracial societies, 
e.g., the American South, South Africa, and most South American 
countries with sizable European populations. If what is tabooed is 
what is naturally, but unconsciously, desired, what might we con-
jecture about the psychological source of institutionalized racism? 
H o w could one begin this kind of investigation? 
17 Freud concludes this long chapter with a famous comparison 
between three great social institutions and three types of neuroses. 
W h y are the latter asocial structures (note the Norton paperback 
edition dropped the a' from asocial)? Each line of these final two 
paragraphs is a condensed (and brilliant) assertion and is worthy 
of intense reflection. For example, why is it that sexual needs do 
not unite "men" in the same way as egoistic (or self-preservative) 
ones? (Related issues are raised in Bonner, 1980; Wilson, 1975; 
and Wilson and Lumsden, 1981.) 
Chapter III: Animism, Magic, and Omnipotence of Thoughts 
18 It is fashionable to explain Freud's opinions on religion and his the-
ory of primitive religion, especially, as reflections of his 19th-
century milieu, one of evolutionary speculation, racist doctrines 
masquerading as science, and so on. In what ways is he guilty of 
these charges—given, for example, his thesis about the three great 
stages in human evolution (p. 77)? H o w might one go about measur-
ing the change or alternation in group consciousness between, say, 
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the Greeks and the present day? Must evolution coincide with his-
tory? If so, does it follow that medieval science and religion and 
philosophy were of a much higher "stage" than those of the 
Athenian Greeks? 
19 After summarizing the opinions of the experts of his day, especially 
those of Frazer, Freud says they overlooked the "dynamic" factor 
(p. 83). What is a dynamic factor—in psychoanalytic terms? H o w 
does the Rat Man's phrase "the omnipotence of thoughts" aid Freud 
in arguing that there is a continuum between primitive magic, mod-
ern prayers, children's games, and our c o m m o n dream life? H o w is 
each a "vicissitude" of this universal belief? 
20 Freud invokes his libido theory to account for this universal phe-
nomenon. W h y is "overvaluation" a key element in his argument? 
What in the world is "narcissistic cathexis"? As always, one cannot 
understand these kinds of abstract psychoanalytic formulations 
without having examined a goodly number of examples. So get four 
or five examples of narcissistic cathexis: Ought they to be related to 
the famous oral, anal, phallic triad? (Can a teenage boy sometimes 
love his car like he loves his parents or himself?) 
21 Is Freud disdainful of the savages about w h o m he is writing? 
Nineteenth-century authorities on primitives explained most of 
their behavior as irrationally motivated. What is wrong with this 
approach—according to Freud? Would a group retain expensive 
and arduous rituals, like those described on p. 98, if they had no 
adaptive value? Must a group or society recognize those values? 
Might it prove more advantageous for them to sacralize and mystify 
the rationale for their actions? W h y is marital fidelity, for example, 
so crucial to our society? H o w is it enforced? 
IV: The Return of Totemism in Childhood 
22 Consider the footnote on pp. 102-103 and Freud's assessment of the 
reliability of his sources and, consequently, of the reliability of his 
own conjectures. Is it more difficult to understand children than 
adults? What kind of people seem especially "good" with children? 
Can one acquire these kinds of talents? Would psychoanalytic psy-
chotherapy, in principle, help one in that endeavor? 
23 After quoting Reinach's code du totemisme, Freud enumerates 
conflicting theories about the origin of this apparently universal cul-
tural institution. W h y is he especially intent upon arguing that 
totemism and exogamy are necessarily linked together (pp. 120-
125)? Freud wants to show that the horror of incest is inherited but 
not instinctual—what is the difference between the two modes of 
transmission of behavior? What kinds of additional experimental 
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evidence would help one choose between them? 
24 What is the "return of totemism" in childhood? W h y did Little 
Arpad say that he would like to eat "some fricasse of mother" 
(p. 131)? Is this a normal appetite for a young boy? H o w does 
Freud go from the analysis of his and Little Hans's phobias to 
claiming that the totemic animal is but a substitute for the father? 
25 In part four of this final chapter, Freud leans upon the work of 
Robertson-Smith (whose book is fascinating, by the way). W h y 
would some guests of Bedouin's be sure and part company after 
they have shared a meal, but before making a prolonged excur-
sion to the bathroom? 
26 Having summarized and transformed Robertson-Smith's theory, 
in part four, Freud marries it to Darwin's speculations about the 
origin of human social groups, in part five. What is the fantastic 
hypothesis born of this union? In a note on p. 142 Freud refers to 
evidence that mammalian herds often manifest a kind of horde 
structure, in which a dominant male controls sexual access to the 
females. Is this relevant to his speculations about the origin of 
primal groups? If so, ought w e to find vestiges of the same feel-
ings and attitudes in modern peoples? And do we? (Does Freud?) 
27 Given the analysis of totemic religion, e.g., on p. 145, is it fair to 
conclude that it, as well as later variations of it, are overdeter-
mined? If so, what characteristics must w e expect to find associ-
ated with it? Is there any form of a totemic sacrifice in Christian 
or Jewish religious traditions? (Why is Jesus called the L a m b of 
God? H o w does H e take away the sins of the world?) 
28 If the totem animal (or symbol which stands for the animal) rep-
resents the father and the god-head also represents the father, 
why this double representation? Recall the Rat Man's feelings 
about his father: D o you find in that story splits in the father-
imago similar to those occurring in Christianity? H o w did the 
"father-religion" become a "son-religion", and why does Freud 
feel this is a key to understanding the triumph of Christianity, 
especially in the West? (Would this also help account for the deep 
animosity official Christianity has shown towards Judaism?) 
29 Freud concludes this grand synthesis by suggesting that one can-
not account for the persistence of primal ambivalence and the 
sense of guilt without assuming that mental characteristics are 
somehow inherited. Is this a plausible Darwinian claim? If not, 
must it be incorrect? 
30 H e refers to Goethe's anti-Christian masterpiece. W h y does he use 
this quotation in this final statement? To which Old Testament and 
N e w Testament verses does Goethe's line refer? Finally, does it fol-
low that neurotics cannot make use of those cultural institutions, 
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including religion, which deal with the primal wishes (and memo-
ries) that underlie their own disorder? And if this is true, can one 
properly say that ordinary religion, that is, religion amenable to and 
established within a culture, is neurotic? 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) 
I: Introduction 
This essay, which Freud had begun drafting in 1919, is usually over-
looked in standard accounts of Freud's psychology of religion. Although 
there is a short chapter on the Catholic Church, it is perfunctory and no 
more extensive than a similar discussion of social hierarchy within the 
army. Yet the essay as a whole is vital for it illustrates the ways in which 
Freud sought to develop his theory of the person into a theory of the 
group. More so, it entails Freud's most powerful theoretical critique of 
religion. 
1 Freud feels he has to demonstrate that he has some right to speak of 
"group psychology," and he proffers an argument to that effect in 
this first section. What distinguishes "social phenomena," in this 
text, from those he wishes to term "narcissistic"? Although w e do not 
read The Ego and the Id (1923) in our c o m m o n labor, a fuller 
understanding of his claims will be gained by considering his 
famous notion of the superego (see below, chapter eight). W h y does 
it make sense to say that the superego is a "social phenomenon"? 
2 Recall Freud's comparison of the neuroses with social institutions: 
neurotics, he said, had turned away from social reality, and sought 
refuge in their fantasies. Is this consistent with his claim, in this text, 
that sociologists and group psychologists have argued for a "social 
instinct" that might better be described as the outgrowth of individ-
ual instincts operating within a small group, the family? (He men-
tions the individual's relationship to the physician—what other 
name might we attach to this relationship? Could transference 
occur at a "distance"?) 
II: Le Bon's Description of the Group Mind 
3 Just as he used anthropological authorities in Totem and Taboo, 
both as sources of information and as foils against which he could 
present his own thinking, Freud here uses Le Bon's famous discus-
sion of "groups' (which includes what we would term "mobs") to 
set off his own theory. What are the three questions Freud asserts 
a complete theory ought to answer, and why is it best to begin 
with the third? W h y is the question of the "bonding agent" so 
important to Freud? 
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4 Le Bon appears to have a dynamic theory of group formation for he 
too speaks about the "unconscious" elements that emerge when indi-
viduals enter into a group and throw off what was unique to them. 
Does Freud share this view? Is Le Bon's notion of the "unconscious" 
more compatible with Jung's, for example? A popular image of 
Freud's notion of the "unconscious" is that it contains all that is 
worst in human feelings and wishes, hence, what is "repressed," that 
is, forced into this dynamic unconscious, is always evil and vicious. 
But is this true? What kinds of feelings and wishes did Dora, Rat 
Man, and Wolf M a n repress? Could someone repress wishes that 
were in themselves innocent and even loving? 
5 W h y does Le Bon use the notion of "suggestion" in his explana-
tion of group formation? H o w do most novelists, movie directors, 
T V authors, etc., picture the status of an individual caught up in a 
group? H o w do they tend to portray mobs, strikes, and other mass 
movements? In other words, do they subscribe to Le Bon's theory 
or to Freud's? 
6 It will be useful to outline Le Bon's assessment of the characteristics 
of groups: D o they have any positive features? H o w do college foot-
ball crowds, for example, treat the opposing players—especially 
after having lost the "big game"? W h o , according to Freud, makes 
the great decisions and momentous discoveries that advance our civ-
ilization? In fact, what is the very worst failing Freud attributes to 
groups? D o you agree? 
7 As is often true, it pays to read Freud's footnotes, like that on 
p. 79. W h y can a child tolerate the presence of two wholly incom-
patible feelings about a parent, for example, while an adult could 
not? H o w is the gradual coordination of the sexual instincts paral-
lel to the gradual consolidation of the ego? Give an example or 
two from any of the three case histories in which the patient 
tolerated a "split" in his or her ego for some time, but finally 
reacted, "with all the usual consequences" (p. 79). 
8 Are Le Bon's notion of "prestige" (p. 81), Freud's notion of "trans-
ference," and Max Weber's notion of "charisma" similar to one 
another? (Weber's famous concept is discussed in his The Sociol-
ogy of Religion.) Are they compatible with one another? 
Ill: Other Accounts of Collective Mental Life 
9 After praising Le Bon's work and adopting his descriptions, Freud 
appears to take it all back in this chapter when he points out a major 
contradiction in Le Bon's account. H o w does the fact of language 
(p. 83), for example, argue against an entirely negative assessment 
of groups? Considering Freud's analysis of the uncanny in the essay 
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by that name, why would he be especially concerned to praise the 
"power" and "genius" of natural languages, like German and Eng-
lish? Does dream interpretation itself require one to know and use 
the genius of language? H o w so? 
10 W h y does Freud bother to quote from McDougall, whose opin-
ions on the nature of a group appear as incorrect and ordinary as 
those of Le Bon? W h y is the problem of "raising collective mental 
life to a higher level" (p. 86) so important? H o w do both Freud 
and McDougall picture the qualities of an individual who is not 
enmeshed in the workings of a "primitive group"? 
IV: Suggestion and Libido 
11 Freud refers to a number of authorities who attempted to explain 
how a group is able to influence an individual, usually for the worse. 
Chief among their theories is the notion of "suggestion." H o w does 
this theory, in the midst of a psychotherapeutic encounter, some-
times lead to "violence" (p. 89)? W h y does Freud quote the riddle 
about Christopher? Has this notion been retained in social scientific 
work after Freud? (What unconscious fantasies might likely be 
aroused by the notion of suggestion should a therapist introduce it 
into the treatment relationship?) 
12 Not too surprisingly Freud argues that "libido" is a better concept 
and ought to replace "suggestion." W h y ? What central character-
istic of libidinal activities make "libido" a better (more scientific 
and more concrete) term for explaining the formation of groups? 
(See his comments on Trotter, p. 87.) In the numerous treatises on 
"Love" one finds the author typically attempts to distinguish 
between types of love (sexual, friendship, parental, divine, etc.). 
C. S. Lewis's book, The Four Loves (1960) is one such example, 
though written at a level and with a skill much beyond the aver-
age. What's wrong with these books in general? W h y does Freud, 
again, turn to the "genius" of language in order to help justify his 
unitarian conception of "libido"? 
13 Reflecting back upon our reading of the three case histories, does 
one find that Dora, for example, had radically different concepts 
of love? For example, did she distinguish between her feelings for 
Herr K, for her father and for Freud? If there are no fundamen-
tal differences between these types of feelings, how can a child, 
for example, learn to distinguish "appropriate" from "inappropri-
ate" behavior? Consider Freud's remarks on the formation and 
dissolution of the Rat Man's feelings about his father. 
14 "Let us remember that the authorities make no mention of any 
such [erotic] relations" (p. 91). W h y is this not sufficient evidence 
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that these relations are not in fact erotic? 
V: Two Artificial Groups: The Church and the Army 
15 "A church and an army are artificial groups . . ." (p. 93). Why? Is 
punishment an important element in the creation and mainte-
nance of most religious organizations? H o w is discipline enforced? 
With what other kinds of groups is Freud comparing these two? 
W h y does he say that both church and army are held together by 
an illusion of love? W h y use the term "illusion" in this context? 
16 D o all great leaders, whether ethical or not, at least pretend to feel a 
compassion and affection for their followers? Is this true of Ameri-
can political leaders as well? (Consider FDR's fireside chats.) H o w 
could a wiser German General Staff have helped prevent the des-
truction of Wilson's 14 points? (Was Wilson an idealist who also 
failed to see the importance of illusion?) 
17 H o w does Freud use the existence of panic to argue against 
McDougall's "rationalistic" explanation? Under what conditions 
does one find that panic spreads like a contagion? W h y would the 
breaking of emotional ties lead to a state of panic in otherwise 
well-disciplined troops? If Freud is correct, what illusion would 
the clever leader always hope to convey about his or her feelings 
toward each of his followers? 
18 H e continues his analysis of panic with reference to a popular 
novel of his time. W h y would such a story enjoy "extremely large 
sales" (p. 98)? Would it in our time too? And what shall we say of 
his assessment of the nature of the religion of love? Must it be 
necessarily hard and unloving to outsiders? W h y ? H o w does 
Freud explain the decrease in wars of religion and religious perse-
cutions? Because w e are better people in w h o m reason now reigns 
supreme? 
VI: Further Problems and Lines of Work 
19 Which of the two great emotions, love and hate, is primary and 
which is secondary? W h y would Freud find this question inappro-
priate and misbegotten? Of the two great loves, love of self and 
love of others, which is primary and which is secondary? Is it just 
Europeans who manifest a narcissism of minor differences? What 
kind of libido is, as it were, the fuel or energy source to which 
groups have access and with which they carry out their enter-
prises? D o you find Freud's basic contentions supported or contra-
dicted by the techniques fund raisers and politicians employ? 
W h y do candidates wear Indian hats on reservations and hard 
hats in union halls? 
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20 What does "desexualized, sublimated homosexual love for other 
men" (p. 103) mean? Would most m e n accept this description of 
their motives for remaining within group formations? Would they 
recognize any truth at all in this metapsychological formulation? 
Freud realizes that his propositions will fail to convince most of 
us. Yet they have the merit of leading us to consider a more fun-
damental issue: identification. 
VII: Identification 
21 This is an extremely important chapter, even though it is only six 
pages. It is also extremely misleading. For example, the first sen-
tence is not true, according to other things Freud has told us, 
since w e must assume that infants manifest emotional ties with 
others prior to the development of classical oedipal feelings. (On 
this point see Schafer [1968] in which he elaborates the differences 
between identification, assimilation and introjection.) What cen-
tral tendency of mental life and ego development is responsible 
for the creation of the oedipal complex? 
22 Freud appears to say that the boy's competition with his father for 
his mother's favor causes him to hate the old man: but is this so? 
W h y does he invoke the case of the cannibal at this juncture? Which 
features of the Rat Man's story manifest similar cannibalistic fea-
tures? And which elements in "Dora" are also similar? 
23 Freud tries to distinguish between wanting to be like one's father 
and wanting to have one's father as a sexual object. Which is the 
more mature desire? Is this a linguistic distinction merely? Can 
we count on the genius of natural languages to come to Freud's 
rescue as it has in the past? The SE translators use the term "ego" 
on these pages (pp. 106-107) when referring to a person. Are 
there better terms? What type of persons and which age groups 
seem especially prone to imitate people w h o m they respect or 
admire? If a patient like Dora begins to imitate the analyst, is that 
a sign that she is advancing along the paths of ego maturation? 
W h y would group identifications of the kind described on p. 107 
contribute to repression? Given this claim, how would Freud 
assess the utility of group psychotherapy in general? 
24 Does Freud denigrate those who manifest identification? Ought 
psychoanalysts and others in helping professions to display "empa-
thy"? Is Freud correct in not distinguishing empathy from sympa-
thy? W a s he empathic with Dora, in your judgment? Are there 
general characteristics that empathic persons share? Are your best 
teachers empathic—must they be so? What virtues might an 
empathic teacher exhibit and what role might such teachers play 
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in the development of one's emotional life (p. 108)? 
25 Freud then discusses two additional examples of identification: 
that which he says is present in some kinds of homosexuality and 
that which appears in some cases of melancholia (note the two 
essays to which he refers in the footnote on p. 109). What does 
the phrase "it remoulds the ego in one of its important features— 
in its sexual character—upon the model of what has hitherto been 
the object" (pp. 108-109) mean? H o w is he using the term "ego" 
here? Ought one to find this kind of identification in all cases of 
homosexuality? H o w does identification preserve the lost object in 
both cases? 
26 In an especially laconic sentence he describes how identification is a 
first step in the creation of both melancholia and other behaviors in 
which conscience rages against part of the self. Is this persuasive? 
Consider an example of the workings of conscience in any one of the 
three case histories w e discussed above. W h y is conscience so often 
associated with a voice? Where does the voice come from and to 
w h o m does it belong? In other words, whose voice was it originally? 
W h y is there no eye of conscience? (And why are there evil eyes but 
not evil voices?) 
27 H e ascribes a number of functions to an agency here termed the 
ego-ideal. (Note that these functions are not those Freud will later 
attribute to the agency he terms the superego in his 1923 text, 
The Ego and the Id.) Is the differentiation between ego and ego-
ideal an automatic event that occurs necessarily at a fixed time 
and in a fixed mode in all people? Does it serve or hinder the 
aims of civilization? Would successful psychoanalytic treatment 
enhance or reduce one's tendency toward this differentiation? 
(How might the analytic situation itself, in which the therapist sits 
behind the patient, contribute to the construction of a more dif-
ferentiated ego-ideal? Are there corresponding arrangements in 
traditional religious practices?) 
VIII: Being in Love and Hypnosis 
28 As we have seen repeatedly, Freud appeals to the genius of ordinary 
language (rather than to the technical terms of science) when he 
launches a new generalization about psychic life (cf. his reliance 
upon the testimony of great artists w h o m he claims corroborate his 
theories). W h y and how does he rely upon the ordinary uses of the 
word "love"? (Children say they love ice cream, their parents cor-
rect them and have them say instead that they "like" ice cream. 
With w h o m does Freud side?) 
29 Sexual love is famous for its intense and short-lived qualities. Upon 
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orgasm either sleep or boredom prevail. Yet Freud unabashedly 
claims that it is sexual love which animates us, even to the carrying 
out of lengthy labors the ends of which one may not envision, or if 
envisioned, may not reach. What guarantees the possibility of main-
taining a lasting cathexis? Given this general theorem, which is 
unhappily buried in this, why would neurotic symptoms manifest a 
repetitious (cyclical) nature? 
30 H o w does the multiphasic structure of libidinal development con-
tribute to the elaboration of erotic variations like "affection"? Surely 
most adolescents, for example, would deny that their feelings for 
their parents are sexual. Are they wrong? Were Dora's feelings for 
her father sexual—only? Under what circumstances might one find 
affection turning back into sexual feelings? What kinds of transfor-
mations—in horror films, for example—seem especially fascinating 
to an audience (to us)? H o w do groups treat a fallen hero, say a 
basketball player, who fails to maintain his ideal status? 
31 " W e have always been struck by the phenomenon of sexual 
overvaluation " (p. 112). W h y is overvaluation a sure sign that 
the lover has found in the beloved a vehicle which bears the origi-
nal store of narcissism? Is it true, by the way, that adolescent love 
is an activity carried out as if the lover wore blinders? Is love 
blind? W h o , according to new parents, has the most beautiful 
baby in the world? Whose school is the greatest and whose father 
is the strongest in the world? 
32 Yet, according to Freud in this chapter, the idealization of the 
beloved cannot proceed if there is too much satisfaction. W h y ? If 
this is so, how might Freud explain the standard Western (civ-
ilized) requirements of chastity before marriage and fidelity after-
wards? Are these still ideals to which the majority would ascribe? 
W h e n do we know that idealization has gone too far? 
33 Freud goes on to make an especially obscure distinction: an object 
may replace either the ego or the ego ideal (p. 114). This gives 
him a way to show how hypnosis—one of the mysteries of the 
19th century and about which he wrote a great deal—is similar to 
being in love. H o w are they alike? If, as the footnote tells us, 
Freud later changed his mind and attributed reality testing to the 
ego, does the analogy still hold? W h y is hypnosis not a good anal-
ogy for group formation? (Is hypnosis an uncanny topic for most 
people too?) 
34 Having said why he finds hypnosis an unattractive model of group 
formation (just as he had earlier rejected it as a mode of psychother-
apy), Freud offers us one of his rare charts (p. 116). (He provides 
graphic representations of his model of the mind in SE 5, 
pp. 537-541; SE 19, p. 24; and SE 22, p. 70 as well). Most people 
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find this diagram exceedingly obscure. A hint as to its meaning may 
lie in the next to last sentence, the one in italic letters. Note that the 
arrows go from right (the external object) to left (the ego ideal). In so 
doing they pass from the external world (where the ideal persists) to 
the internal world (where each individual maintains a representa-
tion of it). The vertical, dotted lines that run down from the ego 
ideal and ego would seem to represent the unification of individuals, 
first via their c o m m o n ideal and, secondly, via their c o m m o n ego 
identity. They represent the linchpins, as it were, without which the 
group would fly apart. 
IX: The Herd Instinct 
35 In the first paragraph of this chapter Freud seems to admit that his 
speculations on the formation of groups have led us only to more 
questions. Yet in the second paragraph he states—as if it had been 
demonstrated—that "regression" is an essential characteristic of 
groups. H o w did he manufacture this crucial theorem out of the 
doubt he advanced initially? Where else have w e seen the equation 
of neuroses, infantile behaviors, and group processes? 
36 After praising Trotter's description of the herd instinct, Freud takes 
him to task for overlooking the question of ontogenesis (p. 119). 
W h y ? W h y does Freud argue that the "group" mind cannot be a 
primary entity, and that, on the contrary, it is derived from the 
child's earliest struggles? Given this analysis why do older children 
come to love younger ones about whose welfare they are especially 
solicitous? 
37 What is Freud's recipe for the creation of the group ideal of equal 
justice for all and all for one and one for all? W h y does he use the 
term "reaction-formation" (p. 120)? Having worked through a 
number of his major texts w e should be able to predict which kinds 
of feelings and which objects will be subject to this form of defense: 
and which are those? Under what conditions would one expect to 
see reaction-formations "dissolve"? (Which of the three patients, 
Dora, Rat Man, or Wolf Man, exhibited the most pronounced 
instances of reaction formation?) W h y might persons who are reli-
giously devout tend to be particularly marked by an excess of reac-
tion formations? 
38 Freud refers to the famous story about King Solomon who was 
asked to adjudicate a dispute in which two women, one of w h o m 
had just lost her child, claimed to be the mother of the same 
child. Consider Solomon's wisdom in offering to divide the dis-
puted child in half: H o w is this story interpreted normally, and 
how does Freud's interpretation differ? 
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39 Has Freud been persuaded by anything that Trotter or Le Bon 
has proposed? If so, name those factors. If not, why has he 
bothered to refer to them at all? D o groups always require the 
presence of an esteemed leader who loves all equally? H o w do 
groups respond to leaders who appear to favor one member over 
the others? W h y should rock stars, charismatic leaders, and popu-
lar teachers be particularly cautious about charges of favoritism? 
(That these kinds of persons are the recipients of primary narcis-
sism is shown by what essential fact in their fans' behavior?) 
X: The Group and the Primal Horde 
40 Which is older: the individual as we understand him or her to exist 
in our culture or the group? If Freud's answer is the correct one why 
would it follow that innovative thinking, particularly science as w e 
know it, could not arise in group contexts? And how is this event in 
turn linked to the existence of private property? (Recall Freud's 
opinions on the source of great discoveries, above.) W h y is it more 
correct to say, according to Freud, that there are and always have 
been two distinct psychological types? Is Nietzsche's "superman" 
identical to the great leader that Freud describes? (How did 
Nietzsche portray the life of great heroes prior to the civilization of 
the West by the forces of Christianity?) 
41 Freud then recaps his general story about the origins of the group 
and the primal father's response to his sons. Is there any science or 
any mode of research the practitioners of which could verify 
these claims? Note: W h y does Freud mention the honeybee exam-
ple (p. 124)? If anthropologists and primatologists showed conclu-
sively that protohumans never manifested primal horde behavior, 
would or could Freud maintain his general theory of group psy-
chology? Would he be able to retain his general theory of the 
origins of religion too? 
42 H o w did the lack of inhibitions upon his sexual urges lead the 
original primal father to exhibit an unbridled narcissism? Is this 
evident today? H o w do gossip magazines and similar periodicals 
portray the sexual life of movie stars and other heroes? And is the 
public equally willing to allow university deans and business lead-
ers a similar range of sexual highjinks? If not, what may we con-
clude about our general understanding of the degree to which 
such community leaders may exhibit narcissistic behaviors? Can a 
politician ever be anything other than humble and grateful for 
the chance of serving this nation? 
43 One cannot look upon the face of the godhead, according to 
Freud's reading of the stories about Moses, without fear and 
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dread. Is this a general feature of the great world religions? With 
what kind of light does a person's face shine—according to 
Freud's psychoanalytic explanation? Consider expressions like 
"beaming approval," "a show of pride," "eyes shining approval," 
etc. The biblical story explains the light showing in Moses' face as 
a transferral of manna; how must w e understand it? H o w would 
you characterize the faces of young women, for example, watch-
ing their favorite musician perform on stage? 
44 Although he does not employ the concept of hypnosis in his the-
ory, Freud allows that ordinary language is not wrong when it 
speaks of an especially powerful person as hypnotic. W h y is ordi-
nary language correct here too? Is hypnosis an uncanny topic in 
our times? Consider the footnote on p. 126 (about the transfer-
ence): Would a hypnotic method increase or decrease the likeli-
hood of insight? Would hypnotic treatment require more or less 
work than that required by psychoanalysis? Finally, which is pri-
mary: the phenomenon of hypnosis or unchecked narcissism? 
XI: A Differentiating Grade in the Ego 
This is another especially condensed chapter. It contains one of 
Freud's most succinct expressions on the relationship between the indi-
vidual and society. One way to underscore its central question is to ask: 
H o w does the selfish infant become a self-sacrificing adult? In other 
words, how is primary narcissism transformed into the love of others: 
H o w is sacrificial love forged out of the raw materials of instinctual love 
of self? 
45 In the first paragraph Freud summarizes the work up to this 
point. What is the "prodigy" he mentions in the last sentence of 
this paragraph and again in the first sentence of the second? 
(Why would he use a term like this—where else have we seen 
him emphasize the extraordinary nature of a phenomenon every-
one else takes for granted?) 
46 What can Freud mean by the phrase "more freedom of libido" 
(p. 129)? If Freud is correct in his general understanding of the 
formation of groups, under what conditions would one expect to 
find that the incidence of mass behaviors, including the formation 
of charismatic groups, increases (p. 129)? H o w can it be that 
many people become great leaders because their followers make 
them great? Give an illustration of such an event: Would the 
followers in such an event be aware of their part in the creation 
of their hero? Could they become aware? H o w might they 
respond to someone like Freud informing them of their roles in 
the manufacture of charisma? 
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47 The sentence on p. 130 beginning "Each of the mental differenti-
ations that we have become acquainted with" states Freud's fun-
damental theorem about the ego. What universal psychological 
phenomenon exemplifies this return to a "self-sufficient narcis-
sism"? If this fundamental theorem is correct, which type of peo-
ple are most susceptible to the breakdown of the ego? And which 
are least? W h y must the ego be "maintained"? H o w do jokes, 
humor, and other cultural forms contribute to that task? H o w 
might w e explain the rise of psychoanalysis at the end of the 19th 
century (a century in which official religion no longer dominated 
every aspect of the intellectual world and political realm)? 
48 As often happens in Freud, he breaks off his exposition, particularly 
in these more technical papers, to take up themes developed else-
where. This is especially true of his remarks on narcissism, which he 
set out most completely in his 1914 paper (in SE 14). A thorough 
explication of his thoughts on religion would include a close reading 
of that essay. However, lacking the time and space necessary for 
carrying out that effort, we can still ask: H o w prevalent are issues of 
narcissism in ordinary religion? Does petitionary prayer, for exam-
ple, reveal a narcissistic structure? D o other forms of worship mani-
fest a similar configuration? Are there any religious institutions that 
do not manifest a concern for or transformation of narcissistic 
wishes and needs? 
49 Freud breaks off his exposition, again, to take up the problem of 
manic-depressive illness (pp. 131-133). Is he sure that every case of 
this type of mental disease is caused solely by psychogenic factors? 
W h y does identification of the ego with the ego-ideal produce ela-
tion while the failure of identification produces either shame or 
guilt? Consider a handful of hymns or other devotional aids: What 
kinds of feelings do they tend to induce in the faithful? D o they 
produce feelings of joy and pleasure? And are these two feelings the 
same as mania? If not, is Freud correct about the emotion which 
unification of ego and ego-ideal creates? Are religious joy and reli-
gious pleasure sublimated forms of mania? Did the Wolf M a n gain 
any pleasure out of his boyish religious practices? 
XII: Postscript 
50 Although there are few authors who have his rhetorical power 
Freud rarely gives one the impression that he has come to a final 
and complete understanding of the subject matter under considera-
tion. (Is this true of theological treatises in general?) In note A he 
distinguishes between two forms of identification. Does he agree 
with the Christian claim that the church demands a form of ethical 
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labor higher than that of the primal horde? Is the church, then, 
more than a group? H o w ? 
51 Alfred Kroeber, a famous American anthropologist, has called 
Freud's theory of the primal horde, here repeated, a just-so story. 
Does Freud agree? Just-so stories are types of fairy tales—and 
does Freud believe that the latter are themselves nothing more 
than pleasant fictions? H o w does he understand the role of the 
original poet—were his songs merely entertaining divertisements? 
Or were they something else? Recall the conclusion to Totem and 
Taboo: W h y was the deed prior to the word (or to the song)? Is 
the hero myth a lie (p. 137) and nothing else? 
52 In part C, Freud summarizes his basic theory of the development 
of adult, aim-inhibited, passions. Which appears first: sexual long-
ing or affection? Even if it is true that children are particularly 
erotic creatures, unembarrassed about their bodies and unencum-
bered with prudery, why must we conclude that adult forms of 
affection are nothing but "sublimated" forms of those earlier sex-
ual longings? W h y cannot one form fade away and be replaced 
by a later, more mature form? H o w did the primal father contrib-
ute to his sons' capacity to sublimate their original sexual and 
aggressive impulses? 
53 H e carries out this analysis in the next section. Is it true that there 
is no room for heterosexual love within the two great institutions 
he names? W h y would a wise leader require celibacy of those 
whose task it was to create (through their labor) an institution 
which, like the Roman Catholic Church, requires sacrifice of both 
clergy and laity? In other words, how does celibacy contribute to 
the construction of a cultural institution? If this is so, why does it 
follow that sexual love between a m a n and a w o m a n is particu-
larly dangerous to a rigid institution? (Up until the last decade 
most universities forbade departments from appointing a married 
couple to their staff. W h y would this seem to be a good rule to so 
many administrators?) 
54 H o w are philosophico-religious sects and the like "crooked cures" 
for all kinds of neurosis? Would any one of the three patients with 
w h o m we are now familiar have joined a mystical sect? W h y do 
people join such sects? Under what economic and social circumstan-
ces does the number of such sects appear to increase? (For a won-
derful description of some 19th-century American sects see William 
James's classic text, The Varieties of Religious Experience [1902].) 
55 Finally, he concludes by summarizing the developmental series 
that extends from being in love to the formation of groups, like 
the church. Are any of these states—being in love, hypnosis, and 
the formation of the group—completely primitive? W h y do the 
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neuroses stand outside this developmental sequence? Why does 
the period of latency become a complicating factor in human 
development? Recall the general developmental histories of the 
three patients whose stories w e have read. Does each of them 
show both (1) a period of latency, and (2) an increase in mental 
conflict following that period? If Freud is correct about the cen-
tral role latency plays in human development, how ought a well-
developed tradition, like that of the Catholic church, to treat 
children during this period? What kinds of ritual, for example, 
might w e expect the church to require of latency age girls? 
The Future of an Illusion (1927) 
Technical Terms 
Illusion; frustration; prohibition; privation; mental wealth; humanization 
of nature; hallucination; delusion 
Chapter I 
1 Freud sets the tone and problem for the entire book in this first 
paragraph. The tone is worth comparing to that of the clinical 
essays. What is the difference? D o the first and last sentences in 
the paragraph mesh together in a coherent way? Is anything left 
out of Freud's description of the problem of time? Are the sen-
tences in the first two paragraphs of a different length than com-
parable sentences in the other texts w e have read? If so, how 
would you account for this difference? 
2 The SE editor tells us the German term, "Kultur," which Freud uses 
in his title and in another famous essay, "Civilization and Its Dis-
contents" (1930), may mean either civilization or culture. Freud is 
aware of the distinction yet he says he scorns it (p. 6). W h y ? W h y 
would he find this usual distinction contrary to his major develop-
mental theses? H e then describes three factors that mark the two 
aspects of the relationship between civilization and the individual. 
Which of these three is a particularly Freudian claim? 
3 W h y is it natural to suppose that the struggles between the aims 
of civilization and those of the individual are not inherent (p. 6)? 
Is this not a plausible philosophic opinion? W e see Freud return 
to the theme of work: What dynamic principle, illustrated numer-
ous times in the three case histories, guarantees that all civiliza-
tions will deny this basic truth of their origins? If this is so, how 
would official spokespersons respond to Freud's argument? (Freud 
refers to this principle indirectly on p. 8 where he summarizes the 
two great shortcomings of the masses.) 
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4 Freud never abandoned his 19th-century conviction that the 
world of ultimate reality was the physical world. If this is so, and 
if civilizations or societies "run" on some kind of energy, from 
what sources must they secure it? W h y can w e not place too 
much hope in the idea that each new generation m a y further the 
aims of civilization and so slowly advance the work of culture? 
5 Could not psychoanalysis itself contribute to this great task? If the 
answer to this question is yes, ought one to find that children of 
psychoanalysts, for example, are both more emotionally developed 
and intellectually freer than the majority? And is this so? Freud 
would appear to be less modest in this essay than he was in Group 
Psychology where he averred his lack of expertise. What elements 
in his science and life's work give him a firsthand knowledge about 
the struggle between the individual and his or her culture? 
Chapter II 
6 What are "the rebelliousness and destructive mania of the partici-
pants in civilization" (p. 10)? Where else have w e seen Freud use 
the term mania? If a person or a group is capable of mania, what 
must w e conclude about their unconscious wishes and their con-
scious fears? At the end of the previous chapter Freud had 
referred indirectly to the Soviet experiment with a universal 
application of Marxist principles. Is he optimistic or pessimistic 
about their chances at building a free and just society in which 
there is no coercion? 
7 Beginning at least with Alfred Adler many brilliant students of 
psychoanalysis have attempted to marry it to Marxist theory. W h y 
would this appear to be a good match? Is it, though? Which ele-
ments in Freud's social theory would one have to reject in order 
to wed the two? This is another way of asking if Freud's social 
theory, as articulated in this book and others of this period, is 
grounded upon his clinical theory. And is it? 
8 Have w e "slipped unawares out of the economic field into the 
field of psychology" (p. 10)? Yet it appears that the species has 
changed, for the better, if w e look back to the practices of 
savages. Surely this means that w e can look forward to similar 
advances in the species? Does Freud deny, entirely, the validity of 
either claim? W h y is it only to the non-psychoanalytic eye that 
cannibalism appears to have been surmounted? (What feelings do 
tales about cannibalism evoke in most people in our times? In 
which cultural fields do w e find cannibalism alive and well?) 
9 W h y does Freud say that internalization is the psychological pro-
cess most important to the development of civilization? Recall our 
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discussion of the process of identification as Freud described it in 
Group Psychology: Could a society ever reach a stage in which it 
was no longer necessary to suppress or otherwise control cannibal-
istic wishes? W h y might one say that even the most sublime forms 
of religious thought, like that about the Holy Spirit, cannot aban-
don a reliance upon archaic forms of internalization? 
10 While there has been a kind of progress in the civilization of 
oedipal wishes, for example, other forms of human fault persist 
(pp. 11-12). W h y is Freud so sure of this claim? O n what grounds 
and with what evidence could he support this contention? (Recall 
the unconscious wishes and beliefs catalogued in the three case 
histories. Is it only people like Dora w h o m we would expect to 
find enmeshed in such tainted ideas?) 
11 Yet culture has a way of paying one back for the severe taxation it 
levies against everyone. What are these ways? Are they payment in 
full, or are they debased in some manner? Is it with hard currency 
or inflated currency that one's civilization repays us for our labor, 
including our libidinal sacrifices? W h o , in contemporary American 
society, appears most gratified by patriotic displays and which 
groups seem least involved and least emotionally attached to them? 
D o both kinds of groups take part in the "most important item in the 
psychical inventory of a civilization" (p. 14)? 
Chapter III 
12 Why does Freud begin this chapter with this question and why does 
he use the word peculiar? Has he demonstrated that religious ideas 
are peculiar? From this dramatic question he leaps to another preci-
pice upon which he balances the archaic unconscious against the 
claims of civilization. Would the condition he describes lead to a 
state of splendid enjoyment? There have been episodes, like those of 
the Nazi death camps, where one group had total authority over the 
lives of members of another. Were members of the first group 
splendidly happy? 
13 But there are other moments when, Freud says, one gains an 
exalting impression of the work of mankind. What typifies these 
situations? D o you find a similar sentiment in fairy tales, or 
myths, or in movie films? (Is nature majestic, cruel and inexora-
ble? W h y is she a "she"? D o all or most cultures picture nature as 
a feminine force? If yes, how might Freud account for this uni-
formity? H o w is this general propensity related to primary narcis-
sism and to the humanization of nature?) 
14 " . H e gives them the character of a father' (p. 17). W h y ? W h y 
are the gods or God himself masculine, while nature is feminine? 
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Is Freud's claim biological, psychological, or theological? Or is it 
something else? What was "In the beginning"? 
15 According to this account the gods have three great tasks. W h y do 
these tasks change as a culture matures? Freud says the "most 
gifted people of antiquity" placed Moira above the gods. W h y 
does he not simply use their proper name (he means the Athenian 
Greeks of the 6th and 5th centuries B.C.)? W h y is he so fond of 
this kind of indirect references in this text? Have w e seen him 
write in this style elsewhere? (Is Moira male or female or some-
thing else?) 
16 "And thus a store of ideas is created . " (p. 18) is Freud's way of 
announcing his basic thesis. Is it plausible? That is, under what 
circumstances do most people turn to religion? W h e n both houses 
of the American Congress convene a new session, opening prayers 
are offered: W h y ? What is the usual content of these prayers? Do 
they entail the kinds of beliefs Freud catalogues on pp. 18-20? 
17 Freud was not trained, officially, in the study of religion—though 
he became well-educated by dint of his own research. But he is not 
shy about offering this summary of standard Western conceptions of 
God. Would most academic theologians share these thoughts and 
these beliefs? Since the middle of the 19th century scholars of reli-
gion and official theologians of the various Christian denominations 
have attempted to amalgamate their beliefs with the teachings and 
methods of science. Would Freud respect these efforts? W h y does 
he not refer to them or to their authors? 
18 Is America "God's own Country"? H o w would the majority of 
Americans answer this question? H o w do most T V preachers 
understand the relationship between this nation's future and God's 
will? (What is the shape of worship to which Freud is alluding?) 
Is Freud an especially "timid" author? Is the next step he proposes 
to take a small one? 
Chapter IV 
19 Is Freud worried about the style of the treatise so far? The SE 
editor refers us to another Freud book, The Question of Lay 
Analysis (1926), in which he used a similar kind of dialogue. 
Have we seen dialogues anywhere else in Freud? Recall his initial 
worries about presenting his case histories to a public that might 
read them as romans a clef. They were not novels, yet did they 
not have dialogues in them? (Recall the number and use of quota-
tion marks in the three case histories we read above.) 
20 Is Freud especially adept at rendering dialogues? What aspects of 
his profession would prepare him and his students for this kind of 
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labor? Why would Freud say that he will write the dialogue of an 
opponent who is mistrustful? What state of mind did he hope his 
listeners to the Introductory Lectures would manifest, particu-
larly at the beginning? Around what kinds of issues does it appear 
Freud feels most comfortable with the dialogue form of presenta-
tion? (Here it would pay one to read carefully the 1926 text on 
lay analysis in SE 20.) 
21 His opponent objects to Freud's use of the verb "created" to describe 
the way cultures manufactured their religious ideas. What is his 
objection? With w h o m would most religious persons agree? H o w do 
cultures explain the origin of their sacred institutions and their 
sacred books? For example, what is the standard Jewish belief about 
the origin of the Torah? And how do orthodox Christians explain the 
origins of the N e w Testament? And how do Mormons understand 
the origins of their Book of Mormon? Must religious groups main-
tain these kinds of beliefs? Can Freud contemplate the possibility of 
a group being both religious (in his sense of that term) and not 
claiming a divine sanction for its sacred texts? 
22 After responding to the charge that the humanization of nature 
should come as no suprise, Freud repeats his remarks about this 
"peculiarity" (p. 22) of human thought. Is this fair to his oppo-
nent? Had not the latter just said that religious thought is not 
peculiar at all? In fact, Freud himself appears to argue that all 
cultures manifest some form of religion. And if this is so how 
could it be a peculiar thing in any manner? 
23 H o w does the distinction between manifest and latent motives, a 
distinction we saw first in his lectures on dreams, serve him in his 
attempt to connect this essay with his remarks on totemism in the 
previous two? Does Freud argue against the possibility of any 
advance in religious thinking? Does he believe that psychoanalysis 
will permit us to solve every problem in the history of religions? O n 
the other hand, does he believe that the scientific study of religion 
can proceed without attending to psychoanalytic findings? 
24 "Thus his longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for 
protection against the consequences of his human weakness" (p. 24). 
W h y ? Freud carries out the ontogeny-phylogeny analogy we saw 
developed in "The Uncanny." In that essay he said some people, 
including himself, no longer manifested a propensity toward having 
uncanny experiences. If this is true, does it follow that there might 
be a corresponding development, a maturation, at the level of cul-
ture? The Wolf M a n was devout, peculiarly devout one might say, 
as a boy, yet not so as a young man. What changed? Does Freud hint 
at a corresponding change in the development of cultural expecta-
tions and cultural institutions like the church? 
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Chapter V 
25 Freud begins this chapter as if it were part of a textbook, in the 
previous chapters of which he had laid down the groundwork for 
the formulations and definitions that now appear. But is it a text-
book and has he laid down such foundations? After offering an 
exceptionally conventional definition of religious ideas (p. 25), he 
describes a "very remarkable" experience he himself had years 
before. Although he adds quickly that he will not lay too much 
stress upon this example, ought w e to agree? Given the validity of 
the principle of psychic determinism what kinds of questions 
ought w e to ask of this episode and Freud's reasons for including 
it in this chapter? 
26 Most teachings that require belief, both those of science and 
schoolboy geography, admit of some form of verification. Is this 
true of religious teachings? Outline the three answers Freud says 
are typically given in rebuttal of challenges to religious truths. 
W h y is the third an obvious target for psychoanalytic investiga-
tions? Have many brilliant intellects broken down over the con-
flict between the claims of religion and those of science? Are 
there similar breakdowns over other debates in the natural or 
social sciences? Given what w e know of conflicts typical to neu-
rotics, who also suffer "breakdowns," what kinds of issues must the 
conflict between the two sets of claims entail? (Consider Freud's 
emphasis upon the primal ancestors on p. 26.) 
27 H e then summarizes three possible lines of defense (though his 
interlocutor is strangely silent in these pages). Are any of them 
particularly powerful or persuasive to Freud, or to you? Are these 
the only or the best arguments available to the defenders of reli-
gion? Freud refers to one contemporary thinker, Vaihinger 
(1922). W h y does he not refer to the numerous theologians who 
had also addressed themselves to these issues and who had 
advanced subtle and, some say, sophisticated counter-arguments? 
Chapter VI 
28 In this crucial chapter Freud advances his most contentious notion 
about religion. However, before doing that in the second para-
graph he completes his cataloguing of religious claims. Are these 
trivial? Are the feelings they convey and the hopes they entail 
silly or products only of the most infantile of desires? The great 
philosopher Kant once spoke of three great questions to which all 
serious philosophy addressed itself. H o w are those three questions 
related to the wishes Freud describes in this chapter? 
29 " . All of them are illusions and insusceptible of proof" (p. 31). 
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Why are they illusions and not simply false or mistaken beliefs? 
H o w is it that some illusions have turned out to be correct? Given 
Freud's definition of this central term, is it correct to say that neu-
rotic patients suffer mainly from their illusions? What is the 
"reality value" of Dora's unconscious beliefs? Is it correct to say 
that the Wolf Man's unconscious ideas about his parent's sexual 
habits were illusions? Or were they something else? 
30 Although he did not use this term in a technical manner, Freud 
discussed the nature of illusion in Group Psychology. Where? 
That is, what aspects of the leader-follower relationship are most 
likely based upon illusions? And which aspects of being in love 
manifest a similar reliance upon this human propensity? 
31 Freud's tone changes dramatically on p. 32. There he uses the 
term "sacred" twice, once to describe religious questions, and then 
to describe a person's relationship to the truth. Is he sincere in 
both instances? Is one ironic and the other not? In the same para-
graph he refers to philosophers of religion (among w h o m w e can 
include most theologians) who attempt to integrate their rational 
beliefs with the claims of religion. What are Freud's feelings 
about such integrative attempts? What kind of religion is he will-
ing to respect and which kind receives his abuse? W h o are among 
the "mighty personalities" of religious doctrine? (Freud's answer 
to this question is contained in the last text w e consider in our 
c o m m o n reading.) 
32 Is "humble acquiescence" (p. 32) an achievement or a failure? What 
kind of persons would most likely exhibit this form of humility? Is 
humility a religious virtue or an "irreligious" one according to the 
argument of this chapter? And according to you? Does Freud pre-
tend to assess the final truth value of religious claims? Would he 
have chosen to raise his own children within a religious tradition or 
would he have abjured it altogether? If the latter, why is he so inter-
ested in the claims and nature of religion at all? 
33 Were our ancestors "wretched, ignorant, and downtrodden' 
(p. 33)? Is this the usual way people speak of their ancestors or 
the way nations portray their forefathers? H o w might one use the 
concept of the narcissism of minor differences to explain the gran-
deur which most societies ascribe to those who went before them? 
H o w do Jews and Christians, for example, portray the first com-
munities of their respective faiths? D o they too believe that their 
ancestors could not have solved all these difficult riddles? W h y do 
most American fundamentalist preachers refer to "New Testa-
ment Christianity" as an ideal toward which they strive and 
against which they judge the current church and current social 
structures? 
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Chapter VII 
34 Freud lets his interlocutor return in this chapter and challenge the 
equation of religion and mass illusion. Are his opponent's argu-
ments in favor of religion c o m m o n to those who wish to defend 
religion against its despisers? That is, are they simply emotional 
reactions which Freud ascribes to a straw man, or might one find 
that a number of religious and lay authorities hold to them as 
well? W h o , for example? Is it true, by the way, that the one per-
son Freud can harm by publishing this book is himself? What 
about all those fine intellects that have broken down over the 
conflict between religion and science? 
35 "In point of fact psycho-analysis is a method of research, an impar-
tial instrument, like the infinitesimal calculus, as it were" (p. 36). Is 
this a perfect analogy? (Note that calculus was among Newton's 
great inventions—why would Freud employ it in his analogy here?) 
Is his attack upon religion not dependent upon his own discoveries 
about the origin of "uncanny" feelings, for example? D o "defenders 
of religion" make use of psychoanalytic methods and theory? Do 
Freud's fundamental theory of mental operations, as well as his 
basic theory of the formation of ideals, have no bearing upon the 
truth-value of religious beliefs? 
36 H o w does Freud know that the number of people dissatisfied with 
our civilization is "appallingly large" (p. 37)? What kinds of clinical 
evidence might he draw upon here in order to support this claim? 
(David H u m e , by the way, did not publish his attacks upon the 
proofs for the existence of G o d — w h y ? ) To which Russian novelist is 
he referring on pp. 37-38? H o w is the question of God's existence 
treated in his novels? (See Freud's ascerbic remarks upon this same 
novelist in his 1928 essay in SE 21.) 
37 What is the scientific "spirit" (p. 38)? W h y would Freud use this 
term? (Spirit is related to the Latin term spiritus, which in turn is 
related to the Greek term pneuma; both these latter terms appear 
in the Christian terms for the Holy Ghost [or Holy Spirit].) Is it 
true that "civilization has little to fear from educated people and 
brain workers" (p. 39)? H o w do all communist and most other 
nations as well treat such workers? 
Chapter VIII 
38 Who is the modern counterpart to St. Boniface, and what forms 
of superstition is he rooting out? This chapter is particularly 
important for understanding Freud's conception of ethics. And 
what is that conception? Are ethical truths discovered in nature? 
Are they revealed by God or by one of his emissaries? Or are they 
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entirely arbitrary fabrications of the ruling classes or a priestly 
clan? Are all religious ethical demands "rigid" and unchangeable 
(p. 41)? Is there a state or society that does not claim its funda-
mental ethical norms are essential truths? 
39 Freud immediately recaps his primal horde theory: W h y ? That is, 
why does it make sense for him to repeat that theory in this context? 
W h y is he driven to hold that there was an actual primal father, and 
actual sons, and they actually killed the father? Indeed, how do the 
most sacred portions of both Jewish and Christian religions support 
this claim? 
40 " The pathology of the individual does not supply us with a 
fully valid counterpart" (p. 43). W h y not? Is the analogy of reli-
gion and obsessional neurosis limited because it too closely assimi-
lates religion with a form of mental illness? That is, is Freud 
restricting his claims out of a feeling of deference to the positive 
values of religion? If this is so how ought we to understand his 
remark that devout persons are spared the task of creating per-
sonal neuroses (p. 44)? Is this true: D o you know of counter-
examples or of persons who are both devout and neurotic? 
41 Freud returns to the theme of historical truth when he compares 
the education of children with the education of the race. If this 
new analogy is to hold good, what must be true, again, about the 
actual events that gave rise to the process of civilization? What 
does he mean by "symbolic disguisings of the truth"? (On the 
question of Freud's use of the term "symbol" see our discussion of 
his dream theory). If his other analogy, between analytic treat-
ment and education, is to hold good as well what must w e con-
clude about the usual results of analytic treatment? (See the two 
articles referred to on p. 44, and see Freud's famous essay on the 
curative efficacy of psychoanalysis, "Analysis Terminable and 
Interminable' [1937].) 
Chapter IX 
42 Freud reintroduces his opponent. But this time he gives him a 
long speech. Of the four major criticisms leveled against him with 
which does Freud not deal? "You have said yourself that religion 
is more than an obsessional neurosis. But you have not dealt with 
this other side of it" (p. 46). What is the other side? W h y does 
Freud invoke the example of the anthropologist measuring the 
cranial index of a foreign people? Both Totem and Taboo and 
Group Psychology contain extended theories of the origin and 
usefulness of religion. What must be true if, as Freud holds, a 
civilization no longer requires them? That is, what needs must be 
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met minimally if a Father religion is no longer required? What 
part might psychoanalysis itself play in this phylogenetic event? 
43 Is the psychological ideal the "primacy of the intellect" (p. 48)? 
W a s this ideal evident in the three case histories? Is Freud pro- or 
anti-feminine in this passage: Is it still true that females are sub-
jected to more suppression and repression of their sexual instincts 
than are males? What does the phrase "thinking like a woman" 
bring to mind? 
44 What has the American experiment with prohibition got to do 
with the effects of religious ideas upon the maturation of chil-
dren? Religion is a kind of infantilism according to this text, yet 
infants and children manifest a "radiant intelligence" which is 
soon snuffed out by the combined forces of parental suppression 
and religious instruction. What permits Freud to value one form 
of childish behavior and to devalue another? 
45 The style of Freud's writing in these final pages is worth remarking 
upon. Have we seen a similar rhetoric elsewhere employed? "Of 
what use to them is the mirage of wide acres in the moon, whose 
harvest no one has ever yet seen?" (p. 50). If w e treat this and the 
sentence which follows it as dream images, what kinds of associa-
tions and to what form of literature are they related? To what kinds 
of texts is this kind of language restricted usually? W h y would 
Freud find it useful to quote the two lines from Heine? 
Chapter X 
46 "If you want to expel religion from our European civilization, you 
can only do it by means of another system of doctrines; and such 
a system would from the outset take over all the psychological 
characteristics of religion for its own defence" (p. 51). This is 
a much more sophisticated argument for it allows Freud his major 
claims about religion, yet appears to also force him to demon-
strate where or how a non-religious society might function. H o w 
is it related to his earlier question, in chapter IX, about the 
French Revolution? 
47 Freud's opponent, perhaps sensing victory, now moves forward 
and invokes Freud's own theory of the task of civilization: W h y is 
latency that time in which a child must bend to the dictates of 
civilization? (What characterized the Wolf Man's religious behav-
ior during his latency period?) Following the immense surge of 
enthusiasm for psychoanalytic ideas in the late '20s and '30s in 
both Europe and the United States a period of reaction set in; 
many accused Freud of attempting to replace religion with psy-
choanalytic doctrines. W h y might this seem true? (Why is it, as 
The Critique of Religion 101 
Roy Schafer, a noted psychoanalyst has said, that there are no 
institutes for Darwinian studies alongside the institutes for psycho-
analysis?) 
48 "If experience should show—not to me, but to others after m e , 
who think as I do—that w e have been mistaken, w e will give up 
our expectations" (p. 53). Is this true? Note that most critics of 
Freud accuse him precisely of not giving up his most cherished 
ideas, even in the face of evidence contrary to them. Recall to 
mind some episodes in the three case histories where Freud found 
himself confronted with a fact that appeared to be contrary to his 
expectations: H o w did he respond to it? Should w e distinguish 
Freud's adherence to certain principles, like that of psychic deter-
minism, from his adherence to particular claims? Did Freud 
change his mind? (Is he, by the way, completely hostile to reli-
gion? Does he despise it?) 
49 In the midst of his passionate rebuttals Freud alludes to a psycholog-
ical truth which itself is of sufficient magnitude to guarantee that 
religious doctrines cannot persist into the infinite future. What is 
that truth? H e hints at it in his remarks about the design of the 
"mental apparatus" (p. 55). This quality of the mental apparatus 
finds its counterpart in the less-than-omnipotent God "Logos" (see 
the SE editor's footnote on p. 54). W e spoke of Freud's love of the 
truth in the introduction to this study: What forces will guarantee 
that that truth will not disappear? In other words, what must Freud 
believe about the ontological structure of the human world such 
that he can say that the voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does 
not rest till it has gained a hearing? A more important question now 
presents itself to us: What clinical evidence can one draw upon to 
support (or refute) this fundamental belief? If our reading of the 
three case histories reveals no systematic evidence in favor of the 
small voice of the intellect, can one say that Freud's opinions are 
psychoanalytic theorems? 
Freud concludes this manifesto with a eulogy to the claims of 
science and a prediction of its eventual triumph over the realms 
now ruled by religion. However, he did not abandon the problem 
of religion. H e returned to it in his masterful essay on civilization 
(Civilization and Its Discontents), and at the end of his life in 
three essays about the greatest Jewish hero: Moses. 
Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (1939) 
The SE editors point out that this collection of essays is unlike any-
thing Freud wrote, before or after. This fact will not be disputed by 
honest readers who, having enjoyed the style of Freud's earlier writings, 
102 Reading Freud 
will be surprised by his repeated hesitations, falterings, and lapses. Yet it 
remains a great book, particularly for those who wish to comprehend 
Freud's fascination with religion. The SE editors also refer us to Jones's 
excellent discussion of the text in the third volume of his biography (the 
pages are 362-374, not those indicated in the SE "Editor's Note" on 
p. 5). 
I: Moses an Egyptian 
1 The SE editors also tell us that Freud's original title for the work 
was "The M a n Moses, a Historical Novel." W h y would he have 
considered this title appropriate? Recall our discussion of the 
three case histories, especially the introduction to "Dora." H o w 
did Freud treat the question of his novelistic skills then? Many of 
his readers, even those sympathetic to him, remarked upon the 
literary qualities of his reports: W h y did he object strenuously to 
such analogies? What has occurred in between these two periods? 
2 The first sentence is a famous declaration. What power or authority 
can deprive a people of their hero? Given Moses' stature in both 
Jewish and Christian beliefs, what corresponding authority must 
Freud be willing to assume for himself if he is to carry out this great 
task? Might this be a source of his hesitation? Our question becomes 
even more significant when w e recall that Freud had begun this 
essay and then published it as Hitler ascended to absolute power. 
Like most sensible people, he realized that Hitler's manifest aims 
included that of destroying the Jewish race. Furthermore, by the 
time Freud had reached the safety of England and acquiesced in 
the printing of the three essays in a single book, he had already lost a 
large part of his family to the Nazis. W h y then would he go ahead 
and publish a critical book, based upon speculations, about this cen-
tral Jewish figure? 
3 "Possibly the notion that the m a n Moses might have been any-
thing but a Hebrew seemed too monstrous" (p. 9). W h y ? That is, 
why would Freud use the term monstrous here to indicate the 
possible emotional reasons why the majority of historians and 
scientific scholars missed this obvious interpretation of Moses' 
name? And why is Freud so insistent upon referring to Moses as 
the man Moses? W h y would it fall to psychoanalysts like himself 
and Otto Rank (pp. 10-12) to uncover this obvious fact? 
4 Indeed, how might Freud go on to argue that the nearly universal 
willingness to overlook this fact is a sure sign of the presence of 
severe repression? And why would it only be the minority of 
readers who will be able to follow out his reasoning? After sum-
marizing Rank's major findings Freud says the story of Moses 
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differs from the norm in one essential respect. What is that 
respect and why does Freud emphasize the importance of recog-
nizing three families? 
If Freud's reconstruction is correct, why does it follow that there 
must be an Egyptian legend in which the king is warned, by some 
uncanny messenger, that his royal son is to become a threat to 
him? "The exposure in the water was at its correct point in the 
story ." (p. 15), but the Jews changed the remainder. W h y ? 
Have we come across similar reversals either in dreams or in neu-
rotic fantasies? 
While he is aware of the speculative quality of all his conjectures 
thus far, Freud does not hesitate to list the possible results his 
inquiry may afford us: an explanation of the peculiar history of 
the Jews and the origins of monotheistic religion itself. H e con-
cludes by arguing against his current position for it lacks a "sec-
ond firm fact" with which to defend these immense conclusions. 
Does he ever offer us a fact which a neutral observer could call 
"firm"? To answer these last questions we must turn to the second 
essay. 
II: If Moses Was an Egyptian 
Freud says many previous scholars had observed that the official 
Jewish and Christian understandings of Moses' name and birth are 
improbable. H e added to these critical opinions by drawing upon 
the "myth of exposure' analysis he and Rank had advanced twenty 
years before. Could anyone else have used this kind of information? 
That is, is it possible to conceive of a scholar using the methods of 
comparative religion to advance a similar thesis without the use of 
psychoanalytic theory? If Freud's project is to gain any validity at 
all what unstated principle must he rely upon in order to use 20th-
century psychological theory to analyze the motives of a m a n and 
his followers who lived three thousand years ago? 
The entire style of these essays is determined by the hypothetical 
mode: if (as is evident in the title of this second part). It is worth 
noting what kinds of "ifs" Freud is willing to contemplate and 
what kinds of "ifs" he is not. For example, why can we not say, 
"if Moses was divinely inspired," or, "if God appeared to Moses 
(the Hebrew) and gave him great powers and the skill to lead his 
people"? 
Are the differences between early Jewish religion and the Egyp-
tian religion of the time "of the most violent" contrast (p. 19)? 
W h y does Freud use this kind of rhetoric in these few opening 
pages? (Note that they introduce us in part to the "remarkable" 
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fact that there were two great forms of Egyptian religion.) Why is 
Freud not willing to grant that Moses' form of monotheism could 
have originated with him alone? Is this a persuasive argument? 
Are there any historically valid examples of single persons cre-
ating entirely new religions? 
10 Did monotheism arise elsewhere in the world at this or any previous 
time? This is an immensely difficult question to answer since it 
requires one to survey a huge literature in the comparative study of 
religion. If one found that there were neither contemporary nor ear-
lier forms of monotheism, would that strengthen Freud's argument? 
W h y is he convinced that so "sublime" a thought as monotheism 
could not originate except at the end of a long tradition of specula-
tion and within the confines of an immense empire like that of the 
Eighteenth Dynasty? Is there a consistent relationship between a 
culture's theological structures and its political structures? H o w 
could one go about answering this kind of question? 
11 After linking the Jewish rite of circumcision with its Egyptian 
precursor, Freud has to face the apparent fact that his specula-
tions will not fit into the traditionally accepted date of the Exodus 
(pp. 29-31). But he refuses to budge from his claim that Moses 
must have been an Egyptian follower of the great monotheistic 
King, Akhenaten, whose personal and political catastrophe had 
involved him. Indeed, "perhaps he was at that time Governor of 
the frontier province (Goshen) in which certain Semitic tribes had 
settled" (p. 29). W h y is Freud willing to suffer this immense criti-
cism so early in his exposition? (Have we seen him exhibit a simi-
lar obstinacy before? Where?) 
12 Returning to the question of Moses' activities, it would appear 
that another historian, Eduard Meyer, has shown that the Moses 
associated with the volcano god, Yahweh, was a shepherd. If this 
is so it would follow that Freud's portrait of a regal Egyptian 
Moses cannot be accurate. But Freud escapes this snare too—how? 
At this point in one's reading it may prove valuable to keep a 
time chart of Freud's major contentions; e.g., on p. 37 he places 
the murder of the Egyptian Moses much earlier than the unifica-
tion of the kindred tribes. 
13 Freud was very fond of antiquities, especally Egyptian ones. 
Given what we have learned about such affections in other peo-
ple, what can we suppose must be true of this kind of sublima-
tion? That is, Freud himself has taught us that it is precisely those 
things that fascinate one, that one finds uncanny, which are the 
sublime representatives of one's archaic wishes. W e saw Freud 
advance this thesis in the Introductory Lectures in the chapters 
on dream interpretation. Hence, we may ask what kinds of wishes 
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and archaic fantasies might a lifelong fascination with Egyptian 
antiquities represent? (A photograph of Freud with part of his 
collection of Egyptian statues may be found on the frontispiece of 
SE 23 and frontispiece of SE 12.) 
14 In the midst of these fresh speculations Freud says a number of 
times that it was the Egyptian branch of the federated tribes 
which were the more cultured and educated. W h y does he rely 
upon this claim? H o w does he, in turn, connect it to the ambigu-
ous status traditionally attributed to the Levites? (Is it true in 
other historical epochs that later fusions are frequently undone, 
even if that original unification occurred many hundreds of years 
before? Is it true in modern times as well? Are there similar disso-
lutions obvious in individuals? 
15 "The text, however, as w e possess it to-day will tell us enough about 
its own vicissitudes" (p. 43). Where else have we seen Freud 
advance this kind of argument? What special insights into the pro-
cess of distortion should psychoanalytic training afford one? (Note 
that Freud attributes other major cultural advances to the Mosaic 
Egyptians as well: W h y to them and not to the original Semitic 
tribes themselves?) 
16 W h y is Freud so keen to point out what he claims are puzzling 
and incomprehensible passages in the Bible texts? H o w does the 
presence of so many distorted sayings, incoherent legends and 
contradictions within the sacred texts support his basic argument? 
Recall our discussion of Dora's account of her illness: What partic-
ular features of that narration were undeniable indicators of her 
neurotic character? 
17 Freud concludes this sixth section of the second essay with the 
argument that the new Semitic religion that was grafted onto that 
of the M a n Moses reverted back to that earliest "Jewish" form. 
What historical evidence can he bring forth in support of this 
fantastic claim? And what evidence from the psychology of the 
individual might he adduce to supplement, at least, that historical 
evidence? In other words, do we have any other examples of this 
kind of regressive restoration from either distinct historical epochs 
or the three case histories? 
18 After summarizing his argument and offering a minimal chronol-
ogy Freud turns toward the Jews of his day, from w h o m he has 
just taken their greatest hero and of w h o m he has just accused of 
a form of deicide, and offers them some consolation. What is that 
consolation and is Freud as disdainful of it as he appeared to be 
of the Christian doctrines which required one to hate those who 
were not fellow believers? His last remarks, on pp. 52-53, include 
a reference to the importance of great m e n and the "sacrilege" 
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one commits against human life if one refuses to recognize "spiri-
tual" aims. Are these typical of one who hates his religion or its 
history? 
Ill: Moses, His People, and Monotheist Religion 
Parti 
A book which aims to introduce the serious student to an under-
standing of some aspects of Freud's thought ought not to end on a note 
of confusion and disarray. And, as the SE editors point out, Freud's mind 
did not deteriorate. After completing these three essays on Moses he 
wrote the initial parts of his last text, A n Outline of Psychoanalysis (SE 
23, 1940), which is a vivid and concise discussion of his science. Yet this 
third and much the longest section of his study of Moses is hardly con-
cise. But it is vivid and honest. It represents Freud the m a n in an espe-
cially direct way since he refers to his own state (and that of his family) 
numerous times in the work. The clever slur against the Germans of his 
day (p. 54) is not the product of a confused mind. 
19 It sometimes appears as if Freud means only to advance an anal-
ogy between his study of individuals and these essays on a group 
phenomenon like religion. But are these analogies only? If so, why 
is Freud so concerned about publishing his study (cf. pp. 58 and 
72ff.)? 
20 After recapitulating his story, and giving us an even grander por-
trait of the monotheistic Pharaoh, Akhenaten, Freud introduces a 
new dimension to his argument: latency. Freud's literary devices 
and rhetoric are important aspects of his argument. For example, he 
says that the return of Mosaic (Egyptian) monotheism to the 
Hebrews is a "remarkable" fact (p. 69). W h y ? W h y is the return of 
this supposedly repressed mode of religion a sign of its actual histori-
cal existence? 
21 The bulk of this essay is an attempt to argue for the existence of 
actual events, which are then remembered symbolically in the 
forms of religious rituals and beliefs. Have w e seen Freud address 
this question in his essays on individual neurotics? (Why does he 
say his argument seeks to unite group psychology and individual 
psychology with the postulate of the identity between religion 
and obsessional neurosis [p. 72]?) 
22 Although one may find Freud's exposition of the parallels between 
the genesis of adult neurosis from infantile precursors and the crea-
tion of an advanced religion from earlier forms suggestive, it would 
appear to falter on one major problem. Some neurotics report 
"memories" of events in their past, like parental seduction, which 
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never occurred. Freud had to face this fact early in his career when 
he abandoned his original theory that later outbreaks of neurosis 
were the results of the reinstigation of sealed-over trauma. If there is 
no consistent evidence that all traumatic neuroses have this aetiol-
ogy, how can Freud employ them as models for historical events? 
H o w do the examples of early Greek legends provide him some aid 
in carrying out his proposals? 
23 One cannot fault Freud's gumption, for in the next few sections 
he succeeds in tying Christianity and its greatest apostle, Paul, to 
the murder of Moses and both of those to the primal crime he had 
elaborated upon in Totem and Taboo. The truth of what psycho-
logical principle permits him to do this? For example, how does 
he show that one ought to envision Jesus as the return of the M a n 
Moses? H o w is the hatred against Jews at bottom a hatred against 
Christians? (What is the history of the German Christian churches 
in their relation to Hitler and the Nazi regime?) 
24 Part E, Difficulties, is an especially crucial part of the reconstruc-
tion. W h y does he spend so much effort proposing that there must 
be memory-traces of actual historical events which survive in a 
c o m m o n archaic heritage? H o w does the latter concept help him 
complete the work of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego? 
Part II 
25 Where else have we read of "tormenting ghosts" in Freud? It was 
this kind of ghost that forced him to begin this most awkward 
essay again (pp. 103-104). Strictly speaking, what are ghosts and 
from whose past and toward what future are they most likely 
directed? The SE editor has referred to the special difficulties of 
translating Freud's German term "Geistigkeit." It means both 
spirituality and intellectuality (for example, it occurs in the Ger-
man expression for the Holy Ghost [another kind of ghost], and in 
Hegel's great work, The Phenomenology of Mind). Is Freud's use 
of the term "spirituality" ironic or does he believe there is some-
thing uniquely valuable in the Jewish (and Egyptian!) peoples? 
26 In part B, The Great Man, Freud advances his argument for the 
special place a great historical person may have in the history of a 
people or a nation. Does he deny that social, economic, and political 
structures may also play a role in the "overdetermination" of a par-
ticular group achieving a significant status? Yet not all powerful 
people are great—what particular good must a great leader provide 
his (or her) followers? (Does Freud himself fit this requirement?) 
Could a w o m a n ever fulfill the same requirement? 
108 Reading Freud 
27 Why is Freud so concerned to explain the sense of superiority 
which he says characterizes Jews, both of the earliest times and of 
this century? H o w is the triumph of the Egyptian Moses' ideas 
related to the immense differences Jews traditionally feel exist 
between themselves and their neighbors? (Are these issues still 
alive in our day as they were in the Roman world and in Europe 
in the 1930s?) "In this dichotomy their decision was at least in 
favour of the worthier alternative" (p. 115). Is this an unsupported 
value judgment? Or can Freud call upon psychological theory, if 
not psychological facts, with which he can justify placing intellec-
tuality above physical development? 
28 This question allows us to address Freud's comments on the genesis 
of ethics in part D, The Renunciation of Instinct (pp. 116-122). 
Although he relies upon the terminology and distinctions found in 
The Ego and the Id (1923), a text w e have not studied, his discussion 
is not too far removed from that found in a text w e do know, Group 
Psychology. W e have asked if a w o m a n could ever become a Great 
Man, now w e can ask if she might ever contribute to the construc-
tion of the superego. H o w must Freud answer this question, given 
his distinction between paternity and maternity on p. 118? And 
how is paternity related to the choice of objects and actions which 
shall be "holy" and those that shall be "taboo"? 
29 What is "true in religion"? If religious beliefs had neither truth 
nor value, would they persist over thousands of years of history? 
W h y is the persistence of religion, especially among the scientifi-
cally educated, a particular problem for Freud? W a s it simply 
Moses' powerful character which imposed itself upon the Jews or 
something else that led to the return of his "spirit"? H o w does 
Freud account for the interesting fact that a preponderant num-
ber of intellectuals are Jewish and the remarkable fact that the 
majority of psychoanalysts were and are Jewish? 
30 In part F, The Return of the Repressed, Freud offers a rare con-
sideration of the formation of character. Can the past ever be 
overcome completely? Did any of his patients show that he or she 
could renounce completely the pleasures of childhood and over-
come the tendency toward repetition of those earliest behaviors 
associated with those pleasures? Is psychoanalytic treatment itself 
a variation of the return of the repressed? Consider Freud's 
laments about his failure with Dora: H o w were her transference 
wishes themselves replications of the return of the repressed? 
Finally, is sublimation wholly unlike the return of repressed 
wishes? 
31 "There is an element of grandeur about everything to do with the 
origin of religion, certainly including the Jewish one, and this is 
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not matched by the explanations we have hitherto given" (p. 128). 
Are these the remarks of an implacable foe of religion? Is Freud 
willing to grant that there are differences of merit between 
"archaic" religion and monotheism, for example? Does he dis-
agree with "many Jews" (p. 134) who assert that the ethical 
heights of Judaism are achievements comparable to its champion-
ing of monotheism? 
32 Finally, Freud does not hestitate to include Paul and Christianity 
in his grand thesis. H o w is the latter a son religion? And how is 
Paul's theology of original sin itself a return of the repressed? "It 
was as though Egypt was taking vengeance once more on the heir 
of Akhenaten" (p. 136). W h y does Freud say "as though" here? 
Does he believe this claim in some way? What was the first occa-
sion upon which Egypt took revenge upon the great king? Does 
Freud believe that Christianity is a "forward step" in the develop-
ment of "intellectuality" (p. 136)? H o w might Jewish readers of 
the time in which this essay was first published respond to these 
final sentiments? 

REFERENCES 
THE WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD 
Freud Texts 
Abbreviations: International Universities Press = IUP. 
Freud, Sigmund, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud. 24 vols. London: Hogarth Press & 
Institute for Psychoanalysis. 
Freud, Sigmund, Gesammelte Werke. 18 vols, in 17. Frankfurt am 
Main: S. Fischer, 1960. 
The Concordance to the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, S. A. Guttman, R. L. Jones, S. M. 
Parrish. (Eds.). Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980. 6 volumes, 5512 pp. 
Freud, Sigmund, On Aphasia [1891]. London: Imago Publishing Co., 
1953, xv 4- 105 pp. 
Freud, Sigmund, Cocaine Papers by Sigmund Freud, R. Byck (Ed.). 
New York: Stonehill, 1974, xxxix + 414pp. 
Freud, Sigmund, The Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to Wilhelm 
Fliess, Drafts and Notes: 1887-1902. M. Bonaparte, A. 
Freud, E. Kris, (Eds.). New York: Basic Books, 1954, xi + 486 
pp. 
Abstracts of the Standard Edition of Freud. New York: Jason Aronson, 
1974, 315 pp. 
"A Pagination Converter Relating the Gesammelte Werke to the Stan-
dard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sig-
mund Freud." G. H. Klumpner and E. S. Wolf. International 
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 52:207-224. 
Reference Aids 
Eidelberg, L., (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis. New York: Free 
Press, 1968, xxxviii + 571 pp. 
Fodor, N., and F Gaynor, Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1950, 208 pp. 
Greenberg, Bette, How to Find Out in Psychiatry: A Guide to Sources 
of Mental Health Information. New York: Pergamon Press, 
1978, 113pp. 
112 Reading Freud 
Grinstein, Alexander, Sigmund Freud's Writings: A Comprehensive 
Bibliography. New York: IUP, 1977, 181 pp. 
Kiell, Norman, Psychoanalysis, Psychology, and Literature: A Bibliogra-
phy. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1963, v + 225pp. 
Kiell, Norman, Psychiatry and Psychology in the Visual Arts and Aes-
thetics: A Bibliography. Madison, University of Wisconsin, 
1965, xiv + 250p. 
Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J., The Language of Psychoanalysis. Trans. D. 
Nicholson-Smith. New York: Norton (orig. 1967). 
Marmor, Judd, (Ed.), Modern Psychoanalysis: New Directions and Per-
spectives. New York: Basic Books, 1968, 732 pp. 
Moore, Burness and Fine, B.D. (Eds.), A Glosssary of Psychoanalytic 
Terms and Concepts. New York: American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 1967, 96pp. 
Nagera, Humberto (Ed.), Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts of the Libido 
Theory. New York: Basic Books, 1969. 195 pp. 
Nagera, Humberto (Ed.), Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts on Metapsy-
chology, Conflicts, Anxiety and Other Subjects. New York: 
Basic Books, 1970, 233pp. 
Nagera, Humberto (Ed.), Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts on the Theory 
of Dreams. New York: Basic Books, 1969, 121pp. 
Nagera, Humberto (Ed.), Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts on the Theory 
of Instincts. New York: Basic Books, 1971. 136pp. 
Rapaport, David, The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory. New York: 
IUP, 1960, 158pp. 
Wolman, B. B. (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psy-
chology, Psychoanalysis, and Neurology. New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold, 1977, 12 vols. 
Indexes and Reviews 
Beit-Hallahmi, B. (Ed.) Psychoanalysis and Religion: A Bibliography. 
Norwood, Pa.: Norwood Editions, 1980, 182pp. 
Capps. D.; Rambo, L.; & Ransohoff, P., Psychology of Religion: A Guide 
to Information Resources. Detroit: Gale, 1976, 352pp. 
Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago Psychoanalytic Literature 
Index, 1920. 3 vols. Chicago: Chicago Processing Labora-
tories, 1971. 
Freud, Sigmund, Indexes and Bibliographies, Standard Edition, vol. 24. 
A. Richards (Ed.). London: Hogarth Press, 1974. 
Grinstein, Alexander, The Index of Psychoanalytic Writings. Series 1, 
vols. 1-5, 1956-1960; Series 2, vols. 6-9, 1964-1966; Series 3, 
vols. 10-14, 1971-75. New York: IUP. 
References 113 
Hart, H. H., Conceptual Index of Psychoanalytic Technique and Train-
ing. 5 vols. Croton-on-Hudson: North River Press, 1972. 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Cumulative Index 
1953-1974. New York: IUP, 1976. 
Klumper, G. H., "A Review, Comparison and Evaluation of Psychoana-
lytic Indexes", Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Asso-
ciation. (1975) 23:603-642. 
Pruyser, Paul, "Sigmund Freud and His Legacy: Psychoanalytic Psychol-
ogy of Religion." In: Beyond the Classics. C. Glock and P. 
Hammond (Eds.). New York: Harper, 1973, pp. 243-290. 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly: Cumulative Index 1932-1966. New York: 
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., 1969. 
Rycroft, Charles, A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. London: Pen-
guin, 1972. 
ON FREUD THE MAN 
Autobiographical and Family Accounts 
Bergmann, Martin S, "Moses and the Evolution of Freud's Jewish Iden-
tity." The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Sciences, 
(1976) 14:3-26. 
Bernays, Anna Freud, "My Brother, Sigmund Freud." American Mer-
cury, (1940) 51:335-342. 
Engleman, Edmund, Berggasse 19: Sigmund Freud's Home and Office, 
Vienna 1938. [photographs]. New York: Basic Books, 1976, 
153pp. 
Freud, Martin, Sigmund Freud: Man and Father. London and New 
York: Vanguard Press, 1957, 218pp. 
Freud, Sigmund, An Autobiographical Study. SE 20:3-74. 
Heller, Judith Bernays, "Freud's Mother and Father." Commentary, 
(1956) 21:418-21. 
Freud's Letters 
Freud, Ernest L., (Ed.), The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold 
Zweig. London: Hogarth, 1970, 190pp. 
Freud, Sigmund, The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence 
between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung. W. McGuire (Ed.), 
trans. R. Manheim, R. F. C Hull. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1974, xlii + 650pp. 
Freud, Sigmund, Letters. Selected and ed. by E. L. Freud. New York: 
Basic Books, 1960, viii + 470. 
Freud, Sigmund, Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund 
Freud and Oskar Pfister. New York: Basic Books, 1963,152pp. 
114 Reading Freud 
Freud, Sigmund and Karl Abraham, A Psycho-Analytic Dialogue: The 
Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham 1907-1926. H. 
C. Abraham and E. L. Freud (Eds.). New York: Basic Books, 
1965, xvii + 406pp. 
Robson-Scott, W. and E., trans., Sigmund Freud and Lou Andreas-
Salome: Letters. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
1972, 244pp. 
Shengold, L., "The Freud/Jung Letters" in Kanzer, M. and Jules Glen, 
(Eds.), Freud and his Self-Analysis. New York: Jason 
Aronson, pp.187-201. 
Accounts by Friends and Patients 
Andreas-Salome, Lou, Freud Journal of Lou Andreas-Salome. S. A. 
Leary, (Ed.). New York: Basic Books, 1964, 211pp. 
Binswanger, Ludwig, Sigmund Freud: Reminiscences of a Friendship. 
New York: Grune & Stratton, 1957, 103pp. 
Blanton, S., Diary of my Analysis with Sigmund Freud. New York: 
Hawthorn Books, 1971, 141pp. 
Doolittle, Hilda, Tribute to Freud. Balfour: D. R. Ondine, 1974, xiv + 
194pp. 
Dorsey, John M., An American Psychiatrist in Vienna, 1935-1937, and 
his Sigmund Freud. Detroit: Center for Health Education, 
1976, 213pp. 
Gardiner, M., (Ed.), The Wolf Man and Sigmund Freud. London: 
Hogarth, 1972, xiv + 370pp. 
Kardiner, A., M y Analysis with Freud. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977, 
123pp. 
Reich, Wilhelm, Reich Speaks of Freud. M. H. Raphael, (Ed). New 
York: Noonday, 1967, xvi + 294pp. 
Reik, Theodor, From Thirty Years with Freud. New York: Farrar & 
Rinehart, 1940, xi + 241pp. 
Ruitenbeek, Hendrik (Ed.), Freud as W e Knew Him. Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 524pp. 
Sachs, Hans, Freud, Master and Friend. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1945, 195pp. 
Weiss, Edoardo, Sigmund Freud as Consultant. New York: Interconti-
nental Medical Books, 1970, vi + 82pp. 
Wortis, Joseph, Fragments of an Analysis with Freud. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1954, x + 208pp. 
Major Biographical Accounts 
Brome, Vincent, Freud and His Early Circle. New York: W m . Morrow 
& Co., 1968, xii + 275pp. 
References 115 
Clark, R. W., Freud: The Man and the Cause. New York: Random, 
1980, xii + 632pp. 
Ellenberger, H., The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and 
Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books, 
1970, 932pp. 
Fromm, Erich, Sigmund Freud's Mission. New York: Harper, 1959, 
129pp. 
Grinstein, Alexander, On Sigmund Freud's Dreams. Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1968, 475pp. 
Jones, Ernest, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud. New York: Basic 
Books, 3 vols., 1953-57. 
Jung, Carl, The Freudian Theory of Hysteria (Collected Works vol. 4); 
The Theory of Psychoanalysis, C W 4; Freud and Jung: Con-
trasts, C W 4; Sigmund Freud and His Historical Setting, C W 
15; In Memory of Sigmund Freud, C W 15. All in: The Col-
lected Works of C. G. Jung. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1953-71. 
Kanzer, M. and Jules Glen. (Eds.), Freud and Self-Analysis, Vol. 1. New 
York: Jason Aronson, 1979, 308pp. 
Kanzer, M. and Jules Glen. (Eds.), Freud and His Patients, Vol. II. New 
York: Jason Aronson, 1980, 452pp. 
Mahoney, Patrick, Freud as a Writer. New York: IUP 1982, 235pp. 
Robert, Marthe, From Oedipus to Moses: Freud's Jewish Identity. 
Trans. R. Manheim. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1976, 229pp. 
Ruitenbeek, Hendrik M., Freud and America. New York: Macmillan, 
1966, 192pp. 
Schur, Max, Freud: Living and Dying. New York: IUP, 1972, xi + 
587pp. 
PSYCHOANALYSIS: HISTORY & THEORY 
History of Psychoanalysis 
Alexander, Franz and Helen Ross, The Impact of Freudian Psychiatry. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952, 305pp. 
Alexander, Franz and S. Eisenstein, Psychoanalytic Pioneers. New York: 
Basic Books, 1966, xvii + 616pp. 
Amacher, Peter, Freud's Neurological Education and Its Influence on 
Psychoanalytic Theory. New York: IUP, 1965, 93pp. 
Bettelhiem, Bruno, Freud and Man's Soul. New York: Knopf, 1983. 
Brandell, G., Freud: A Man of His Century. Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1979, xi + 110. 
Burnham, John C. Psychoanalysis and American Medicine: 1894-1918. 
New York: IUP, 1967, 249pp. 
Chabot, C. Barry, Freud on Schreber: Psychoanalytic Theory and the 
116 Reading Freud 
Critical Act. Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1982, 
171pp. 
Chertok, Leon and de Saussure, Raymond, The Therapeutic Revolution: 
From Mesmer to Freud. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1979, 
xiii + 226pp. 
Decker, Hannah S., Freud in Germany: Revolution and Reaction in 
Science 1893-1907. Psychological Issues (Monograph 41). 
New York: IUP, 1979, 360pp. 
Fine, R., A History of Psychoanalysis. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1979, 686pp. 
Gifford, G. E., Jr., (Ed.), Psychoanalysis,Psychotherapy, and the New 
England Medical Scene, 1894-1944. New York: Science His-
tory Publications, 1978, xxiii 4- 438pp. 
Hale, Nathan G., Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psycho-
analysis in the United States, 1876-1917, (Vol. I) New York: 
Oxford, 1971, xvi 4- 574pp. 
Klein, Dennis B., Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement. New 
York: Praeger, 1981, xvi 4- 198pp. 
Levi, K., Freud's Early Psychology of the Neuroses: A Historical Per-
spective. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978, 
314pp. 
Lewis, Helen B., Freud and Modern Psychiatry. New York: Plenum, 
1981, 247pp. 
Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. 4 vols. H. Nunberg and 
E. Federn (Eds.); trans. M. Nunberg. New York: IUP, 
1962-1975. 
Munroe, Ruth, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought: An Exposition, Cri-
tique, and Attempt at Integration. New York: Holt, Rine-
hart, and Winston, 1955, xvi 4- 670pp. 
Nelson, Benjamin, (Ed.), Freud and the Twentieth Century. Gloucester: 
Peter Smith, 1958, 314pp. 
Norton, Frederic, A Nervous Splendor: Vienna 1888/1889. New York: 
Penguin, 1979, x 4- 340pp. 
Roazen, Paul, Freud and His Followers. New York: Knopf, 1975, 599 
pp. 
Robinson, Paul A., The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, 
Herbert Marcuse. New York: Harper & Row, 1969, ix 4- 253 
pp. 
Sherman, M. H., Psychoanalysis in America. Springfield, Illinois: Charles 
C Thomas, 1966, xii + 518 pp. 
Stewart, W. A., Psychoanalysis: The First Ten Years. New York: Mac-
millan, 1967, 225pp. 
Wyss, Dieter, Depth Psychology: A Critical History. New York: Norton, 
1966, 568pp. 
References 117 
Whyte, L. L., The Unconscious Before Freud. New York: Basic Books, 
1960, xi + 219pp. 
Surveys, Critiques, Summaries 
Brenner, Charles, An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis. Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955, x 4- 224pp. 
The Course of Life: Psychoanalytic Contributions Toward Understand-
ing Personality Development. S. I. Greenspan and G. H. 
Pollock (Eds.). 3 vols. U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. D H H S Publication No. 80-786. 
Fancher, Raymond E., Psychoanalytic Psychology: The Development of 
Freud's Thought. New York: Norton, 1973, xi 4- 241 pp. 
Farrell, B. A., The Standing of Psychoanalysis. Oxford: OUP, 1981, 240 
pp. 
Feffer, Melvin, The Structure of Freudian Thought: The Problem of 
Immutability and Discontinuity in Developmental Theory. 
New York: IUP, 1982, 298pp. 
Fenichel, Otto, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. New York: 
Norton, 1945, 703pp. 
Fine, Ruben, The Psychoanalytic Vision: A Controversial Reappraisal 
of the Freudian Revolution. New York: Free Press, 1981, xiv 
4- 577 pp. 
Fliess, R., (Ed.), The Psycho-Analytic Reader: An Anthology of Essen-
tial Papers with Critical Introductions. New York: IUP, 
1948, xvii 4- 358pp. 
Freeman, Lucy, Exploring the Mind of Man: Sigmund Freud and the 
Age of Psychology. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969, 
150pp. 
Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays. Richard Wollheim, (Ed.), Gar-
den City, New York: Anchor Books, xv 4- 416 pp. 
Gedo, John, and George Pollock, (Eds.), Freud: The Fusion of Science 
and Humanism: The Intellectual History of Psychoanalysis. 
New York: IUP, 1976, 445pp. 
Hall, Calvin S., A Primer of Freudian Psychology. Cleveland: World 
Books, 1954, 137 pp. 
Holt, R. R., "On Reading Freud." In: Abstracts of the Standard Edition 
of Freud. New York: Jason Aronson, 1974, pp. 1-79, 315pp. 
Hook, S., (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy. New 
York: N Y U Press, 1959, xii 4- 370 pp. 
Holzman, Philip S., Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1970, xvi 4- 204 pp. 
Jahoda, Marie, Freud and the Dilemmas of Psychology. New York: 
Basic Books, 1977, 186 pp. 
118 Reading Freud 
Johnston, Thomas E, Freud and Political Thought. New York: Citadel 
Press, 1965, 160 pp. 
Lewis, Helen Block, Freud and Modern Psychology: The Emotional 
Basis of Mental Illness. New York: Plenum, 1981, 240 pp. 
Masling, Joseph, (Ed.), Empirical Studies of Psychoanalytic Theories. 
Hillside, N.J.: Analytic Press, 1983. 
Pribram, K., and Gill, Merton, Freud's Project Re-Assessed. London: 
Hutchinson, 1976, 192 pp. 
Ricoeur, Paul, Freud and Philosophy. New Haven: Yale, 1970, 573pp. 
Rieff, Philip, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. New York: Doubleday 
& Co., 1959, xvi 4- 397pp. 
Roazen, Paul, Freud: Political and Social Thought. New York: Random 
House, 1968, xii 4- 322 pp. 
Roazen, Paul, (Ed.), Sigmund Freud. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1973, 186 pp. 
Rosenblatt, A. D., and J. T. Thickstun, Modern Psychological Concepts 
in a General Psychology. New York: IUP, 1972, xiv 4- 348pp. 
Sarnoff, Irving, Testing Freudian Concepts: An Experimental Social 
Approach. New York: Springer, 1971, 276 pp. 
Sears, R. R., Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts. 
New York: Social Science Research Council, 1943, vii 4- 156pp. 
Shakow, D., and Rapaport, D., The Influence of Freud on American 
Psychology. New York: IUP,1964, 243pp. 
Sherwood, Michael, The Logic of Explanation in Psychoanalysis. New 
York: Academic Press, 1969, vii 4- 276pp. 
Strupp, Hans, An Introduction to Freud and Modern Psychoanalysis. 
Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, 1967, 101 pp. 
Sulloway, Frank, Freud: Biologist of the Mind. New York: Basic Books, 
612 pp. 
Trilling, Lionel, Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture. Boston: Beacon, 
59 pp. 
Wollheim, Richard, Sigmund Freud. New York: Viking Press, 1971, xix 
4- 292pp. 
Wollheim, Richard & James Hopkins, (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on 
Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
Yankelovich, Daniel, and William Barrett, Ego and Instinct: the Psycho-
analytic View of Human Nature—Revised. New York: Vin-
tage Books, 1970, xiv 4- 494 pp. 
JOURNALS AND PERIODICALS 
Periodicals frequently cited and most available to American readers 
are: Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, Journal of the American Psychoana-
lytic Association, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Psychoanalytic 
References 119 
Study of the Child, and the monograph series, Psychological Issues. The 
city where the journal is edited currently and the year of its initial volume 
appear after each title. 
Abstracts of the Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Ed. C. L. Rothgeb. 
US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. D H E W 
Publication No. 73-9007. 1972. 
American Imago, Detroit, 1943. 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, New York, 1930. 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, New York, 1941. 
The Annual of Psychoanalysis, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, 
1973. 
The Annual Survey of Psychoanalysis, New York, 1959. 
Bulletin of the Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine, New York, 
1961. 
Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, Topeka, 1936. 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, New York, 1964. 
Hillside Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, New York, 1979. 
The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, London, 1919. 
International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, New York, 
1971. 
International Review of Psychoanalysis, London, 1974. 
The Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, New York, 
1973. 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York, 1953. 
Journal of the Philadelphia Association of Psychoanalysis, Philadelphia, 
1974. 
Journal of Psychoanalytic Anthropology, New York, 1978. 
Journal of Psycho-History, New York, 1973. 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, Minneapolis, 
1945. 
Modern Psychoanalysis, New York, 1976. 
Psychiatry, Washington, D. C, 1938. 
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, New York, 1972. 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry: A Topical Journal for Mental Health Profes-
sionals, New York, 1982. 
The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, New York, 1916. 
The Psychoanalytic Review, New York, 1913. 
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, London, 1945. 
The Psychoanalytic Study of Society, New Haven, 1947. 
Psychohistory Review, New York, 1971. 
Psychological Issues, New York, 1959. 
Review of Psychoanalytic Books, New York, 1982. 
Samiksa, Indian Journal of Psychoanalysis, Calcutta, 1947. 
120 Reading Freud 
Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, Copenhagen, 1978. 
Sigmund Freud House Bulletin, Vienna, 1975. 
Foreign Language Journals 
Dynamische Psychiatrie, Berlin, 1968. 
Etudes Freudiennes, Paris, 1969. 
Fortschritte der Psychonalyse (Progress of Psychoanalysis), Goettingen, 
1964. 
Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse, Berne, Switzerland, 1964. 
Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse, Paris, 1974. 
Psychanalyse a L'Universite, Paris, 1975. 
Psyche, Stuttgart, 1947. 
Revista de Psicoanalisis, Buenos Aires, 1943. 
Revue Francaise de Psychanalyse, Paris, 1927. 
Rivista di Psicoanalisi, Rome, 1955. 
Zeitschrift fur Psychosomatische Medizin und Psychoanalyse, Goettin-
gen, 1954. 
INDEX 
Abraham, K., 34 
Absent-mindedness, 1-3 
Abstract ideas represented in dreams, 46-47 
Activity and passivity, 42, 53-54 
Actual neuroses, 32, 44, 52 
Adaptation, adaptive, 91-94 
Affect, 1-3 
in dreams, 47 
nature of, 8 
neurotic anxiety as, 31-32 
words and, 54-55 
Aggression, 62, 78-79, 84 
Aggressive impulses, 37, 82-83 
Ambiguity, verbal, 71 
Ambivalence, emotional, 47, 50, 53-55, 65, 71, 78 
Amnesia (see also Forgetting), 43, 102-109 
infantile, 5 
in neurotic patients, 46, 57 
Anal erotism, 6, 25, 53, 55, 62, 65, 67 
Anal sadism (see also Rat Man), 27, 55-56, 59, 66 
Analogies, 77 
Ananke (see also Necessity), 95, 103 
Animal phobias, 62-63 
Animals, 64 
Anna O., case of, 1-3 
Anthropology, 43, 73, 78, 90 
Anticathexis, 26, 43 
Antithetical meaning of primal words, 48-49, 69-73 
Anxiety, neurotic (see also Fear), 31-32 
as affect, 6, 8 
equivalents for, 33 
and repression, 35, 56 
as transformed libido, 5, 58 
Anxiety-dreams, 63 
Anxiety hysteria, 42 
122 Reading Freud 
Anxiety neurosis, 1-2, 36 
Archaic character of dreams, 27, 74, 105 
Art, 10, 31, 66, 72, 76, 84, 90, 102 
Association of ideas (see also Free association), 3-4, 48-49 
Attention cathexis (see Reality testing) 
Attention and parapraxes, 5 
Attraction of the repressed, 61 
Auto-erotism (see also Masturbation), 5, 24, 53 
Autonomy of the ego, 84-85 
"Avoidances," 42, 53, 73-74 
Bible, the, 64, 78, 88, 98 
Binding energy, bound cathexis, 33 
Biological factors, 27, 31-33, 43, 52 
Birth 
infantile theories of, 65-66 
trauma, 33 
Bisexuality, 60, 68 
Body, human, symbols for, 51 
Body image, 55, 59, 67 
Boys' 
relation to father, 55-57, 62-64, 77-78 
relation to mother, 64, 71 
Breast, 25 
Breuer, F., 2-3 
Brooding, obsessional, 55, 62, 64 
Brothers and sisters, 73-75 
Bungled actions, 4, 10 
Castration 
anxiety, 55, 63, 72 
complex, 58, 67 
symbols for, 60, 72 
threat of, 62, 66 
Cathexis of objects, 26, 43 
side-cathexis, 39 
Censorship (see also Superego), 72 
in dreamwork, 14, 19 
and formation of symptoms, 24 
and repression, 3-4 
Chance actions (see Symptomatic actions) 
Character, 12-13 
Children's fantasies, 58-59, 100 
Children (see also Infantile) 
dreams of, 14 
Index 123 
neuroses of, 41, 52, 60 
object-choice in, 47, 82, 86 
polymorphous perversion of, 55, 90 
Circumcision and castration, 104 
Civilization, 9, 35, 73-74, 76, 90-91 
Cleanliness, obsessional, 55 
Complemental series, 28 
Component (part) instincts, 6, 24, 27, 53 
Composite structures in dreams, 27 
Compulsion to repeat, 50-51, 52, 55, 63 
Condensation, 15-16 
Conscience (see Superego; Ego ideal) 
Consciousness (see also Unconscious), 5, 6 
Constancy, principle of, 29 
Contraries (see Opposites) 
Conversion hysteria, 48-51 
Coprophilia, 6, 54 
Counter-will, 2-3 
Creative writing (literature), 26, 66, 70-72 
Danger and anxiety, 74 
Dark, fear of, 33, 49 
Day-dreams (see also Fantasy), 12, 18 
Day's residues, 17 
Death instincts, dual instinct theory, 82-83 
Defense (see also Dream Censor; Reaction-formations; Repression; 
Sublimation; Symptoms) 
hysteria, 43-44 
secondary, 7, 91-92 
in obsessional neurosis, 52-60 
Dementia praecox, 30, 34 
Depression, 84 
Desexualization, 67-68, 83 
Development, 76, 95, 103 
"Dream-book" ancient methods, 15 
Dream censor, 1-3, 31-33 
Dream-content (manifest), 4, 16 
Dream-interpretation, 16-17 
in antiquity, 15 
by dream-books, 15 
by dreamer, 17 
technique of, 49-50 
Dreams (see also Anxiety-dreams) 
absurdity of, 13-14 
124 Reading Freud 
affect in, 33, 63 
censorship of (see Censorship) 
compared to jokes, 16, 20 
compared to myths, 62 
compared to parapraxes, 10-11, 17, 32 
compared to waking life, 29 
during psycho-analysis, 48-51, 66-67 
experimentally produced, 12 
forgetting of, 16, 63 
gaps in, 48 
hallucinatory character of, 14 
navel, 50, 54 
punishment, 62-63 
recurring, 48, 62 
regression in (see Regression) 
and religion, 17 
sense of, 20, 50 
and sleep, 15 
speeches in, 16 
strangeness of, 15-16, 32 
symbolism in, 15, 67 
typical (see also Illusion), 19, 63-64 
visual imagery in, 16 
wish-fulfilment in (see Wish-fulfilment) 
words in, 20 
Dream-thoughts (latent), 13, 17, 20, 48-49 
Dream-work, 4, 15-17, 104-106 
Drives (see Instincts) 
Dyspnoea, 49 
Economic factors, 92-93 
Economic Point of View, 22-23, 29, 38 
Education, 25, 91-92, 99 
Ego, 79 
and onset of neurosis, 2-3, 29-30 
reaction-formations of, 80, 86, 89 
relation of consciousness to, 83 
repression and, 55-57, 105 
resistance of, 38-39, 57 
structure and development of, 80, 92 
Ego-defense (see Defense) 
Ego ideal, 35, 65, 83-84, 89 
Ego-instincts (see also Narcissism), 28, 34, 67, 79 
Ego-interest, 76 
Index 125 
Erection, symbol for, 45 
Erotogenic zones, 44, 61-62, 67, 90 
Errors (see Parapraxes) 
Excretory functions, 61 
Expectation and anxiety, 32 
External world (see Reality) 
Feces (see also Excretory functions), 65-66, 86 
Fairy tales (see also Myths), 50-51, 56, 59, 62-63, 71 
Family complex, 43, 45, 79-80, 105-106 
Fantasy 
hysterical, 50-51 
incestuous, 62-63 
as material of dreams, 17-18, 19-20, 48-49, 50-51 
of neurotics, 29-31, 45-46, 55-56, 64-65 
sexual, 24-27, 38 
unconscious, 23, 35-36 
Fate, 93, 101 
Father, 47-51, 62, 78, 81-82, 95, 102, 108 
Father-transference to doctor, 43, 51 
Fear (see also Anxiety), 75, 77-78 
Fetishism, 53 
Fixation (see Compulsion to repeat), 6, 8, 22, 30 
Flight into illness, 7, 45, 53 
Folklore (see also Myths), 104 
Forgetting (see also Amnesia), 12-13, 22 
Free association (see also Therapy), 12, 42-43, 53 
Fright, 7, 22-23 
Gain from illness, 43 
Genetic point of view, 2-4, 53-54, 91-93 
Genital, 6, 48, 50 
Genitals, female, (see also Vagina), 51 
and castration complex, 58, 67 
symbols for, 49-50 
Genitals, male (see Phallic symbols) 
God (see also Spirits; Primal horde), 88, 94 
Goethe, 26, 34, 78 
Group psychology, 76-77, 79-91 
Guilt, sense of, 76 
and father, 66 
and religion, 87-89 
Hallucination, 14, 44 
Hamlet, 12, 41 
126 Reading Freud 
Hereditary factors, 41-42 
Hieroglyphics, 20 
Homosexuality, 47, 50, 66-67, 84 
Hypnosis, 3-4, 12, 85 
Hysteria (see also "Dora," case of), 22 
Breuer's theory of, 2-3 
compared to obsessions, 43 
Hysterical amnesia, 46 
Id, 79 
Ideal self, 66, 76 
Ideals and ideal-ego, 65, 102 
Identification, 53, 63, 83 
hysterical, 41-52 
narcissistic, 67-68, 82, 89 
religious, 64, 93, 108-109 
Identity, 102-103 
Imago (see Ideal self) 
Illusion, 76, 91-101 
Incest, 26, 73, 75 
Incestuous impulses (see also Oedipus complex), 67, 75-76 
Infantile (see also Children) 
amnesia, 26 
hopes and religion, 65-66 
masturbation, 55-56 
narcissism, 67 
phobias, 46, 61, 78 
sexual researches, 63-64 
sexual theories, 24, 66 
sexuality, 5-7, 18, 45, 53, 64, 66, 91 
Inhibition, 14 
Inner world, 64, 86 
Instincts (see also Drives), 58, 79, 82-83, 108 
Instinctual representatives, 6-7 
Internalization, 53, 63, 83, 93-94 
Interpretation of dreams, 12, 16-17, 18-21, 48-51, 62-63 
Inversion, sexual (see Homosexuality) 
Jews, 78-79, 95, 102-109 
Jokes, 3-4, 20, 36, 57 
Judgment, 29 
Jung, C. G., 33, 66, 80 
Kant, I., 74, 97 
Kissing, 44, 45 
Index 127 
Language, 47-48, 56, 71-72, 74, 81 
Latency period, 25-26, 91, 101, 106-107 
Learning, 100-101 
Legends (see also Myths), 107 
Libido (see also Sexual instinct), 5, 58, 79 
development of, 33 
fixation of, 28 
narcissistic, 81 
object, 26 
regression of, 5 
sublimation of, 24, 28, 52, 90 
theory, 5, 33-34 
transformed into anxiety, 31 
Linguistic usage, 80-81 
Love, being in, 79, 83-84 
and religious affection, 81-82, 88, 90 
Magic, 58-59, 76-77 
Manic-depressive states, 88-89, 92 
Marriage and dreams, 77 
Masochism, 58, 62, 88 
Masturbation (see also Auto-erotism), 47-49, 53, 55, 62 
Medicine and Psychoanalysis, 4, 32, 50-51, 53, 61, 64 
Megalomania, 35 
Melancholia (Depression), 84 
Memory (see also Amnesia), 2, 46, 49-50, 58, 107 
Men, symbols for, 62-64 
Metapsychology, 83 
Mishearing, 70 
Mislaying, 10 
Misreading, 10 
Model of the mind, 3, 6, 28, 46, 49, 59, 61, 86, 101 
Monotheism, 106-109 
Morality (see also Religion), 7, 29, 49, 53, 68 
Moses, 102-109 
Mother as child's love-object, 66-68, 71-72, 75 
Mourning (see also Melancholia), 74-75, 107-108 
Myths (see also Fairy tales; Legends), 51, 59, 74, 84, 94, 98, 103 
Names 
forgetting of, 13 
Narcissism, 33, 68, 73, 77, 88-89, 94, 97 
Narcissistic 
identification, 67-68, 82, 89 
libido, 77 
128 Reading Freud 
object-choice, 34, 79, 87 
Necessity, 93-94 
Negation in dreams, 5, 19-20, 47 
Neurology, 32 
Neuroses (see also Actual neuroses) 
Oedipus complex as nucleus of, 58 
onset of, 57 
precipitation cause of, 33, 43, 52 
predisposition to, 45 
prevention of, 61 
sexual aetiology of, 27, 48-49 
theory of, 32 
traumatic aetiology of, 3, 27, 44, 55 
Neurotic symptoms (see Symptoms) 
Neurotics, 30, 41, 52, 60 
characteristics of, 54 
compared to normal persons, 31, 92-93 
psycho-analysis of, 41, 52, 60 
tendency to transference in, 52, 72 
Neutralization, 79 
Normal persons, 1-3, 16, 24, 93 
Object-choice, 6, 84, 86 
development of, 5 
incestuous, 26, 50-51 
mother's breast, 7 
narcissistic, 82-83 
perversions, 24-25 
regressive, 76 
Object-libido, 6, 84-85 
lack of, in psychosis, 34-35 
Obsessional 
acts, 74-75 
brooding, 53-54 
ceremonial, 55, 99-100, 107 
cleanliness, 49 
doubt, 72 
ideas, 57 
impulses, 53 
Obsessional neurosis 
and anxiety, 53 
compared to hysteria, 53 
compared to narcissism, 34, 67-68 
curability of, 55 
Index 129 
"Rat Man" case, 52-60 
and religion, 67-68, 75, 100, 107 
transference in, 61 
Oedipal phase, 58 
Oedipus complex, 7, 18, 57-58 
and art, 26, 71 
and religion, 87-88 
Omens and auguries, 71, 75 
Omnipotence of thought, 71-73, 76-77 
Opposites (see also Negation) 
representation by, in dreams (see also Reversal), 15-17 
substitution of, in parapraxes, 19-20, 65 
Oral erotism, 45-46, 67, 78 
Organic pleasure, 25 
Organic illness, 50 
Orgasm, 84-85 
Orifices, bodily, symbols for, 49-50, 55-56 
Overdetermination, 45, 50-51, 64, 108 
Over-interpretation of dreams, 51 
Pain, 1-2, 7, 12, 23, 32-33, 88-89 
Parapraxes, 9, 39, 70 
compared to dreams, 4 
defined, 10 
sense of, 22 
somatic factors and, 53-54 
Parents 
and children, relations (see also Oedipus complex), 44-45 
symbols for, 63-65, 68, 71-72, 83, 93-94, 98-99 
Parricide (see Primal Horde) 
Passive sexual attitude, 60-62 
Periodicity (see Quantity) 
Persecution, delusions of, 34-35, 95 
Perversions, 6, 24-25, 27 
Phallic 
phase, 25-26, 72 
symbols, 51, 77 
Philosophy, 57-58, 66, 69, 91 
Phobias (see also Fear), 75 
Phylogenetic inheritance, 76-77 
Play, 58, 91 
Pleasure principle, 5, 25 
and reality principle, 18-19, 99-101 
Poetry, 90 
130 Reading Freud 
Pregenital sexuality, 6, 36, 67 
Prehistoric humans, 73-78, 94 
"Pressure" technique, 1-3 
Primal 
fantasies, 62 
horde, 87-88, 99, 106 
scene, 49, 60-61, 66-67 
Primitive humans, 30, 74-76, 91, 96 
Psychiatry, 21-22 
Psychic pain (see Pain) 
Psychoanalysis, 9, 47, 71 
and civilization, 98-101 
criticisms of, 42-43, 57 
of neurotics, 28, 41, 52, 60 
and psychiatry, 4, 21-22, 53, 77 
and religion, 76, 82-83 
resistance to (see also Resistance), 72 
therapeutic aspect of, 36, 99 
Psychoanalytic technique, 3, 22, 37-39, 97-98 
"fundamental rule" of, 38 
Psychology, experimental, 12, 71 
Psychoneuroses (see Neuroses) 
Psychoses (including schizophrenia), 34 
Puberty, 49, 55 
Punishment dreams, 18-19 
Quality, 29-30 
Quantity, 30-31 
"Rat Man," case of, 52-60 
Reaction-formations, 53-54, 56, 65, 77, 86 
Reality, 97 
frustration by, 30-31 
and phantasy, 71-72 
principle, 31, 107-108 
testing, 29, 85-86 
Regression, 86 
in dreams, 48-49 
of the ego, 58-71 
of libido, 68, 76 
and repression, 105-106 
Religion, 29, 73, 75, 78, 86, 97 
ancient, 57, 102-107 
modern, 62-63, 67-68, 78, 94 
opposed to psychoanalysis, 61, 64-65, 82, 94 
Index 131 
Repetition, compulsive, 50-51, 52, 55, 72, 87-88, 108 
Renunciation, 61, 108-109 
Repression 
and anxiety, 1-3 
and censorship, 24 
demonstrated by resistance, 23-24 
and dreams, 4, 13-14 
forgetting as outcome of, 12-13 
as function of the ego, 105 
lifting of, in creative art, 10 
lifting of, in psycho-analysis, 59-60 
and regression, 6 
and religion, 80, 87-88, 95, 103 
and symptom-formation, 55-56 
theory of, 80-81 
Resistance, 2-3 
and character-traits, 56 
to dream-interpretation, 12, 50 
of ego, 51 
intellectual, 12-13 
in narcissistic neuroses, 34 
overcoming of, in treatment, 37, 58 
and transference, 52 
Return of repressed, 59, 72, 74, 108-109 
Revenge, 51-52, 72 
Reversal, 44, 48-49 
Ritual, 58-59 
Sadism, 27, 68 
Satisfaction, 84 
Scopophilia, 55 
Screen memories, 18, 62, 67 
Secondary revision, 32, 54 
Seduction, 45, 61-62, 67 
Self (see Ego) 
Self-punishment, 55-56 
Sexual aetiology of the neuroses, 61 
Sexual aim, 5-6, 24, 89-91 
Sexual fantasies, 59-60, 84-85 
Sexual freedom versus asceticism, 6, 85-86, 88 
Sexual instinct (see also Libido), 32, 79, 85 
Sexual researches of children, 24 
Sexual symbolism, 48-49, 59-60 
Sexual theories of children, 25, 66 
132 Reading Freud 
Sexuality, 5, 7 
definition of, 24-27 
normal, 24, 33-35, 63 
pregenital, 18, 33-35 
Sign and signification, 20, 48, 50-51, 65-66 
Sleep 
and dreams (see Dreams and sleep) 
and waking life, 12-14 
Slips of the pen, 10 
Slips of the tongue, 11 
Speeches in dreams, 16-17 
Spirits, 75, 93, 98 
Sublimation, 24, 28, 52, 60, 68, 90 
Suggestion, 80-81 
Suicidal impulses, 44 
Super-ego (see also Ideals), 23, 35, 79, 84 
Symbolism 
in ancient thought, 49 
in dreams, 15, 49 
interpretation of, 65-66 
as a phylogenetic heritage, 76 
sexual, 48-49, 59-60 
Symptomatic actions, 3-4, 45-46 
Symptoms, neurotic, 22, 29 
compared to dreams, 3, 20 
curability of, 42-43 
as defense mechanisms, 22 
diphasic onset of, 24 
interpretation of, 29, 31 
mechanism of, 32 
as product of conflict, 49 
and repression, 30 
sense of, 22, 46 
as substitute satisfactions, 13, 32 
"typical," 54-55 
wish-fulfillment in, 10-11 
Taboos, 73-76, 108 
Thinking (thought), 56-57, 76-77 
Thumb-sucking, 45 
Totemism (see also Religion), 73-78 
Transference, 36, 49, 52, 72, 79 
neuroses (see also Hysteria; Obsessional neurosis), 37, 51-52, 59, 61, 
107 
Index 133 
resistance, 38-39, 55-56, 67 
Trauma, 7, 22, 31, 33, 50-51, 66, 107 
Uncanny, the, 57-58, 69-73, 95 
Unconscious, the, 2-4, 22 
and dreams, 14, 51 
in normal persons, 9, 14 
relation to consciousness, 54-55 
and repression, 8-9 
Unconscious mental processes, 67 
Unpleasure (see Pain) 
Vagina, 66 
Verbal usage (see Words) 
Virginity, 90-91 
Waking life and dreams, 14-15 
War, 82 
Wish-fulfillment, 14, 57-58 
in dreams, 18-19, 27 
in fantasies, 50-51 
in parapraxes, 11, 15-17 
and religion, 64-65 
in symptoms, 46-47 
"Wolf Man," case of, 60-68 
Women, 71, 77 
sexual development of, 41-52 
symbols for, 100 
Words, 3 
Work (of ego), 91-92 







